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Abstract
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed a critique of the concept of beauty 
in art and philosophy (McGann 190), with Christopher Janaway 
characterising aesthetics as the Cinderella of philosophy who “doesn’t 
make it to the ball” (vii). However, since around 1980 an increasing 
number of artistic and critical voices have begun to speak about beauty 
once again. 
Anglophone novels of this period, from 1980 to 2012, show a 
particular engagement with the subject through their exploration of human 
beauty. By figuring the beauty of characters in metaphorical terms, they 
demonstrate that conceptions of human beauty as either a sinful, fleshly 
temptation or an abstract ideal can be transformed. Five specific metaphors 
through which this is achieved form the subject of analysis for this thesis: 
fruit, water, ice, glass and gold. Ten post-1980 novels are examined in their 
use of these metaphors to reformulate human beauty.
! The preoccupation with the transformation and rewriting of beauty 
will be shown to indicate a distinct  trend in post-1980 fiction, one which 
enacts a notable move away from fiction regarded as postmodernist. It will 
be demonstrated that the present concern with beauty  emerges from the 
emphasis on surfaces in postmodernist fiction (Waugh, Practising 
Postmodernism 4), but that contemporary novels are characterised by a 
reconstructive and transformative approach which is less evident in earlier 
fiction. 
 This transformative approach is directed to the division of beauty 
into concrete and abstract by philosophers such as Plato, Augustine, Kant 
and Adorno. In post-1980 fiction and the critical work of Wendy Steiner, 
Denis Donoghue, James Kirwan and others, this dichotomy is profoundly 
challenged. This thesis engages with these aesthetic philosophies in close 
readings of the ten chosen novels, to expound how the relationship between 
concrete and abstract human beauty is represented and rewritten in 
post-1980 fiction. 
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Introduction
 
Reintroducing Beauty
By drawing on a syntax of enchantment that conjures fluidity, ethereality, 
flimsiness, and transparency, writers turn solidity into resplendent airy 
lightness to produce miracles of linguistic transubstantiation. 
Maria Tatar, Enchanted Hunters: The Power of Stories in Childhood
 Jerome McGann writes in The Scholar’s Art that for “about a 
hundred years there has been something called ‘the death of beauty.’ 
Recently  people have been telling us that it’s time for beauty to come back 
into the eye of the beholder. But how does one make that happen?” (190). 
This thesis presents one way in which the revival of beauty  is already 
happening: in anglophone fiction published since 1980, which recuperates 
and reforms ideas of human beauty through the workings of metaphor, the 
“linguistic transubstantiations” from solid to ethereal described by Maria 
Tatar in the epigraph to this work. In asserting that post-1980 fiction 
demonstrates a notable concern with human beauty, and exploring the 
manifestation of this in a number of novels, this thesis makes a claim that 
spans the fields of contemporary literature and aesthetic philosophy. The 
analysis presented in this work knits the two fields closely together, as 
mutually  illuminating ways of examining the artistic representation of 
human beauty. The four fundamental arguments posited by  this thesis are as 
follows, and this introduction will explore each point in detail:
• Post-1980 fiction is deeply concerned with the aestheticisation of the 
world, and particularly of the human body.
• This concern grows out of the postmodernist emphasis on surface 
(Waugh, Practising Postmodernism 4), and its challenge to the idea of 
producing meaning through ‘grand narratives’: without these structuring 
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systems to govern the production of meaning, the aesthetic becomes a 
central driving force for fiction, and “rather than disappearing, has 
actually incorporated everything else into itself” (ibid. 5-6).
• The inheritance from postmodernist writing of a deconstructive attitude 
towards history has led post-1980 fiction to unravel the history  of human 
beauty and its artistic representation, and to remake it in alternative ways.
• This reconstructive and transformative approach is characteristic of 
post-1980 fiction.
Post-1980 fiction is deeply concerned with the aestheticisation of the world, 
and particularly of the human body.
 
 This thesis takes a selection of post-1980 novels that demonstrate a 
clear concern with human beauty. There are many more that  lie beyond the 
scope of this project, so ten key  novels have been chosen, spanning from 
the 1980s to 2012, which together indicate a particular trend in 
contemporary  fiction. This trend comprises an exploration of the conflict 
between the abstract and concrete aspects of human beauty — the idea and 
the body — and this conflict is investigated through metaphor. This conflict 
is part of the “sea change” observed by Jago Morrison in “understandings 
of the body and its relation to identity” in the last thirty years (40). Since 
the establishment of a “formal distinction between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ in the 
1960s” (ibid.) the concept that the body  is a discursive construct with both 
abstract and concrete aspects has become particularly significant to the 
novel, which explores the linguistic nature of the body and identity. 
Theorists of this period such as the psychoanalyst Robert  Stoller, in his 
1968 work Sex and Gender: On the Development of Masculinity and 
Femininity, emphasised and made explicit the constructed nature of gender, 
an idea which had been pioneered earlier in the twentieth century by  works 
such as Joan Riviere’s essay  “Womanliness as a Masquerade” (1929), and 
Simone de Beauvoir with her famous assertion in The Second Sex (1949) 
that “One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman” (249) through 
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socialisation. In The History of Sexuality (1976), Foucault asserts that the 
body is “a historical construct” (105) through which the “production of 
sexuality” (ibid.) takes place via “a great surface network in which the 
stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the incitement to 
discourse, the formation of special knowledges, the strengthening of 
controls and resistances, are linked to one another, in accordance with a few 
major strategies of knowledge and power” (105-6). With the advent of this 
conception of the body as “a discursively ordered product of 
institutionalized knowledge and power” (Saunders, Maude and 
Macnaughton 4), fiction in the second half of the twentieth century has 
been given the tools for analysing the body and its beauty through these 
“strategies of knowledge and power” (Foucault 106). 
 Human beauty entered this arena more explicitly in the 1990s with 
Judith Butler’s feminist theories asserting the socially  constructed 
performativity of gender in Gender Trouble (1990) and Bodies that Matter 
(1993), works contemporaneous with much of the fiction studied in this 
thesis. In Butler’s work, beauty is interpreted as part of the performance of 
femininity, a “discursive production that claims to be prior to all 
discourse” (Gender Trouble 54). Taking up Riviere’s ideas but  from the 
masculine perspective of the ‘Phallus’ as signifier of masculinity, Butler 
claims that if this “ontological specification of the Phallus is masquerade, 
then it would appear to reduce all being to a form of appearing, the 
appearance of being, with the consequence that all gender ontology is 
reducible to the play of appearances” (ibid. 47). 
 Surfaces, appearances and aesthetics then are key: a concern which 
will also be shown to be central to postmodernist fiction and theory. The 
implications of such a view are twofold: some feminist critics such as 
Naomi Wolf in The Beauty Myth (1990) and Germaine Greer in The Whole 
Woman (1999) regard this constructed beauty as an oppressive tool of 
patriarchy, responding to the advances of second-wave feminism: “The 
contemporary  backlash is so violent because the ideology of beauty is the 
last one remaining of the old feminine ideologies that still has the power to 
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control those women whom second wave feminism would otherwise have 
made relatively uncontrollable” (Wolf 10-11). Wolf states her claims boldly, 
with the result that the widespread success of The Beauty Myth propelled 
into the mainstream the concept of beauty as an impossible ideal that 
women have been persuaded to feel they  must achieve in order to be 
legitimate and successful as women and as individuals. Jane Gallop 
articulates this mode of thought in Thinking Through the Body, asserting 
that the way in which we “make sense of, rationalize, aestheticize our 
bodily  givens, our embarrassing shapes and insistent tastes is to transform 
them into a consistent style” (1988 13). In claiming that we stylise our 
bodies Gallop introduces the category of aesthetics into her arguments, 
demonstrating the endurance of beauty  as an inherent concern in 
discussions of the body. 
 Conversely, Elizabeth Grosz makes a claim for the specificity  of 
individual bodies, within the context of the body’s socially constructed 
nature, writing in Volatile Bodies (1994) that “All the effects of depth and 
interiority” (vii) of an individual’s identity, usually considered distinct from 
the body, “can be explained in terms of the inscriptions and transformations 
of the subject’s corporeal surface” (ibid.). We will return to surfaces 
repeatedly in this introduction, tracing the increasing importance of 
surfaces and appearances to postmodernist and contemporary  fiction and 
theory. In a similar move, Thesander argues that gender is a social and 
cultural construction which is then transposed on to the body as an ideal, a 
requirement: “Women have been made synonymous with their bodies, the 
cultural form of which was an expression of the specific meanings attached 
to them” (1997 9); in Butler’s terms, an “ideal construct  which is forcibly 
materialized through time” (Bodies that Matter 1). Beauty, in this view, is 
equally a product of discourse that is conflated with femininity to create “a 
female physical ideal” (Thesander 11).
 Fiction of this period, however, has frequently  adopted a more 
optimistic interpretation of Butler’s theories than is characteristic of 
post-1980 feminist works, without disregarding the oppressive potential of 
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human beauty  that these works explore. As Morrison states, “what we see 
in contemporary writing is a polymorphous rethinking of the body and its 
relationship  to identity  and experience” (42), in which novelists utilise the 
potential for change and transformation offered by a view of gender that is 
biologically unfixed, determined by a performance that individuals and 
social groups may consciously adapt to rework gender and beauty into new 
forms. From the perspective of gender, Alice Ridout has observed that 
younger, twenty-first-century  women writers such as Zadie Smith “feel far 
less anxiety about the woman writer’s entry  into text” (2) than their 
predecessors, of whom she cites Toni Morrison, Doris Lessing and 
Margaret Atwood. This thesis does not focus specifically on women writers 
although they happen to form the majority of the novelists studied, which 
can perhaps be attributed to human beauty having been addressed by many 
critics as a feminist concern — Butler, Wolf, Greer and Grosz for instance. 
However, the decrease in anxiety  noted by Ridout is evident more broadly 
in contemporary fiction, referring not just to human beauty  but to a 
widespread emphasis on transformation and reformation in the 
contemporary novel. 
 This pattern in post-1980 fiction has been described by Waugh as a 
sense of “celebration” (Metafiction 9), by  Mengham as one of “endless 
change” (2003 1) and by James as a period of “reconstruction” (3) with 
particular regard to literary  treatments of history. Worthington persuasively 
contends that “many contemporary fictions in fact explore and exemplify 
the creative, constitutive capacity of subversive linguistic play” (17), in 
contrast to the “aesthetics of negativity” (18) identified in postmodernist 
fiction. In a similar mode, Hoberek et al claim that twenty-first-century 
novels “share a perhaps surprisingly  consistent suspicion of modernism and 
(especially) postmodernism, suggesting that these categories may  be losing 
some of their sway” (9). However, Worthington and Hoberek are in a 
minority of critics who have explicitly noted a distinction between 
postmodernist and contemporary fiction. Arguably  this is an issue of time, 
so that it is possible now in 2012 to observe a shift in fiction from around 
1980 that had not  yet become evident for critics such as Edmund J. Smyth 
in 1991, who conflates the terms ‘postmodernist’ and ‘contemporary’ in 
arguing that “postmodernism has come to be used . . . to designate either 
negatively or positively the contemporary cultural condition as a whole . . . 
[or] describing the contemporary novel in general” (9). The difficulty in 
formulating a coherent argument that encompasses the work of a period still 
in flux is expressed in Mengham’s use of the same phrase as Morrison to 
describe contemporary fiction, a “sea change transforming fiction in 
English” (Mengham, 1999 1) in response to the “major alterations” (ibid.) 
undergone in “Perceptions of history, the environment and the politics of 
culture” (ibid.): a transformation which is still occurring. 
 Nonetheless, the attempt to analyse contemporary fiction is 
necessary  in order to understand, as far as possible, the developments in the 
novel which are presently unfolding. In particular the shift in attitudes 
towards beauty and aesthetics appears increasingly definitive of fiction in 
the contemporary  period; the process began in the 1980s when, as recorded 
by Dipple in 1988, “while Franco-American and ‘cultural’ academic critics 
denigrate the aesthetics of literature, fictionists continue to produce as 
though their activity counts” (4). Dipple’s statement offers an implicit 
acknowledgement of the significance of beauty and aesthetics to post-1980 
fiction: this thesis will demonstrate it in detail. Since the 1980s, criticism 
and theory  have begun to catch up  with the novelists in their renewed 
attention to the role of beauty  in fiction, matching the changes in 
perspective evident in post-1980 fiction by  “focussing less on formal and 
spiritual aspects and more on issues of ethnicity  and sexuality, gender and 
the body, history  and memory” (Childs 275) — a list echoed almost exactly 
in the chapter headings of Bentley’s 2008 work Contemporary British 
Fiction. 
 The present work is, necessarily, only able to tap into a limited 
range of these fields, but the focus on beauty and aesthetics is directly 
involved with questions relating to every element in Childs’ list. This 
accounts for the importance of studying beauty in contemporary fiction: it 
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acts as a vehicle for the exploration of these varied topics. As Heilmann and 
Llewellyn argue, fiction of this era engages in “a process of critique” (2) of 
its cultural and political contexts, with the particular intention to not only 
“deconstruct” (ibid.) but to subsequently “reinterpret” (ibid.). This thesis 
details the reconstructive and transformative character of post-1980 fiction 
through the lens of beauty, which is just one subject currently undergoing a 
celebratory rewriting in fiction.
 Recent works of criticism have adopted a range of approaches to 
beauty and the body, which will be examined in more detail in the overview 
of aesthetic philosophy and theories of beauty towards the end of this 
introduction. Saunders, Maude and Macnaughton state that the object of 
study for their essay collection The Body and the Arts is the “dynamic 
relation” (1) between the body and art, in which the body acts as 
“inspiration, subject, symbol, metaphor and medium” (ibid.). They also 
assert that a constant in this field has historically been “the body as real 
versus the body as ideal” (2), a tension whose present significance forms 
the subject of this thesis. The role of metaphor within this conflict is also a 
primary concern; not only  the metaphors employed by  novelists, but also 
those of philosophers and critics, and which all display a remarkable 
consistence. Waugh takes as inspiration a passage from Virginia Woolf 
which metaphorically  casts the body  both as glass and as wax, to ask the 
question, “Are we inside a body  ever buffeted, scraped and sculpted by the 
elements, alternately softening and hardening . . . ?” (ed. Saunders, Maude 
and Macnaughton 131). Similar metaphors of human beauty appear in the 
work of writers as varied as Plato, St Augustine, Immanuel Kant and 
Theodor Adorno — the four philosophers whose aesthetics are closely 
studied in this thesis — as well as the novelists and critics who engage with 
the same questions of beauty and its embodiment. Waugh continues, 
“metaphors reveal the bodily  grounding of cognition, undoing the 
transparency of concepts” (132): it is because metaphors traverse the gap 
between the abstract and the concrete that they are the chief object of 
analysis in this thesis.
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 The novels examined here present human beauty through a set of 
metaphors that  each parallel the conflict between abstract and concrete 
which is enacted in human beauty in contemporary  fiction. Like human 
beauty, the five metaphors — fruit, water, ice, glass and gold — are all 
physical in origin, each gradually  becoming abstracted and sublimated into 
an artistic form as the narrative of each novel progresses. Although a range 
of post-1980 novels are discussed in the chapters that follow, extended 
close analysis is presented of the following texts:
• In Chapter 1, Fruit, Margaret Power’s Goblin Fruit: A Novel (1987) is 
discussed in detail, with comparative discussion of The Other Side of the 
Fire (1983) by Alice Thomas Ellis and The Pleasure of Eliza Lynch 
(2002) by Anne Enright.
• Chapter 2, Water, closely analyses Lisa St Aubin de Terán’s Joanna 
(1990), Fingersmith (2002) by Sarah Waters and The Sea Lady (2006) by 
Margaret Drabble.
• In Chapter 3, Ice, detailed discussions of Alice Hoffman’s The Ice Queen 
(2005) and Eowyn Ivey’s The Snow Child (2012) continue the arguments 
of the previous chapters.
• Chapter 4, Glass, focuses on The Girl with Glass Feet (2009) by Ali Shaw 
and Possession: A Romance (1990) by A. S. Byatt.
• Finally in Chapter 5, Gold, Rose Tremain’s The Colour (2003) is 
discussed along with Venus as a Boy (2004) by Luke Sutherland.
 
 In each of the novels studied, a character is transformed into a work 
of art, through a manipulation of their beauty achieved through metaphor. 
In this way, sinful and fallible flesh is transcended, so that human beauty 
becomes purified and immortal in an artistic, textual form. The five 
metaphors all have extensive — and often interconnected — histories as 
metaphors for human beauty  in classical mythology, fairy tale and 
literature. By exploring their evolution through these fields, and their 
manifestation in contemporary  fiction, the thesis presents a history  of 
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human beauty from the angle of the tension between abstract and concrete, 
idea and flesh. This is achieved by  engaging with philosophies of beauty 
that address this question, and which will be discussed later in this 
introduction, in a chronological overview of aesthetic philosophies that 
discuss the concrete-abstract divide; the overview concludes with 
contemporary  discussions of beauty by Wendy Steiner, Denis Donoghue, 
Elaine Scarry, James Kirwan, Elisabeth Bronfen, Arthur Marwick, Jerome 
McGann, Dave Hickey and Marcella Tarozzi Goldsmith.
  
 In parallel — and in connection — to the contemporary concern 
with the body and its beauty, Susan Redington Bobby remarks on the 
“resurgence of works whose archetypal motifs allude to the genre [of fairy 
tale]” (7) in the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries, in one of many 
critical works discussing the postmodernist and contemporary fictional 
engagements with the fairy tale form. Stephen Benson’s description of 
Robert Coover’s use of a “dense, elaborately  loaded and knowing voice of a 
fairy-tale character bearing the full weight of experience” (122) can be 
extended to include not only much of the postmodernist fiction of Coover’s 
time, but also post-1980 fiction which consistently reutilises this style, 
elaborating fairy  tale plots and motifs into the detailed texture of novels 
which have not, however, retained the characteristically  postmodernist 
fragmentation and disjunction of Coover’s work. 
 This ‘knowing’ and experienced reworking of the fairy  tale is also 
characteristic of the particular trend described by  Redington Bobby as 
“feminist postmodern contemporary fairy  tale revisions” (7), the ambiguous 
conjunction of postmodern and contemporary  in this phrase accurately 
expressing the enduring connection between them (this work was published 
in 2009, so presumably it is broadly post-1980 writing that is referred to as 
contemporary). She cites as the proponents of this trend Margaret Atwood, 
Anne Sexton and Angela Carter, whose influential short story collection 
The Bloody Chamber of 1979 presents what Lorna Sage terms “a dazzling 
series of transformations” of traditional fairy tales (Contemporary Fiction, 
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1988 6). I am studying a later and wider range of writers, some well known 
(A. S. Byatt) and others less so (Luke Sutherland), and some who have only 
just made their debut (Eowyn Ivey), in order to trace the directions in which 
these postmodern fairy tale transformations have developed in more recent 
writing. 
 Susan Sellers encapsulates an important element of contemporary 
engagement with the fairy tale: “One of the strengths of reworking fairy 
tales, I would suggest, is precisely  the interplay  between the known and the 
new: like the good fairy, the presence of customary  elements reassures and 
underpins our daring to defy prohibition and go to the ball” (14). Since 
post-1980 fiction seeks to rework established representations of human 
beauty into new forms that both celebrate beauty but also resolve some of 
the ambivalence surrounding it, writers require a literary  form that 
facilitates such a process. Jack Zipes in Fairy Tales and the Art of 
Subversion identifies the fairy-tale form as a tradition which offers a way to 
address and resolve social issues, due to its inherently  transformative 
nature:
The tendency is to break, shift, debunk, or rearrange the traditional 
motifs to liberate the reader from the contrived and programmed 
mode of literary reception. Transfiguration does not obliterate the 
recognizable features or values of the classical fairy  tale but cancels 
their negativity  by showing how a different aesthetic and social 
setting relativizes all values. Though the liberating and classical 
fairy  tales may contain some of the same features and values, the 
emphasis placed on transfiguration as process, both as narrative 
form and substance, makes for a qualitative difference. (180)
 
The majority of the novels examined here — and many more post-1980 
novels — present reworkings of fairy-tale narratives and motifs, in a 
paradigm of transformation described by  Zipes that engages with both 
fictional forms and traditions, as well as contemporary  social, political and 
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cultural questions, especially those surrounding beauty in its varied guises. 
For instance, Andrew Teverson writes that Salman Rushdie’s fiction 
“reutilizes fairy tales in order to contest the models of social and cultural 
identity  that such narratives have, in their canonical forms, reinforced” (ed. 
Benson 48). 
 This inherent tension within the fairy tale form, especially in its 
postmodernist and post-1980 manifestations, between the promotion or 
subversion of social norms is a central concern of this field of criticism. 
Discussion of this conflict  is vital to the arguments of Cristina Bacchilega, 
who locates the emergence of strongly subversive aspects in fairy tale 
within its transformation into a literary form: “the tale of magic within a 
folk context was not and cannot be simply liberatory because within its 
specific community it would also, to some degree, rely on and reinforce 
social mores” (Postmodern Fairy Tales 7). What happens when the fairy 
tale is developed into a literary  form functioning in larger, more anonymous 
and less controlled public contexts is one of the subjects of this thesis, from 
the angle of human beauty. Bacchilega focuses on postmodernist fairy tales 
by writers such as Robert Coover and Donald Barthelme, and their use of 
metafiction and narrative fragmentation. However, Elizabeth Wanning 
Harries offers the insight that “the ‘postmodern’ narrative techniques 
Bacchilega so brilliantly explores are strikingly similar to the narrative 
preoccupations of [sixteenth-century writer] Giambattista Basile and of the 
late-seventeenth-century conteuses” (15). The fairy  tale has been adopted 
by postmodernist and contemporary writers because it already serves their 
transformative purposes, is already amenable to their narrative experiments. 
Marina Warner in From the Beast to the Blonde asserts that “On the whole 
fairy  tales are not passive or active; their mood is optative — announcing 
what might be” (xvi), thereby establishing their capacity to advance either 
repressive or emancipatory ideologies: however, Warner’s statement makes 
especially clear the fairy tale’s potential for utopian stories of ‘what might 
be’. As we shall see in the following chapters, post-1980 engagements with 
the fairy tale also make use of the utopian potential of the form, as well as 
15
its capacity for social critique. However, these rewritings are clearly distinct 
from their postmodernist predecessors, and rather than deconstructing fairy 
tale narratives to expose the discursive systems underlying them, 
contemporary  novelists are turning their transformative agenda to the 
metaphors and motifs of the fairy  tale. By placing these metaphors in 
specific temporal settings — usually the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries — recent novels examine their workings, their influence and their 
relevance to actual social situations. Zipes ascribes the potential for radical 
social change to the fairy  tale, along with other fairy-tale critics whose own 
preoccupations differ from Zipes’ Marxist position. Bacchilega, for 
example, adopts a feminist standpoint to argue for the repression of women 
through the fairy tale via the “long tradition of representing women both as 
nature and as concealed artifice” (9): the metaphor upon which she focuses 
to prove this is the magic mirror, because by “showcasing ‘women’ and 
making them disappear at the same time, the fairy tale thus transforms us/
them into man-made constructs of ‘Woman’” (ibid.). Here again is the 
transformative aspect of fairy  tale which Bacchilega goes on to explore in 
postmodern fairy tale fiction. 
 This thesis aims to extend this kind of criticism, analysing a further 
series of transformative fairy  tale metaphors through a slightly wider lens 
than that of gender. Important though the fields of gender and feminism are, 
and strongly connected to the study of human beauty, this is a different 
project intending to identify and explore a pattern that is becoming visible 
in post-1980 fiction, without implying or imposing socio-political agendas. 
Therefore, this thesis discusses fairy-tale rewritings in the context of Zipes’ 
identification of the fairy tale as a potent form capable of both reinforcing 
and reconstructing social mores, rather than ascribing to feminist 
interpretations by critics such as Bacchilega, Warner, Sellers, Kate 
Bernheimer (1998) and Merja Makinen (1992). Equally, their work 
primarily  studies fiction published before 1980, analysing the work of 
authors such as Angela Carter and Anne Sexton who belong more to studies 
of postmodern writing: this thesis casts light on their successors. In this 
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context, Zipes’ arguments are largely borne out by  the novels analysed in 
the following chapters, whose consistent use of fairy-tale symbols of 
human beauty as a vehicle for various transformations upholds both his 
claims for the form, and my own argument that transformation is a central 
theme and concern of post-1980 fiction — transformation of human beauty 
and its representation in literature.
 Not all of the novels examined in this thesis contain an explicitly 
fairy-tale element, but  each of the metaphors studied here do. The clearly 
emerging pattern within contemporary fiction of reworking metaphors of 
human beauty that have lengthy histories in previous artistic works, fairy 
tale or myth is fundamentally related to the transformative character of the 
novel now. As Zipes and other fairy tale critics have proved, the fairy tale is 
an eminently  changeable and versatile form — “metamorphosis defines the 
fairy  tale” (Warner xvi) — which helps to explain its prevalence in 
post-1980 fiction whose collective aim appears to be an ideologically and 
socially reconstructive response to the deconstructions of postmodernist 
writing. Tatar writes that, “In a world that has discredited that particular 
attribute and banished it from high art, beauty has nonetheless held on to its 
enlivening power in children’s books. It draws readers in, then draws them 
to understand the fictional worlds it  lights up” (76). Tatar is specifically 
referring to fairy  tales in her discussion of children’s books: as we have 
seen, the fairy  tale is no longer just for children, and it  has taken its 
fascination with beauty with it into adult literary fiction. 
 It thus becomes possible to recuperate and re-examine human 
beauty, both its fascinations and its dangers, through familiar metaphors 
that already carry cultural and historical associations. By addressing and 
then reshaping these associations — such as the fickleness and 
unpredictability of human beauty that has been frequently articulated 
through the metaphor of water, or the pursuit of human perfection and 
immortality  implicit in the metaphor of gold — post-1980 fiction can 
envision new and often subversive forms of human beauty using the 
transformative operations of the fairy tale and its metaphors. 
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 Max Lüthi observes in his influential 1947 work The European 
Folktale that “the folktale tends to render things and animate beings in 
metallic or mineral terms . . . shoes made of stone, iron, or glass . . . Golden 
apples are especially  favoured. Golden and silver pears, nuts, or flowers, 
tools of glass, or golden spinning wheels are some of the folktale’s regular 
accessories” (27). Tatar extends this to claim that fairy  tales “are committed 
to surfaces — to clarity, tangibility, and solidity  as well as to all that 
glitters, dazzles and shines” (73): the importance of beauty to the fairy tale 
is evident in this statement, both in its physical, tangible forms and also in 
its esoteric glitter. Tatar continues with the observation that the “chief 
components” of the fairy-tale articulation of beauty are “Metals, ice, glass, 
mirrors, silver and gold” (ibid.). My choice of fruit, water, ice, glass and 
gold as images worthy of study  is not, therefore, arbitrary: they  are 
traditional fairy-tale metaphors for magical metamorphosis, and a great 
many of these changes involve beauty. Cinderella with her glass slipper and 
Snow White with her poisoned apple and glass coffin are two of the 
strongest presences in recent fiction, while Greek mythology is also 
entwined with these images — the Midas myth reworked by Luke 
Sutherland in his protagonist’s transformation into gold, conflated with 
Cinderella’s slipper by Ali Shaw in The Girl with Glass Feet (2009), whose 
protagonist turns to glass from the feet up. These organic and mineral 
metaphors are so often employed by recent writers because they  explore the 
process by which physical human beauty can be transformed into other 
bodies and abstracted into metaphor. Such metaphors, therefore, are the 
tools with which Zipes’ radical fairy  tale can offer a reimagination of 
contemporary life, representing the real changes that are possible.
 
The concern of post-1980 fiction with human beauty grows out of the 
postmodernist emphasis on surface, and its challenge to the idea of 
producing meaning through ‘grand narratives’: without these structuring 
systems to govern the production of meaning, the aesthetic becomes a 
central driving force for fiction.
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 The period from 1980 to the present is one of transition and 
transformation in the novel, in which the “crisis of narratives” (Lyotard, 
Postmodern Condition xxiii) which characterises postmodernism maintains 
a strong presence, but  one from which writers are beginning to move on. 
Something new is afoot, but it remains intertwined with the old, and its 
agenda has not yet been clearly articulated either by literary works or 
criticism. Postmodernist fiction responds to and engages with the 
breakdown of established systems of knowledge in the second half of the 
twentieth century, leaving “the status of knowledge unbalanced and its 
speculative unity broken” (ibid. 35). Referring to the self-legitimating 
systems (or narratives) of knowledge, such as history, philosophy  and 
religion which had defined and directed the pursuit of ‘truth’ for centuries, 
Lyotard describes the “incredulity toward metanarratives” (xxiv) that 
prevailed during this period, and that comprises the legacy passed on to 
contemporary  writers and critics. However, Patricia Waugh noted in 1984 
that “The paranoia that permeates the metafictional writing of the sixties 
and seventies is … slowly  giving way  to celebration, to the discovery of 
new forms” (Metafiction 9). 
 While modernist fiction “sought to master the world’s messy 
contingency  from a position above and outside it” (McHale, Constructing 
Postmodernism 21), postmodernism on the other hand, “far from aspiring to 
master disorder, simply accepts it” (ibid.). Indeed, Ihab Hassan ascribes to 
postmodernist fiction a “fanatic will to unmaking” (89), though he 
acknowledges that it also displays the need (if perhaps not the achievement) 
of some kind of unity between its diachronic and synchronic 
experimentation (ibid.). Post-1980 fiction emerges from this scene with an 
acceptance of disorder that nonetheless resists transferring this mess into 
the structure and style of narrative. Instead, perceptions of disorder are 
unravelled, explored and moulded into a new form which yet remains wary 
of all-encompassing ‘wholeness’. The celebratory and transformative 
approach of post-1980 fiction is what distinguishes it  from previous 
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decades, and human beauty  is a particularly significant node of this 
transformation, since it involves questions of representation and the role of 
the human in art. 
 The “literary-historical fiction” of postmodernism as McHale called 
it in 1987 (Postmodernist Fiction 4), turns on questions of ontology and 
representation: he argues that postmodernist writing rejects the 
metaphysical centre (or totalising system) of esoteric ‘truth’ underpinning 
modernist writing — the “grand narrative” in Lyotard’s famous term (xxiii) 
— and from this position develops the features of fragmentation, aleatory 
structure, parody and self-consciousness which have become so well-
known (McHale, Postmodernist Fiction 4-5). For postmodernist writers, it 
is not an option to attempt to represent outer worlds as they ‘really are’ in 
the mode of realist texts, or indeed to represent the truth of inner worlds, as 
in modernist fiction. Representation itself comes under question, its history 
becoming the subject of self-aware postmodernist  critique. Linda Hutcheon 
explains the relationship of postmodernist writing to history  and 
representation in The Politics of Postmodernism; a work published in 1989 
and which itself demonstrates the simultaneous involvement in, and 
retrospective detachment from, postmodernism that post-1980 fiction also 
displays:
In a very real sense, postmodernism reveals a desire to understand 
present culture as the product of previous representations. The 
representation of history  becomes the history of representation. 
What this means is that postmodern art acknowledges and accepts 
the challenge of tradition: the history of representation cannot be 
escaped but it can be both exploited and commented on critically 
through irony and parody. (55)
In post-1980 fiction this postmodern struggle with the representation of 
history has evolved into a specifically aesthetic concern with 
representation: this is manifested in explorations of literary  style as well as 
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the concept of beauty. Richard J. Lane and Philip Tew detail how 
“Throughout contemporary fiction the adjacency of past and present 
becomes an aesthetic dynamic, a motive force for narrative, self-
identifications and cultural models in a changing society” (12). The 
significance of this ‘aesthetic dynamic’ stems from the shift described by 
Waugh in which the “playful irony, parody, parataxis” (Practising 
Postmodernism 5) and other features of postmodernist writing were 
transformed from mere “aesthetic practices” (ibid.) into a profound concern 
with the category of the aesthetic itself. This occurs because, as Waugh 
continues, if history has come to be considered as “a series of 
metaphors . . . ‘truth’ cannot be distinguished from ‘fiction’ and . . . the 
aesthetic, rather than disappearing, has actually  incorporated everything 
else into itself” (5-6). 
 Jameson remarks of Derrida’s essay  “Structure, Sign and Play in the 
Discourse of the Human Sciences” (1967), that “In this essay, which has 
sometimes been taken as the opening move in what we now call 
poststructuralism, it  seems appropriate to suggest that Derrida’s unmasking 
of the secret modernism of Lévi-Strauss constitutes a first step in the 
inauguration of a postmodernism based on play and randomness (in short, 
on the ‘aesthetic’ itself, when you stop to think about it” (Late Marxism 244 
emphasis in text). Theodore F. Sheckels emphasises the importance of 
surfaces in the postmodern aesthetic: “the postmodern eschews both 
supposedly realistic stories and less realistic mythologies for explorations 
of aesthetic surfaces” (ed. Gaile 85). Post-1980 fiction, as we shall see, 
attempts to reconcile ‘realistic’ narratives and descriptions with the 
awareness that these are indeed constructed narratives that rely more on the 
operations of their aesthetic surfaces than may be immediately apparent. 
Therefore, the concern with representation that continues from 
postmodernist through to more recent fiction arises from the influential 
poststructuralist “conviction that there could be no thinking separate from 
language, and that everything identified or designated as ‘thought’ was 
already in some more profound way a proto-linguistic event” (Jameson, 
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Late Marxism 234). Fiction has a crucial role in examining the value of this 
theory, and its implications, from the inside because it  is precisely the 
boundary between fiction and theory, or fiction and history, which is 
disputed. In particular, the conception of language as all-encompassing has 
important consequences for beauty, which becomes a linguistic 
phenomenon, and it is for this reason that post-1980 fiction explores so 
explicitly the process of creating and representing beauty  through linguistic 
metaphor.
 In the 1980s and after, the prerogative of self-reflection requires that 
postmodernism also be self-consciously examined, and the “self-conscious, 
self-contradictory, self-undermining statement” (Hutcheon 11) 
characteristic of postmodern writing is adopted by later fiction with a 
retrospective and contemplative detachment. The drive towards detached 
self-examination that emerged in postmodernist writing subsequently 
becomes a feature of post-1980 writing, and my argument regarding human 
beauty extends from this. In novels after 1980, postmodernist  self-
detachment is applied to explorations of human beauty: self-detachment 
develops so far that beauty becomes detached from the flesh which 
harbours it and is transformed into an abstract, artistic representation. By 
addressing beauty in this way, contemporary writers are able to engage with 
postmodern (and older) techniques of representation, while interrogating 
their significance to the present time, and transforming human beauty and 
its modes of portrayal into new and hybrid forms. 
 Recent fiction shows a marked engagement with beauty, in a revival 
that attempts some redemption of beauty  from accusations of being “far too 
pretty or sensuous or complacent to be taken seriously” (Steiner, Venus in 
Exile xvii), while still addressing the problems that arise from our perennial 
fascination with all things beautiful. Jameson’s 1981 work The Political 
Unconscious offers a useful example of the attitude towards theories and 
studies of beauty for the duration of the twentieth century until the 1980s: 
in emphasising his “essentially historicist perspective” (xi) Jameson is 
unconcerned with “the specificity of poetic language and of the aesthetic 
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experience, the theory  of the beauty, and so forth” (ibid.), clearly separating 
them from the “priority of a Marxian interpretive framework” (x). As a 
preeminent critic of the 1970s and early 1980s, Jameson’s relegation of 
beauty and aesthetics to critical irrelevance is typical of the era. 
 However, the literary scene has changed, and contemporary 
criticism is making the same shift as contemporary fiction, although the 
transition is by  no means complete. The study of beauty is no longer 
regarded as precluding a historicist  understanding of fiction: instead, 
post-1980 fiction engages in an exploration of the history of beauty, 
frequently in the specific context of human beauty. Jameson implies a 
prediction of this combined study of beauty and history, when he asserts, 
“The point is that in such a society, saturated with messages and with 
‘aesthetic’ experiences of all kinds, the issues of an older philosophical 
aesthetics themselves need to be radically historicized, and can be expected 
to be transformed in the process” (The Political Unconscious xi). 
 It is precisely this kind of transformative rewriting of previous 
conceptions of beauty which fiction began to pioneer after this time, in 
response to the highly aestheticised nature of twentieth-century culture 
described by Jameson. However, traditional modes of studying aesthetics 
must be overhauled: in his discussion of Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, to 
which we shall return in Chapters 2 and 3 (on water and ice), Jameson 
describes Adorno’s rejection of art as a universalised concept, abstracted 
into categories such “harmony, consonance, proportion” (Late Marxism 
158) in the manner of many philosophers from Aristotle to Kant. Instead, 
the implication of Adorno’s theories is that “the project of yet another 
philosophical aesthetics after this end of aesthetics as a philosophical 
discipline remains entangled in this dead conceptuality which it cannot 
jettison but must somehow untangle and provisionally readapt for new 
purposes” (ibid. 159). The contention of this thesis is that post-1980 fiction 
engages in the transformation of the category of the aesthetic through its 
particular focus on human beauty  and its representation in art. In this way 
the role of the aesthetic is transformed from two sides, in its manifestation 
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as beauty and as art. This claim is evidenced through close readings of 
specific works of art while resisting the generalisation of these texts under a 
universal concept or school of thought.
  
The inheritance from postmodernist writing of a deconstructive attitude 
towards history has led post-1980 fiction to unravel the history of human 
beauty and its artistic representation, and to remake it in alternative ways.
 
 The recent return to beauty as an important topic of study  and of art 
is best understood in relation to its historical treatment in aesthetic 
philosophy. Donoghue makes the useful distinction that “Aesthetics and 
theories of beauty  are not the same, because the theory of beauty may be 
concentrated on objects and appearances, but aesthetics is concerned with 
perceptions and perceivers” (43). A novel, of course, can accommodate 
both, and is the ideal forum for exploring the relationship between beautiful 
objects and their perception: what happens when an artist’s perception of 
beauty begins to overwhelm the beautiful person, engaging in the process 
of representing — and thereby transforming — the beautiful person in art, 
is unravelled in the novels studied here. Although I agree with Donoghue’s 
distinction between beauty and aesthetics, the two are nonetheless 
profoundly intertwined, and one important element of aesthetic philosophy 
has consistently been the division of beauty  into concrete and abstract. 
What follows here is a necessarily  brief overview of some of the major 
proponents of aesthetic philosophy, selected for their focus on the 
dichotomy of abstract and concrete beauty.
 Plato’s concept of beauty, in the Symposium in particular, is of a 
pure essence of beauty as the source of all other beauty in the world, taking 
in both physical phenomena and abstract ideas. Insofar as Plato offers a 
definition of beauty, it  is through “measure, moderation, and harmony” as 
Iris Murdoch explains (The Fire and the Sun 11). One can reach absolute 
beauty by  progressing from the love of “beautiful bodies” to “beautiful . . . 
thoughts” (Symposium 40-1; 210a-e), from which one can comprehend the 
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beautiful as “a single form” (41; 211b). Here of course is implied Plato’s 
famous theory  of Forms, which are the “pure objects of spiritual 
vision” (Murdoch 10) upon which the physical world is based, as a concrete 
(and inferior) manifestation of these Forms. Plato establishes a clear 
hierarchy within this system of beauty  in which fleshly beauty  is located 
firmly at the bottom. 
 The aim, ultimately, is to achieve an entirely abstract beauty: Plato 
adapts the perception of physical beauty into an attitude towards 
philosophical enlightenment, co-opting our love of beauty into acting as an 
incentive, a mere imitation of the condition of wisdom. So beautiful bodies 
and objects are metaphorical representations of the abstract form of beauty 
which has no physical being itself. A beautiful person is just a metaphor or 
symbol of beauty  itself, and an artistic representation of them is “a symbol 
of a symbol” (Brittan 11), even further from true beauty. For Plato, human 
beauty is only the first step towards perceiving the absolute, and once this 
stage is passed one should consider the beauty of a physical body as 
“something trivial” (41; 210c). Earthly beauties are also, in the Phaedrus, 
temptations to abandon the pursuit  of “beauty itself” (31; 250e1), in favour 
of “surrendering . . . to pleasure” like an “animal” (31; 250e5), placing in 
peril the noble, rational part  of the soul. Plato is not generally an enemy of 
human and natural beauty, but he does place them emphatically at  the 
bottom of his hierarchy of beauty, and those who fail to climb higher than 
that rung are irredeemably base and corrupted. 
 Equally, Plato’s well known denunciation of the arts arises from 
their adherence to physical beauty, so that  “literature shares its sister arts’ 
corruptive potential for inciting the passions” (Faas 17) by 
“misrepresenting reality” (ibid.) to make it more beautiful. Plato’s position 
regarding the arts is given some clarification by  Warry’s distinction that for 
Plato, the “effect of beauty in art  is different from that of beauty  in 
life” (84). Partee explores this matter in more detail, claiming that  the 
“beauty of all harmonious physical objects — if properly  regarded — can 
lift  the soul to a vision of pure beauty” (xi). To regard beauty ‘properly’ is 
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to view it  with the “spiritual vision” described by Murdoch (10) which sees 
beautiful objects as manifestations of the Form of beauty, but without 
intrinsic value in themselves except to elevate the soul of the perceiver. 
 Partee continues with the distinction that “language cannot for Plato 
raise man above physical appearances. Beauty in language presents a 
danger, for words are the only means by  which we can communicate 
ideas” (xi). This statement seems inconsistent, given Plato’s privileging of 
ideas over physical appearances in the Symposium. However, it is the 
connection of ideas with the empirical objects and scenes represented by 
literature which is problematic for Plato, since the fact that while “passive 
exposure to harmonious objects can instil harmony in the soul, language 
demands an active involvement of the mind” (Partee 1-2). Literature 
therefore draws the perceiver away from a ‘pure’ contemplation of beauty 
and further into the complexities of the empirical world. Plato’s emphasis 
on pure beauty also rules out the beauty  of living things according to 
Janaway, as true examples of beauty: presumably  this includes human 
beauty, because “living things are like pictures in that they excite desires 
and emotions, so that we cannot appreciate their beauty ‘pure,’ as we can 
that of a geometrical construction” (Janaway 70). 
 Post-1980 fiction, we will discover, explores the question of 
beauty’s purity — if this exists in any way at all, and how such an esoteric 
essence might actually be manifested in everyday life. The pattern that 
emerges from Plato’s insistence on purity in beauty continues throughout 
the history  of aesthetic philosophy, with the sentiment that Janaway 
observes in the Symposium, that “a sharp  distinction cannot always be made 
between ‘erotic’ and ‘aesthetic’ contemplation of human beauty” (79): a 
sentiment that reverberates through the centuries all the way to 
contemporary theory and fiction.
Aristotle dismisses the bulk of Plato’s visionary quest, instead 
asserting that beauty resides in function. Characterised by “order, 
symmetry, and delimitation” (Metaphysics 400; bk. Mu 1078b), something 
is counted beautiful when it is appropriately formed to fulfil its function. 
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This applies to people as much as to objects: in the Rhetoric Aristotle 
compares the beauty  of a young man, “his body useful for the toils of 
competition and force” (89; pt. 1 sec. 3 1361b), with an older man for 
whom beauty is “related to military service and combines a pleasant 
appearance with awesomeness” (ibid.). Although Aristotle regards the 
functionality of the human body as definitive to its beauty, he nonetheless 
stresses that  both a young and a mature man must have a pleasant 
appearance as well as an appropriately functional body. Function is key, but 
does not fully account for beauty. Warry writes that for Aristotle, “since 
order, proportion, and limit are the fundamental ‘causes’ of existence, 
beauty is in the same way to be treated as a fundamental cause” (87). This 
statement is more enlightening when read in conjunction with Aristotle’s 
statement in the Poetics that “fineness lies in magnitude and order” (10; 
50b 35), so that beauty arises from the most appropriate proportion and 
coherence of the material. Warry notes that  this material may be intended as 
either melody  or “the disposition of the limbs. It depends how one 
translates ‘mele’” (87). This linguistic ambiguity  implies a possible 
connection between human and artistic beauty, and critics such as Warry 
have indeed interpreted Aristotle’s philosophy of beauty as applying to 
both. In fact, Warry argues that Aristotle’s theory  of beauty  is in agreement 
with Plato’s, adapting the concept of beauty  as a “fundamental 
cause” (ibid.) to the assertion that there “is a primitive harmony to be 
discovered in certain objects of the phenomenal universe, of which beauty 
is an aspect or ingredient” (88). The statement does indeed contain echoes 
of Plato: in my opinion, Warry suggests a metaphysical component for 
which there is little evidence in Aristotle’s writings.
What is notable in Aristotle’s philosophy of beauty and art, 
however, is a relative synthesis of the abstract and the concrete which arises 
from his empirical focus, insisting on the study of observable, knowable 
phenomena while broadly  rejecting the speculative flights of metaphysics 
found in Plato. For Aristotle as for Plato, art is “a matter of representation 
or ‘imitation’” (Barnes 83), but  unlike his predecessor, Aristotle considers 
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art to represent the empirical world, not the metaphysical. This calculated 
argument considers the work of art primarily  in terms of criteria and 
function, denying beauty  any significant metaphysical quality. As Halliwell 
writes, art  for Aristotle “involves a true alignment of the axis of potential/
realisation in human productive activity: it is concerned with bringing into 
being, by  intelligible and knowledgeable means, objects whose existence 
depends on their maker” (46-7). Therefore, because of the concrete origins 
of art in the human individual who creates it and the empirical world it 
represents, beauty in art must be primarily concrete in nature. 
According to Gulley, Aristotle is dubious of literature’s moral value 
because “there is a close connection between using language to imitate 
something and using it to present what is fictional” (ed. Barnes, Schofield 
and Sorabji 168). In this way, literary art takes us even further away from 
truthful things. Schaper, however, offers a different  interpretation, arguing 
that Aristotle rises to the defence of the arts in response to Plato’s 
denunciation of them. She claims that while the mimetic aspect of art is 
negative for Plato it is a positive quality  for Aristotle, since “what art 
imitates is nature’s productive activity” (61), redefining the concept of 
imitation to mean, not that art is a mere imitation of an abstract form as it is 
for Plato, but instead that it presents “a semblance” (ibid.) which reflects 
and critiques empirical phenomena in a socially useful fashion.
In Aristotle, then, beauty  is neither highly lauded nor condemned, 
but his emphatically empirical study of concrete works of art and their 
observable effects fails to address the fascination of beauty, the intimation 
of transcendence that philosophers such as Plato identified in its 
manifestations. St  Augustine takes up  this question, concerning himself 
with the religious paradox of beauty’s appearance of goodness and its 
simultaneous potential to incite vice. De Ordine tells an allegorical story of 
reason’s progression from ignorance to the contemplation of the Christian 
divine. This narrative may be reminiscent of Plato’s ‘soul’ pursuing 
absolute beauty in the Symposium, but  the story’s content is distinctly 
Aristotelian. Reason as a protagonist, of course, has an inherent bias 
28
towards function and order, at the expense of rapture and pleasure. 
Augustine characterises the senses as tempting forces trying to divert 
reason from the true path to beauty, which is via the contemplation of 
mathematical design, since “nothing which the eyes behold, could in any 
way be compared with what the mind discerned” (trans. Russell 35). All 
earthly beauties are renounced as perilous and pointless distractions in 
accordance with Augustine’s Christian agenda, which is particularly 
suspicious of the metaphorical powers of physical objects: Brittan writes 
that everything “that exists in the physical world has a potential symbolic 
value, but Augustine needed to ensure that the interpretation of Scriptural 
symbols was not left entirely to the imagination of the individual” (25). As 
we shall see in Margaret Power’s Goblin Fruit, the capacity of human 
beauty to inspire a range of literary metaphors increases the fascination of 
this beauty, thereby leading the individual into carnal sin by privileging the 
body over the divine.
Sin and evil are, however, central to Augustine’s conceptions of the 
good and the beautiful, and which he returns to in his Confessions; this will 
be extensively discussed in Chapter 1. Nicholls describes the Platonic 
return in Augustine’s philosophy to a clear distinction between esoteric and 
fleshly  beauty: “The Beauty (capitalisation appropriate here) we should 
seek dwells in the realm of reason and the soul. Conversely, the beauty 
found in things of sense captivates negatively through ensnaring the mind 
on ground level” (5). Augustine himself in the Confessions is preoccupied 
with “Bodily  desire” which he describes as a “morass” (13; bk. II ch. 4). 
Physical existence is not itself to blame, as Nicholls is careful to observe; 
the mind is not  ensnared by beauty  because “the very ontology  of material 
things embodies what is evil” (5). Instead, when beauty  appears in a 
physical form it must not be regarded as a physical phenomenon, for that 
entails the danger of idolising a beautiful body which should only be 
appreciated as an example of the beauty of God. It is here that  the 
importance of the rational mind becomes clear, since for Augustine a 
perception of beauty can only be morally and philosophically pure if it is 
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perceived with the kind of rationality that finds mathematical designs 
beautiful. In fact, the dualistic nature of Augustine’s philosophy creates a 
fundamental split  in human nature: “Because the human mind is essentially 
intelligible rather than material, he classifies the human and angelic natures 
together, all other creatures being primarily physical” (Burnell 20). Such a 
distinction cuts a deep divide through human existence, casting its physical 
aspect as animal. 
In Chapter 1 this impasse is examined in more detail, through 
narratives by  both Augustine and post-1980 novelists who explore the 
difficulties of being both an animal and an angelic being, through the 
metaphor of fruit with all its associations with sin and sex. However, in an 
interesting turn, Babcock establishes that in Augustine’s philosophy, the 
“contrast between good and evil . . . contributes to the harmony 
(congruentia) and enhances the beauty (pulchritudo) of the whole” (ed. 
Lienhard, Muller and Teske 237). Human sin serves to accentuate God’s 
divine beauty by contrast  — though it must be viewed from a rationalised 
perspective — and in the autobiographical Confessions it is precisely  this 
apprehension of sin that converts the young Augustine to the beauty of 
Christian devotion. Beauty is, therefore, once again clearly separated from 
the empirical world and particularly from the human body, whose fleshly 
manifestations of beauty act as an incitement to sin.
In his brief discussion of human beauty in the Critique of 
Judgement (1790), Immanuel Kant extends the definition of physical 
beauty through functionality established by  Aristotle, even so far as to 
recycle his metaphor, describing “one whose rugged features might be 
softened and given a more pleasing countenance, only he has got to be a 
man, or is, perhaps, a warrior that has to have a warlike appearance” (61; 
bk. 1 sec. 16). Kant reserves his more detailed discussion for the 
relationship  between beauty  and art as we will shortly  see, but the 
difficulties that his aesthetic theories face in practical application is made 
very clear in his attempt to resolve the opposition of abstract and concrete 
beauty within the human form. He writes, “the ideal of the beautiful is still 
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something different from its normal idea . . . it  is only to be sought in the 
human figure . . . all that  our reason connects with the morally good in the 
idea of the highest purposiveness — benevolence, purity, strength, or 
equanimity, etc. — may be made, as it  were, visible in bodily 
manifestation” (66; bk. 1 sec. 17 emphasis in text). For Kant, then, the 
human form serves as a metaphor for genuine beauty  (which itself 
represents goodness), as the physical incarnation — the ideal, in his terms 
— of the rational idea that beauty resides in form and function. 
Unfortunately, this offers no illumination into our actual experiences of 
human beauty, as evidenced by  Kant’s bizarre assertion that  when 
considering the beauty of a man, “one gets a perception of the average size, 
which alike in height  and breadth is equally  removed from the extreme 
limits of the greatest and smallest statures; and this is the stature of a 
beautiful man” (65; bk. 1 sec. 17). In none of the other discussions of 
beauty examined here is ‘average’ synonymous with ‘beautiful’.
In establishing his philosophical system, Kant continues to aim 
towards the conjunction of the concrete and abstract within art, moving 
away from Aristotle’s and Augustine’s efforts to subsume beauty under 
rationality. Arguing that the feelings evoked in us by beauty are non-
cognitive, Kant fashions a place for sensual appreciation of beauty within 
his phenomenological philosophy: “If we wish to discern whether anything 
is beautiful or not, we do not refer the representation of it to . . . the 
understanding with a view to cognition, but by  means of the imagination 
(acting perhaps in conjunction with the understanding) to the subject and its 
feeling of pleasure or displeasure” (Critique of Judgement 35; bk. I). In 
claiming that our purely subjective response of pleasure or pain co-operates 
with our understanding in our judgement of an object as beautiful, Kant 
establishes the question of the perceiver’s role in the judgement of beauty, 
addressing the influence of their mediating mind on the beauty that they 
perceive. This is clearly shown in his answer to Augustine’s paean to 
mathematical design: “To apprehend a regular, purposive building by 
means of one’s cognitive faculty . . . is something quite different from being 
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conscious of this representation as connected with the sensation of 
satisfaction” (35-6). 
However, Lyotard contends that in the judgement of beauty the 
imagination and the understanding actually, for Kant, “compete with each 
other, one with forms, the other with concepts” (Lessons on the Analytic of 
the Sublime 73). The focus on processes of perception and judgement 
continues to be interrogated by post-1980 novelists, in their analyses of 
artists, muses and their metamorphoses from concrete to abstract beauty. 
Nonetheless, Kant does establish a set of criteria for beauty, focusing on the 
disinterestedness of our pleasure — a notion directly opposed to Aristotle’s 
argument for function. Drawing similarities with logical judgements — that 
these and aesthetic judgements, not driven by personal interests, can 
therefore be presupposed to be universally valid (42-3) — Kant places 
logical and aesthetic judgements side by side, each concerned with different 
aspects of human nature. J. M. Bernstein in The Fate of Art attributes great 
significance to this “categorial separation” (2) of art and aesthetics from 
cognitive spheres such as reason, justice and truth. Such a separation 
precludes art and beauty from participating in the production of meaning in 
these cognitive spheres, and so the aesthetic is relegated to useless trivia.
Wendy Steiner, in her important 2001 work Venus in Exile: The 
Rejection of Beauty in Twentieth-Century Art, considers Kant one of the 
central figures in the repression of beauty in art  and discourse. She argues 
that Kant privileges the awe and terror of his conception of the sublime, as 
a noble and masculine “model” (xxiv) for aesthetics, over the “pleasurable 
and complex reciprocity” (ibid.) brought about by beauty. However, other 
critics discussing Kant’s dichotomy of the sublime and the beautiful 
interpret his influence differently. Luc Ferry’s Homo Aestheticus offers an 
alternative reading of Kant, finding sentiment and the subjectivity and 
contingency  of beauty to be central to his aesthetics. Having “relativized 
and brought down” (Ferry 78) the notion of an abstract Absolute to “the 
rank of a simple ‘Idea’ of reason” (ibid.), Ferry  reads Kant’s reinstatement 
of the finite world as a progressive move away from the classical 
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domination of reason, most clearly illustrated by Plato’s Forms — which 
would have beauty  as an abstract, eternal essence. Although we should still 
be ruled by rational consideration, Kant regards the understanding and the 
imagination working in harmony, which is generated especially  in the 
perception of the beautiful. 
While Ferry is right to emphasise Kant’s challenge to the notion of 
absolute beauty, the Kantian understanding of beauty is still underpinned by 
ideals of purity — disinterestedness — which regard only  the most 
sequestered appreciation of beauty  as genuine, divorcing it from any 
engagement with the human empirical world. Allison in fact identifies two 
types of purity  as essential to a genuine judgement of beauty for Kant, 
arguing that, “Here ‘pure’ has both the negative sense of being purely or 
merely a judgement of taste, that is, a merely  aesthetic judgement based on 
feeling rather than a concept, and the positive sense of having an a priori or 
normative component. A judgement of taste must be pure in both senses if it 
is to be able to make a valid demand on the agreement of others, while still 
preserving its aesthetic character” (86). Therefore, the beauty of an object 
or work of art is distanced from the concrete existence of the object and 
sublimated into an a priori idea which can be objectively apprehended by 
everyone: there is no room for subjectivity  in Kant’s philosophy. In this 
there is an undeniable echo of Plato. 
McGann also identifies this tension within Kant, arguing that he 
“struggles to preserve a transcendental ground for human judgements in the 
face of the radical process of secularization set in motion by Locke” (20). 
In this struggle, beauty  seems to slip through the gap that opens between an 
aesthetics claiming legitimation from a transcendental source, and one 
which finds its legitimation in empirical grounds, as expounded by English 
philosophers such as Locke in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
(1689). James Kirwan, whose 1999 study Beauty will be discussed later, 
states in The Aesthetic in Kant that “it is noteworthy that, even as the 
secularization of thought once more appeared to gather momentum in the 
later nineteenth century, this form of aesthetics, which it would seem could 
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hardly  sustain itself without a commitment to something beyond the 
secular, nevertheless lost none of its hold” (3). Here again the fundamental 
conflict between abstract and concrete beauty is active, pursuing a 
transcendental essence of beauty and relegating “to a secondary order of 
practice” (McGann 20) fiction and other art forms that create or engage 
with beauty, an attitude which persists “until the cultural emergence of 
sensibilities we now associate with postmodernism” (ibid.). McGann’s 
statement implies that the postmodernist disintegration of the 
metanarratives that divide beauty into concrete and abstract has been the 
crucial move in enabling new conceptions of beauty, even if postmodernist 
fiction itself had little interest in doing so — rejecting the harmony and 
proportion associated with beauty is central to its agenda. Fortunately, the 
retrospective view on postmodernist fiction that is now available to 
contemporary  writers has brought the project of recuperating and reforming 
beauty into the foreground.
Steiner identifies the modernist  disavowal of beauty as the primary 
cause of the twentieth-century rejection of beauty  as an object of serious 
study. She traces this back to Kant, arguing further that the early twentieth-
century “hostility to the female subject and the beauty she symbolized had 
deep  roots in the past. It  arose from the Enlightenment notion of the 
sublime and from a disgust toward women and the bourgeoisie [who were 
strongly identified with beauty as a vulgar, uneducated pleasure] that had 
been building throughout the nineteenth century among increasingly 
disaffected artists and writers” (1). Such a claim is borne out by  critics such 
as Lyotard, who in “Return upon the Return” analyses Joyce’s Ulysses as an 
example of the modernist “counteraesthetic (an an-aesthetic) of the 
sublime” (Toward the Postmodern 197). The modernist evolution from 
Kant inheres in the use of the sublime to “assault . . . signifying 
syntheses” (ibid.) which construct fundamental connections between the 
general and the particular (198). Lyotard argues, in a mode that has become 
frequent in postmodernist writing, that these syntheses have for centuries 
“lent their signifying value to the signifier as well as foundation and 
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authority first to poetics and later to the aesthetics of the beautiful” (ibid.). 
Therefore, the postmodern deconstruction of beauty and rejection of 
aesthetics emerges from the modernist attack on artistic synthesis, the 
creation of the work as a deliberate, self-legitimating whole. According to 
Steiner, the modernist approach was inherited directly from Kant, although 
it should be noted in view of Lyotard’s analysis that the modernist sublime, 
which suborns the beautiful, also begins to challenge the ideal of wholeness 
which underpins Kant’s philosophy.
Following Kant, Schelling in his System of Transcendental Idealism 
(1800) presents a Romantic philosophy which places the artist and the ego 
(related to the imagination in Kant) at the centre of beauty’s production and 
perception. His philosophy is concerned with wholeness, in contrast to the 
categorical separation which underpins Kant’s work: Simpson explains that 
Schelling’s philosophy tends “toward a synthesis of everything (self, 
nature, science and religion)” (117) which we will see thoroughly  broken 
down in the twentieth century. However, although Schelling absorbs Kant’s 
establishment of the subjective and objective faculties as distinct but 
complementary, this partnership is adapted into a privileging of the artist 
who unites these contradictory principles in the work of art. 
This is Schelling’s definition of beauty, the artistic resolution of the 
tension between ideal and actual: since “these two activities [of the 
conscious and the unconscious mind] are to be depicted in the product as 
united, what this latter presents is an infinite finitely  displayed. But the 
infinite finitely  displayed is beauty” (Schelling 225; pt. 6 sec. 2c). This 
results in the dismissal of natural beauty, for example of the landscape 
(ibid. 226), which is no longer considered the instigator and object of art 
because the contradiction between conscious and unconscious, subjective 
and objective, is not present in objects such as mountains which are 
obviously unconscious and objective. Instead, art shows us natural beauty: 
“so far from the merely contingent beauty  of nature providing the rule to 
art, the fact is, rather, that what art creates in its perfection is the principle 
and norm for the judgement of natural beauty” (ibid. 227). 
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In this theory Schelling enacts a break away from Kant that is 
particularly significant to the question of human beauty, since as Steiner 
explains, “for Kant, any representation that evokes appetite is outside the 
realm of the beautiful; a notion of beauty as a human interaction rather than 
a ‘property of things’ risks the introduction of impure interests” (11). 
Schelling posits art as precisely and centrally a human interaction, a 
development which is vital to fiction that attempts to unravel the issues 
surrounding human beauty. Llewellyn details further the importance of 
symbol and metaphor to Schelling’s development of Kant, in that “the 
highest flight of the imagination will be symbolic . . . [in the sense that] 
neither does the general signify the particular nor does the particular signify 
the general, but in which these signifyings are absolutely one” (ed. Ross 
and McWalter 193-4). In this Schelling synthesises Kant’s categorical 
separation of the faculties of the imagination and the understanding, by 
extending Kant’s more tentative connection of these through the human 
process of artistic production — which is, for Schelling, a process of 
synthesis. He also opens the question of the role of the artist and the 
perceiver, and in each of the following chapters we will see recent novelists 
exploring the process of constructing artistic beauty, and the implications of 
this process for both the creator and the raw material. Aesthetics for 
Schelling, then, is concerned with artistic productions of beauty, and for 
him this beauty is elevated to “the ultimate and absolute expression of what 
is true and of value” (Simpson 117).
 Even though Schelling’s Romantic aesthetics continue to 
problematise beauty, particularly in its intensely  idealist conception of the 
value of beauty, it nonetheless represents progress which is particularly 
noticeable when compared with Hegel’s subsequent return to classical 
ideals, as Faas colourfully expresses it: Hegel “tried to rebuild those castles 
in the empty  sky  whither the butterfly wings of metaphysics had raised 
philosophers before Kant” (171). Writing in the 1820s-30s, Hegel moves 
back towards Plato’s subordination of the aesthetic sphere to the rational, 
arguing that art “reveals the absolute. It represents the absolute as spirit. 
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And it reveals or embodies the Idea” (Inwood xiv). This highly esoteric 
idealism has a very Platonic appearance, with Hegel placing an abstract, 
metaphysical concept at the centre of his philosophical system. 
Classical art (particularly ancient Greek art) is for Hegel the highest 
form because, as Desmond explains, the “classical formation yields the 
Ideal: the ideal form wherein an individualized and determinate unification 
of Spirit and sensuous embodiment is found” (ed. Maker 6). The privileging 
of classical art over Hegel’s other categories, the symbolic and the romantic 
is attributed to the fundamental connection within the classical of art and 
religion, which lends determinacy to the spiritual content of art. It is the 
lack of such determinacy that for Hegel renders the symbolic inferior, and 
the inward-looking lack of material determinacy that bedevils the romantic 
(ibid.). Beauty  in art, therefore, requires a delicate balance of the concrete 
and the abstract, with the concrete nonetheless subsumed to the influence of 
the metaphysical. In this sense, we will find a similar theory in Adorno, 
although the balance he advocates is couched in more antagonistic terms in 
the context of twentieth-century capitalism.
Equally, the same emphasis on moral and ideological purity 
encountered in Plato, Augustine and Kant is evident in Hegel: to “deny that 
there is an absolute is seen by Hegel as little more than a recommendation 
that we revert to this exclusively sensory and appetitive condition” of 
animals (ibid. xv). Hegel writes that art reconciles “the will in its spiritual 
universality  to its sensuous natural particularity” (Introductory Lectures on 
Aesthetics, 1886 59) by “revealing the truth in the form of sensuous artistic 
shape” (ibid. 61 emphasis in text). Essentially, this is another expression of 
the conflict between the concrete and the abstract, arguing that they  are 
reconciled in art through the mediation of the human mind — which in 
itself marries physical form with metaphysical thought. 
In his discussion of Hegel’s Aesthetics, Stephen Bungay argues that 
the crux of this reconciliation of concrete and abstract in art is beauty: 
“Beauty is art’s ideal because it is the centre, the point of balance between 
the mind and the senses which only  art  can reach, and to which the highest 
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value is attached . . . because in it, form and content are completely 
identical” (42). Hegel’s own writing in fact attaches particular importance 
to the concrete, in complete contrast to the philosophers we have studied 
before him. He claims that in art: 
[W]e have essentiality or universality, and particularization, 
together with their reconciled unity, and only such unity is the 
concrete. Now since a content, in order to be true at all, must be of 
this concrete kind, art too demands similar concreteness, because 
the purely abstract universal has not in itself the determinate 
character of advancing to particularization and phenomenal 
manifestation and to unity with itself in these. (Aesthetics, 1835 
70-1)
For Hegel, then, the abstract and universal concept is the object of pursuit, 
but it  cannot be attained or expressed except  in concrete form, and it is in 
art that this kind of fusion can be achieved. However, though this appears to 
redress the consistent  disavowal of the concrete, empirical world 
throughout aesthetic philosophy until this point, Hegel stresses that it is 
only in art that the concrete has this status. Equally, he continues that “this 
sensuous concrete thing, which bears the stamp of an essentially  spiritual 
content, is also essentially  for our inner [apprehension]” (71); it is only  by 
virtue of its connection with the abstract absolute that the concrete has any 
value, and it is not even appreciated in concrete terms. The abstract prevails 
again. 
Benedetto Croce heralds the twentieth century’s exasperation with 
ideal forms and ineffable truths, asserting in his entry on ‘Aesthetics’ in the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica (Fourteenth ed., 1929) that the “pure poet”, the 
“votary of pure Beauty . . . is no real figure but a caricature” (264). Beauty, 
for him, is not  the “innate idea” (265) that haunted Plato, Schelling and 
Hegel, but is instead an “a priori concept” (ibid.) brought into being by the 
objects and artworks that we deem beautiful, and by our perception and 
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discussion of them. Croce is equally scornful of the demotion of natural 
beauty from the sphere of aesthetic philosophy — and indeed the sphere of 
beauty — arguing that “The phrase natural beauty properly refers to 
persons, things and places whose effect is comparable to that of poetry, 
painting, sculpture and the other arts” (267 emphasis in text). It is the 
experience of beauty which links natural and artistic objects, and Croce 
denies any need to elevate one above the other. It is interesting, however, 
that this description nevertheless converts natural objects into human 
artistic creations in the moment that our mind views them as beautiful. 
Although Croce does acknowledge the significance of the natural in 
human experience and in the discourse of beauty, his contention is arguably 
another way of subsuming the inexplicable potency of natural beauty  under 
human agency. The claim, much like Schelling’s, that we make a natural 
object beautiful, remains lacking in justification. Perhaps what is implied is 
simply  the Kantian observation that all aesthetic judgements are subjective 
— flowers are only  beautiful to the human mind, and so beauty is 
reciprocally formed by the processes of perception. But it does not follow 
that this understanding of beauty should be referred to our experience of 
art, as if that is the guiding principle of beauty.
In Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic (1902) 
Croce modifies his previous elevation of artistic beauty by distinguishing 
aesthetic feelings from other kinds of experience. He claims that it is not 
the artwork itself which affects the perceiver but solely its content, in an 
echo of Aristotle’s contention that the function of art  is to represent the 
empirical world. Croce writes that these aesthetic feelings “do not trouble 
and agitate us passionately, as do those of real life, because those were 
matter, these are form and activity; those true and proper feelings, these 
intuitions and expressions”  (54). Moss offers the interpretation that this 
aesthetic feeling is “a cognitive yet emotive expression of the human 
spirit”  (37), and that Croce is in part redeeming the concept of feeling from 
its conventional consideration as “a turbid, obscure vibration of one’s 
brain”  (ibid.). Croce’s discussion of the experience of the aesthetic serves 
as a prelude to his discussion of the nature of beauty, which arises from 
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artistic expression: “Art is the expression of impressions, not the expression 
of expressions”  (1902 26). The artist in effect translates their experience of 
aesthetic feeling in response to something in the empirical world — it is the 
talent of the artist to discern what is essentially artistic in nature, which is 
non-artistic — into an artistic expression, a work of art. Carr summarises 
Croce’s definition of beauty thus: “Beauty is not truth and it is not 
goodness, but a value distinct in its nature from either. Beauty is successful 
expression” (161). 
Croce’s attempt to purge aesthetics of ineffable absolutes and focus 
instead on the implications raised by concrete instances of beauty was in 
part adopted by modernism, although the writers and artists of this 
movement emphasised purity  and clarity of image over beauty  (and purity, 
of course, is not a new ideal). T. E. Hulme, in his essay “Romanticism and 
Classicism” of 1924, opens with the declaration, “I want to maintain that 
after a hundred years of romanticism, we are in for a classical 
revival” (113), by rejecting the Romantic focus on emotion and 
individuality in favour of the classical pursuit of the “universal” (Brittan 
184) and abstract through art. Steiner claims that modernism privileges a 
masculinised ideal related to the Kantian sublime (xxiv), but T. S. Eliot, in 
“Tradition and the Individual Talent” (1919), stresses that  even the “semi-
ethical criterion of ‘sublimity’ misses the mark” when perceiving the value 
of an artistic work (55). Instead, it is “the intensity of the artistic 
process” (ibid.) that  counts — again placing the human artist centre stage, 
just like Schelling and the other Romantics towards whom the modernists 
were so hostile.
Zuidervaart makes the large claim that Adorno’s aesthetic 
philosophy is influenced by “Kant’s notion of beauty  as a symbol of 
morality  and Hegel’s view of art  as a semblance of truth; Marx’s critique of 
ideology and Nietzsche’s suspicion of the ideology of critique; Lukács’s 
emphasis on social totality  and Benjamin’s stress on artistic 
fragments” (xvi). What may  be concluded from this list  is that Adorno’s 
aesthetics explore the value of beauty and art as commodities in a capitalist 
culture with a deep suspicion of universalising concepts or systems; the 
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possibility of beauty and art retaining a moral or truth value in this context 
is the paradox with which he wrestles — a set of problems which have also 
preoccupied postmodernist and contemporary  fiction. Adorno offers a 
thorough assessment of the aesthetic in a broadly modernist era in his 
Aesthetic Theory, published posthumously in 1970. Covering the juncture 
from modernist writing towards postmodernism via two world wars, 
Adorno summarises the twentieth-century role for art as a self-reflexive and 
challenging medium which blossomed into the socially and formally  radical 
metafictions of the 1960s and 1970s.
In the face of the abnormity [sic] into which reality is developing, 
art’s inescapable affirmative essence has become insufferable. Art 
must turn against itself, in opposition to its own concept, and thus 
become uncertain of itself right into its innermost fiber. Yet art  is 
not to be dismissed simply by its abstract negation. By  attacking 
what seemed to be its foundation throughout the whole of its 
tradition, art has been qualitatively  transformed; it itself becomes 
qualitatively other. (2)
The creation of art is always violent  for Adorno, as the empirical 
world is forcibly translated into artistic form in a reflection of the collisions 
occurring throughout history: “The unsolved antagonisms of reality  return 
in artworks as immanent problems of form. This, not the insertion of 
objective elements, defines the relation of art to society” (7). The 
ambivalent nature of beauty comes to the fore in this argument, showing 
beauty to be part of the “affirmative essence” (2) of art, a force which could 
be capable of prompting social change; yet the generation of artistic beauty 
requires the suppression of art’s raw materials under the rigid rule of form. 
Baker states that both this affirmative nature of art and the process of 
producing art (in a twentieth-century  context) is always negative for 
Adorno: “Writing throughout the 1930s and 1940s, Adorno describes how 
the logic of commodification had required art  to appear autonomous in 
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order to fulfil that ideological role which Herbert Marcuse calls art’s 
‘affirmative character’” (33). Therefore, in order for art to be marketable as 
a commodity, it must appear to be autonomous from the exchange systems 
in which it operates, must seem to have some transcendental value. 
Jameson’s point must be noted, however, that with regard to the culture 
industry he discusses, “Adorno’s concern is with the entertainment business 
and not with a theory of the cultural sphere he would never have accepted 
in the first place” (Late Marxism 230). 
It is important to historically situate Adorno’s aesthetic philosophy 
within the rise of capitalist commodity culture in the twentieth century; 
“The irony which saw Adorno flee the ubiquitous propaganda of Nazi 
Germany only to find the same principles of domination at work in US 
advertising is less the product of Adorno’s prejudices than of history 
itself” (Baker 33). This context  makes Adorno’s work particularly relevant 
to this project, since the novels studied here all participate as commodities 
in the publishing industry — and they implicitly address this in their 
reevaluation of beauty and aesthetics, questioning anew the connection 
between transforming a person into a work of art and transforming them 
into a commodity. This question becomes explicit in the final chapter on 
gold, which functions in Rose Tremain’s The Colour and Luke Sutherland’s 
Venus as a Boy as a metaphor for a beauty which is necessarily a 
commodity, by virtue of the desire it evokes which propels it into a system 
of exchange. 
Nonetheless, there remains the potential within Adorno’s theories 
for art to escape the violent and repressive commodity systems in which it 
must now function, through an attempt at true autonomy which is likely, 
however, to push the artwork to the margins of the industry. Baker writes, 
“The truly  utopian yearning of relatively autonomous art is discarded by  the 
culture industry in its fusion of the aesthetic and the socio-economic. In its 
disavowal of autonomy, the culture industry indicates its refusal to posit the 
image or semblance of any alternative to actuality” (35). The implication of 
this statement is that artistic autonomy may be achieved by a utopian 
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envisioning of an alternative to the socio-political realities, by revisioning 
the role of the culture industry in relation to art. 
Post-1980 fiction is making subtle attempts to develop new utopian 
possibilities through such mechanisms as the rewriting of human beauty 
through metaphor: it  may not be forcefully revolutionary, but it is 
unmistakably  present. In particular, the choice of recent fiction to address 
the topic of aesthetics itself, to reassess the importance of beauty, appears 
as a direct engagement with the assertions of Adorno, and a challenge to the 
market forces of the culture industry from within its structure. J. M. 
Bernstein argues that art must do this by  challenging “its autonomous 
essence (autonomously), must, that is, acknowledge that its capacity to 
produce wholes is grounded in its distance from empirical reality, and 
hence acknowledge its wholeness as illusory” (196). In this postmodernist 
fiction’s metafictional resistance to internal coherence is clearly suggested, 
a paradox comprising both autonomy and constraint, wholeness and 
fragmentation, which postmodernist and contemporary fiction struggle to 
resolve. 
In post-1980 fiction, the figure of the beautiful person who is at risk 
of being subsumed by artistic form, turned into a work of art, engages 
directly  with the problems explored by  Adorno, and so his arguments will 
feature prominently in the Water and Ice chapters here. Further, Adorno 
repeatedly discusses the dual nature of art in terms of water and ice: 
freezing, thawing, dissolving and flowing are a central part of his lexicon, 
which in turn demonstrates the metaphorical power and significance of 
water and ice in relation to beauty. An assertion by  Jameson is particularly 
salient here: “the commodity form must somehow be made available and 
tangible in order for the activity  of its dissolution to have any point: the 
work must designate itself as a commodity in order to acquire the means of 
escaping that status” (181). Bradford observes precisely this strategy in 
fiction “over the past twenty years” (47-8), the increasingly “amorphous, 
transitory and superficial” (ibid.) nature of commodity culture results in 
fiction that “tends to be attuned to the demands of the marketplace” (ibid.). 
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However, anxieties remain within the generally  transformative and 
celebratory fiction of the contemporary period. Prosser remarks — 
specifically of 1990s American fiction — that “through all gender 
configurations, popular mediation, the reflection and construction of 
images, is evident” (9); in this we see the legacy of postmodernist fiction’s 
preoccupation with questions of representation as detailed by Hutcheon 
(55). Consequently, “In the image world, commodification of surface 
produces an anxiety about the body, the delusive lure of perfection. The 
hypergendered or hypersexual body  is a vehicle for consumerism” (Prosser 
9). From this the necessity becomes clear for post-1980 fiction to explicitly 
draw attention to its situation within the culture industry, exploring through 
metaphors of human beauty  the value of the aesthetic both as a commodity, 
and as a potential site of challenge to commodity culture.
Having observed the pattern of reactionary alternation throughout 
the history  of beauty and aesthetics, it  is not surprising that the late 
twentieth century has seen a rebellion against the hard, cold, purity of the 
modernist ideal, as noted by Steiner. Postmodern literature grew from a 
widespread discontent with established structures and conventions, in 
artistic, academic and social contexts. Aesthetics became a crucial site of 
challenge to convention, as Waugh writes in Practising Postmodernism: 
“Postmodernism, an art of the surface, was the contemporary period’s 
answer to Adorno’s ‘negative aesthetics’ of Modernism: an art which in 
making itself opaque and resistant to interpretation would, in its effective 
silence, refuse consumption even as it partook of a culture of 
consumption” (4). In the 1960s, when feminism was dismantling gender 
roles and the new wave of Marxism was questioning the global sway  of 
capitalism, structuralism and post-structuralism were helping literature to 
overturn its own rules of form as it addressed these debates. As Bacchilega 
explains in Postmodern Fairy Tales, “postmodern studies have advocated 
anti-humanistic conceptualizations of the subject, played with multiformity 
and performance in narrative, and struggled with the gender and sexual 
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ramifications of problematizing identities and differences” (19). These 
arguments make clear the importance of both aesthetics and human self-
examination to late twentieth-century fiction, and human beauty  is a central 
theme through which writers can attempt to explore and resolve the 
manifold issues of the time.
! Nonetheless, aside from feminist theory, which often addresses 
beauty as a side-issue or condemns it  as a tool of oppression, contemporary 
criticism and theory have not sufficiently matched this focus, primarily 
continuing to study the traditional objects of aesthetic philosophy: 
landscape and art. Denis Dutton offers one example of this in The Art 
Instinct (2009), which discusses beauty and art from the perspective of 
human evolution. Human beauty, however, does not come into it at all, even 
as the object or subject of artworks as it so frequently  has been. Denis 
Donoghue in Speaking of Beauty (2003) offers the insight that “modern 
theorists of beauty took natural landscapes or works of art . . . as their 
paradigm” (64) because “it  was difficult to go beyond the flesh” (ibid.); to 
discuss beauty in isolation from sexual and personal interests. 
 This thesis seeks to redress that balance and analyse the hitherto 
neglected presence of human beauty in anglophone novels published 
between 1980 and 2012. In engaging with and reworking metaphors of 
human beauty  that are part of the traditions of myth, fairy  tale and 
literature, fiction of this period explores human beauty through its 
connections to — and differences from — natural and artistic beauty. The 
novels studied here develop  webs of metaphor which conflate all three 
modes of beauty, resulting in a questioning of the natural and artistic 
elements of human beauty  and the tensions that arise from this dual 
manifestation. 
 Therefore, this thesis is structured around five metaphors of human 
beauty which appear frequently  in post-1980 novels, and which often 
connect with each other. These five metaphorical images — fruit, water, 
ice, glass and gold — are all natural in origin, but as the narratives 
containing them become more richly symbolic the natural aspect becomes 
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questionable: they are clearly being transformed into artistic constructions. 
The existence of a boundary between the natural and the artistic is thereby 
challenged, and since human beauty straddles this borderland it becomes 
the medium by which the challenge is further unravelled. When human 
beauty, which is so often represented in artistic forms, is portrayed through 
these metaphors the result is a range of investigations into the process by 
which human beauty is transformed into art. The flesh which physically 
constitutes this beauty is rendered textual and abstracted into quasi-visual 
linguistic images.
 The prevailing ambivalence towards human beauty evident in my 
chosen novels is mirrored in contemporary critical writing. In Speaking of 
Beauty Donoghue echoes Walter Benjamin’s claims in “The Work of Art in 
the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (1936), arguing that “a liberal society 
gets its way by making people feel that what they have to do coincides with 
what they want to do because it is accompanied by beautiful images” (6). 
The co-option of beauty to serve social, financial and political interests is 
particularly addressed in Goblin Fruit’s study of the artist’s muse who lends 
her beauty  to the canvas, in Fingersmith where human beauty is a vital part 
of an elaborate scam, in the self-conscious academic world of Possession, 
and in the commodification of people and their beauty in The Colour and 
Venus as a Boy. 
 The conflict of interests that render beauty both repulsive and 
appealing is encapsulated in Steiner’s lament that, “Far from a God-given 
virtue, beauty now appears an impossible ideal set by voracious financial 
and sexual interests” (Venus in Exile xx). Here already we can see a 
separation occurring between beauty as a physical, sensual phenomenon 
inciting desire, and beauty  as an abstracted value: in this case an exchange 
value in Marxist terms. Beauty can have a use-value, “realized in use or in 
consumption” (Marx, Capital 126) and constituting “the material content of 
wealth” (ibid.), as it  does in the Gold chapter in the form of sexual services, 
but in this process of commodifying human beauty it is transformed into an 
exchange value “characterized precisely by its abstraction from . . . use-
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values” (127). The very physicality of the desire for beauty  and beautiful 
people is what causes beauty to be abstracted from the human individual 
into a disembodied value, generating a conflict in fictional representations 
of human beauty around the paradox of its double incarnation.
Along with Steiner’s Venus in Exile, studies of beauty began to 
appear around the turn of the century in a reaction to its becoming 
“necessary to defend aesthetic pleasure” (The Scandal of Pleasure, 1995 
xi). Marcella Tarozzi Goldsmith clarifies the role of beauty  in post-1980 art 
and criticism, in the wake of postmodernism: “The beautiful is no longer 
considered vital because it is too superficial to rival the depths of the 
unconscious or to make us understand history” (1999 135). The implication 
of Goldsmith’s attribution of this event to the fact that “art must renounce 
the metaphysical constructions of the past” (136) is that the metaphysical or 
abstract aspect of beauty, which has never quite disappeared in discussions 
of the subject, may be to blame for its declining status throughout the 
twentieth century — until now. In an effort  to produce a new consideration 
of beauty for the twenty-first century, post-1980 discussions of beauty 
address ethics, questions of gender and cultural productions with a 
redemptive tendency to seek an alternative to the dichotomy of pure 
abstract beauty or impure concrete beauty, while simultaneously voicing a 
concern about the dangers of beauty as an impossible and harmful ideal, 
particularly for women. Donoghue in Speaking of Beauty takes up Croce’s 
strategy of studying “beauty  in its social manifestations, its discursive 
presence” (Donoghue 3), looking at beauty’s varied modes of existence in 
order to glean an overall idea of its workings. 
I will also be taking this approach, studying specific images and 
examples of beauty rather than seeking an abstract  universal within or 
beyond them but without  in any way dismissing philosophical methods, in 
the hope that the revival of beauty will follow Donoghue’s example in 
discussing concrete and abstract beauty in new ways. McGann articulates a 
similar view: “Beauty is immortal, then, not from its transcendental reality 
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as such but from our mortal experience of its perpetual flight” (20 emphasis 
in text). McGann’s location of the transcendental aspect of beauty not in an 
esoteric and unknowable essence but in the disjunction of transcendence 
and fleeting mortality occurring in the same experience, offers a useful 
summary  of the best contemporary approaches to beauty. In this manner the 
traditions of aesthetic philosophy, chasing the esoteric, are combined with a 
much more practical focus on actual artistic productions, instances of 
beauty and their socio-political implications.
Elaine Scarry  employs this method in Beauty and Being Just, a 
work of ethical philosophy. Finding her instances of beauty in vases, 
Matisse paintings and flowers, she argues that beauty has been discredited 
because it is regarded as trivial, distracting “attention from wrong social 
arrangements” (1999 58) and even “destructive” (ibid.) to the moral 
integrity  of both observer and observed. Her contention is that beauty  is in 
fact the greatest incitement to morality and justice because it evokes the 
desire to reproduce and distribute the beautiful object and, by  extension, all 
other good things in the world. Scarry’s claim rests on the concept of 
reproduction as central to beauty: “It seems to incite, even to require, the 
act of replication” (3) particularly in works of art, echoing Mothersill’s 
contention that “Beauty is characteristically  diffusive; good in itself” (1984 
2). In this she draws upon Plato’s definition of art as mimetic, necessarily 
producing only  copies of the abstract Form of beauty, but expunging the 
negative aspects of Plato’s attitude towards art. Instead, Scarry makes a 
dubious modification to Platonic philosophy, asserting that beauty’s 
evocation of “unceasing begetting sponsors in people like Plato, Aquinas, 
Dante the idea of eternity” (5). However, her arguments rest on a vague and 
largely ungrounded association of beauty with virtue — one of her central 
propositions is that “beauty is sacred” (23) — for which she has been 
criticised by Kacandes, who begins by stating that Scarry sets up her 
“bogey  adversaries” of beauty without “naming anyone specific” (2005 
156), continuing to argue that Scarry’s theories are purely speculative. 
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This line of criticism is forcefully  taken up  by  the historian of 
human beauty Arthur Marwick who rejects her esoteric approach, arguing 
that “This equation of copulation with artistic creation or the promulgation 
of legal systems is the sort of drivel, gift-wrapped in olde worldly terms 
like ‘begetting’, with which philosophers habitually confuse such issues as 
human beauty” (IT: A History of Human Beauty, 2004 10). Although 
Marwick distorts Scarry’s argument slightly in his critique (her “equation of 
copulation with artistic creation” (ibid.) is not nearly as direct as he 
implies) his emphasis on the need for a clearer acknowledgement of the 
concrete, physical aspect of human beauty is well justified.
Marwick’s historical approach considers beauty  to be in part  — but 
not purely — a social construct employed as a marketing tool in capitalist 
commodity  culture, in which “the received method of marketing products 
of every type is to associate them with a beautiful human being” (Beauty in 
History, 1988 13). However, although Marwick absorbs this element of 
Adornian aesthetics, his concern is to elucidate specifically  human beauty. 
He argues that the study of beauty  has been deeply partial because 
philosophers invariably  “deal with moral or aesthetic beauty, often 
representing the two as being inextricably intertwined, very few descending 
to the mundane topic of the physical appearance of human beings. This is 
because the eternal quest has been for a universal concept of beauty” (IT 1). 
Here Marwick offers an accurate summary of the aesthetic philosophies 
discussed in this work, and his emphasis on human beauty is timely and 
refreshing. Yet his explanation for this philosophical imbalance betrays his 
narrowly historicist methodology, as he claims that throughout history 
“Status and wealth were still the major criteria upon which people were 
judged; beauty was recognised, but was seen as dangerous and disruptive, 
fomenting lust, tempting young people into socially disastrous 
marriages” (ibid. x). In the twentieth century, he continues, beauty  has 
become “an independent characteristic” (ibid.) through its adoption by 
capitalism as a commodity. Although this presents an original angle on 
human beauty it is difficult to universalise Marwick’s claim that social 
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status has lain at the heart of considerations of human beauty: there must be 
more to it than that.
 Steiner’s Venus in Exile has already been discussed at some length, 
but it is worth adding here the socially  transformative theory of beauty that 
she presents as a possibility: in the attempt to resolve the tensions 
surrounding beauty and its uses, she writes, “I would offer a twenty-first-
century myth of beauty, freely adapted from the Hellenistic past: the story 
of Psyche and Cupid” (xxii). For Steiner, like Zipes, the fairy-tale form is 
ideal for rewriting our conceptions and representations of beauty, and here 
its interdependence with Greek mythology  is demonstrated, since the 
narrative of Cupid and Psyche is directly echoed in that of Beauty  and the 
Beast (the beautiful woman who cannot accept her lover in his un-beautiful 
form, and must then embark on a quest of atonement to get him back — at 
which point he is transformed into beauty). Steiner interprets this story as 
an articulation of the personal and social value of beauty: “This myth is a 
little allegory of aesthetic pleasure, as the soul, moved by beauty, becomes 
worthy of love and its delights” (xxiii). By extension, an appreciation of 
beauty untainted by  base interests can prompt one into acts of goodness 
which themselves generate more beauty in the world. Although Steiner 
aligns herself in opposition to the philosophy of Kant, this attitude bears 
distinct resemblances to his decree that a true judgement of beauty  involves 
no interests. This question of the purity of beauty and its appreciation will 
be explored further, particularly in Chapters 4 and 5 (Glass and Gold).
Feminist theory and criticism offers some of the most detailed 
interrogations of specifically human beauty, and although its political 
agenda often casts beauty  as a tool of oppression (for instance Butler, Wolf, 
Greer, Gallop, Grosz) some works such as Beauty Matters, edited by Peg 
Zeglin Brand, offer a wider range of perspectives. Eleanor Heartney’s 
foreword identifies causes for distrusting beauty: “The frightening 
consequences of the Aryan ideal, the obvious ethnocentrism of ‘universal’ 
standards of beauty, and the absurdity of the notion of a beautocracy” (xiii). 
She argues, however, that this is not necessarily  the fault of beauty, but 
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rather of those who manipulate it for their own ends. Equally, Brand’s 
introduction offers a reasonable — though by no means exhaustive — 
explanation for the lack of research into the significance of human beauty: 
“Given the central roles women’s bodies have played in the making of 
art . . . it  should come as no surprise that women have not dominated the 
academic ‘talk’ about beauty, that is, the philosophical, art-historical, and 
art-critical discourses” (5 emphasis in text). This has changed, however, in 
the past three to four decades, as women and men have reassessed and 
deconstructed these positions. Still, beauty continues to be most often 
gendered as feminine, if in more complex ways than previously, and the 
fundamental connection of philosophies of beauty with human physical 
beauty has not yet been fully unravelled. 
Another strand in feminist  studies of beauty has been the equation 
of feminine beauty with death. Taking as a starting point Edgar Allan Poe’s 
statement, “the death . . . of a beautiful woman is, unquestionably, the most 
poetical topic in the world” (“The Philosophy of Composition”, 1846 223), 
Tatar argues in Enchanted Hunters that “Beauty is often used as a mask for 
death, covering and concealing the presence of decay and corruption” (81), 
identifying in this metaphorical relationship some of the tension and 
ambivalence which we have seen surrounding the moral and social value of 
human beauty. Elisabeth Bronfen explores this question in more detail in 
Over Her Dead Body (1992), in which she adopts a psychoanalytic position 
to apply Freud’s theory of fetishism to the aestheticisation of death through 
the image of feminine beauty. She explains the “popularity of an aesthetic 
coupling of Woman and death” (60) with the assertion that we “invest in 
images of wholeness, purity and the immaculate owing to our fear of 
dissolution and decay” (62). Consequently, the repeated pairing of images 
of female beauty with death dissolves the boundaries between the two: 
death becomes beautiful and beauty becomes deathly. For Bronfen, this 
goes some way in accounting for the portrayal of human beauty as 
threatening and morally  questionable. I shall return to these arguments in 
Chapter 4 on glass, where the image of Snow White in her glass coffin — 
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also discussed by Bronfen — will be analysed in its contemporary 
manifestations.
The moral ambivalence of beauty is also evident in studies of 
beauty in visual art, as shown in the art critic Dave Hickey’s 1993 essay 
collection, The Invisible Dragon: Essays on Beauty, which he revised and 
re-published in 2009. Clearly he thought it necessary to expand upon his 
claim that while beauty does sell — itself or other commodities — that 
does not make it evil or dangerous. Bearing certain similarities to 
Heartney’s defence of beauty, he identifies and challenges the prevailing 
view that, “Beautiful art sells. If it  sells itself, it  is an idolatrous commodity; 
if it sells something else, it is a seductive advertisement” (8). He maintains 
that just because the undeniable enticement of beauty is used to manipulate 
our desires and purchasing habits, this is not necessarily the fault of beauty, 
and we must reassess our assignment of extreme moral positions to it, 
whether it is considered the highest good or the ultimate evil. 
It is relatively  characteristic of contemporary studies of beauty — 
even such disparate critics as Scarry and Brand — to vindicate beauty itself 
from charges of seduction and deception. Instead, the blame is placed on 
those institutions and individuals who use beauty to generate money or 
power. Although I agree that arguments in this mode are useful in enabling 
the open discussion of beauty, such approaches are at risk of celebrating a 
vague, abstract ‘beauty-in-itself’ that is to be equated with truth and virtue, 
whereas its specific manifestations are morally  dubious. This direction is 
likely to lead to the same impasse that has baffled philosophers from Plato 
to Hegel, creating a dichotomy of ideal versus real beauty  that forces 
beauty into a set of roles — as temptress, virgin, whore — which do not do 
justice to our actual experiences of beauty.
James Kirwan in Beauty (1999) distances his work from “the 
philosophy of art” (viii), claiming that in this field the term ‘beauty’ is 
employed “either without any meaning whatsoever, or given a meaning (for 
example, as a blanket term for the merits that art may possess) that is quite 
at odds with that normal usage which constitutes its meaning in the world 
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beyond” (ibid.). Kirwan draws on Croce and his contemporary 
Collingwood’s discussions of aesthetic feeling, and the various experiences 
of the beauty  of art and of empirical objects (including people) to conclude 
that beauty is fundamentally  related to desire — further, he implies that it is 
constituted of desire and is self-fulfilling. He writes, “This is the 
fundamental oxymoron of beauty. It  is the desire alone that  endures and, in 
enduring, itself provides that which is its end — beauty” (122). 
Beauty, therefore offers an “ateleological” (124) alternative to the 
driving teleology with which Kirwan characterises contemporary life. 
However, in asserting that beauty is an end in itself, a quality manifest  in 
the empirical world which offers intimations of the transcendent, Kirwan is 
not in fact proposing anything radically different to either Plato or Kant. 
Equally, the divide between abstract and concrete beauty  has become 
implicit in his arguments, but  is still firmly  in place. Nonetheless, this work 
demonstrates the drive of post-1980 theory  and criticism to explore human 
beauty in its own right rather than as an afterthought of aesthetic 
philosophy; the emphasis also evident in Donoghue and Marwick on the 
study of actual instances of beauty in conjunction with more abstract 
theorising is a promising beginning in this field.
 In order to develop a clear and accurate understanding of the 
concerns and workings of post-1980 fiction, this thesis engages in extended 
close readings of novels in conjunction with detailed study  of the aesthetic 
philosophers whose work analyses the same questions of concrete and 
abstract beauty. The employment of the metaphors under study — fruit, 
water, ice, glass and gold — in the writings of these philosophers is also 
examined in relation to the presence of the same metaphors in post-1980 
fictional narratives. Since contemporary fiction has not yet been 
comprehensively theorised in its distinctions from postmodernism, as this 
introduction has shown, it is most appropriate to study these texts on their 
own terms, that is, without imposing the systems and theories of a 
particular school of thought upon them. 
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 This thesis, therefore, does not engage in feminist, psychoanalytic, 
poststructuralist or Marxist interpretations of the texts except where the 
novel itself demands it, through explicit  or implicit participation in these 
modes of thought. For example, Byatt’s Possession is set in late twentieth-
century academia and directly  discusses feminist theories, and Sutherland’s 
Venus as a Boy explicitly questions the narrator’s status as a commodity 
when he works in the sex trade, invoking Marxist ideas. In response to 
these critical engagements in the texts under investigation I have 
correspondingly examined the role of these schools of thought in 
contemporary  fiction, but have resisted aligning the thesis as a whole to a 
single field. To do so would produce a very partial survey  of human beauty 
in post-1980 fiction, and the intention of this work is to let the novels 
define themselves, rather than subsuming them under previous definitions 
of fiction. 
 The choice of aesthetic philosophy as the primary critical field is 
designed to keep the focus on human beauty and the rewriting of its history 
in contemporary fiction, an agenda which this introduction has shown to be 
vital to the novel form after 1980. Equally, this thesis engages primarily 
with the philosophy  of Plato, Augustine, Kant and Adorno rather than with 
contemporary  discussions of beauty by critics such as Steiner and 
Donoghue, because these studies continue to be substantially informed by 
analysis of the earlier philosophers, rather than offering a genuinely  new 
theory  of beauty. Still, their new perspective is valuable in working towards 
a more fundamental reconception of beauty.
 Accordingly, this study also endeavours to analyse the five 
metaphors in question thoroughly, starting with an examination of the 
physical properties of fruit, water, ice, glass and gold — for instance, their 
molecular structure and physical behaviours — to ascertain what they really 
bring to a text. These qualities influence not only the images and concepts 
which are transferred to the beauty thus symbolised, they  also affect the 
structure of the narrative. For example, water appears in Margaret 
Drabble’s The Sea Lady first as a descriptor for the protagonist’s watery 
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beauty; fluid, sparkling, unpredictable. This watery lexicon is expanded 
into metaphorical passages figuring the character as a mermaid or a fish, 
crossing human boundaries into the realms of the animal and the mythical, 
and exploring how these representations affect the protagonist’s interactions 
with other characters. Ultimately the water metaphors infiltrate the structure 
of the novel, as the narrative (which alternates between the perspectives of 
various characters) blurs the distinction between different characters’ 
thoughts and between past events and present, flowing into an abstracted 
narrative concerned with the beauty of things. In the case of glass and gold, 
human beauty becomes increasingly  static, petrified into a statuesque 
attempt at immortality as the protagonist of Ali Shaw’s The Girl with Glass 
Feet finds her body turning to glass, and the narrator of Luke Sutherland’s 
Venus as a Boy turns into gold: here is portrayed an exquisite preservation 
of human beauty in artistic form, but it is lethal for the human individual.
 I have chosen philosophers and theorists whose aesthetics explore 
the problematic dichotomy of abstract  and concrete beauty, to help 
illuminate the processes by which the metaphors under study transform 
human flesh into art. Each metaphor is analysed in conjunction with a 
philosopher whose work also contains elements of this metaphor, so that I 
am able to trace the operations of the metaphor beyond the post-1980 
novels on which I primarily focus. Therefore, in Chapter 1 the fruit 
metaphor is explored in Margaret Power’s Goblin Fruit (1987) alongside St 
Augustine’s Confessions which feature a story of the author’s youthful theft 
of some pears — the fruit becomes a signifier for beauty, temptation and 
sin. 
 Chapter 2, Water, explores Adorno’s arguments in Aesthetic Theory 
regarding the violent  imposition of artistic form on “amorphous” (65) 
empirical nature, analysing the manifestation of this process in Joanna by 
Lisa St Aubin de Terán (1991), Sarah Waters’ Fingersmith (2002) and The 
Sea Lady by  Margaret Drabble (2006). In these novels, watery beauty 
constantly changes shape and threatens boundaries, a subversive beauty that 
resists containment in a single artistic form. Adorno’s figuration of 
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empirical material in watery terms as formless, chaotic and unpredictable is 
set in opposition to artistic form, which renders the formless material hard 
and fixed just as ice freezes water into form. 
 The third chapter on ice therefore extends the study of Adorno to 
examine a mode of beauty which is cold, hard and impermeable, fixed in its 
form — yet always menaced by the mutiny of the water which constitutes 
ice, making it  equally unpredictable. The narrative and metaphorical 
instability arising from this conflict is traced in Alice Hoffman’s The Ice 
Queen (2005), which rewrites Hans Christian Andersen’s fairy tale ‘The 
Snow Queen’ in a present-day  context, and The Snow Child by  Eowyn Ivey 
(2012), in which the protagonists find themselves apparently living out the 
fairy  tale of the same name, as a little girl they make out of snow comes 
miraculously  to life. Although icy  beauty  offers an image of immortal 
artistic perfection, this image is deceptive and subject to radical change at 
any time: ice can always melt back into water, its shape lost forever. 
 Glass, however, renders human beauty perfectly  clear and 
unblemished, as cold and hard as ice but not prone to melting. In this fourth 
chapter, Plato’s concept of an abstract ‘beauty in itself’ that  is divorced 
from the physical world is explored in relation to Adorno’s insistence on the 
violence of this separation, and the collision of the abstract and the concrete 
in art. A. S. Byatt’s Possession (1990) and The Girl with Glass Feet by Ali 
Shaw (2009) unravel the sinister consequences for human flesh of pursuing 
absolute and eternal beauty: Shaw’s figuration of glass as a metaphor for a 
perfect, immortal beauty illustrates the paradoxical dilemma in which the 
individual gains such eternal beauty  at the cost of their life. Byatt 
transforms the fairy-tale metaphor of the glass coffin into a multitude of 
metaphors expressing a cold, untouchable beauty, but  then manipulates the 
workings of these metaphorical images to negotiate an equilibrium of 
abstract and concrete beauty, within which her protagonists are able to 
sustain an untouchable beauty without sacrificing human connection, by 
detaching the individual’s beauty from themselves into an entirely 
metaphorical forum. 
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 Finally, in the fifth chapter the sublimated image of human beauty 
presented by  the glass metaphor is further abstracted into gold, a metaphor 
which eliminates even the image of human beauty (which can still be seen 
through glass), symbolising it in the exquisite mineral purity  of gold. Kant’s 
philosophy of moral purity and ‘disinterestedness’ in judgements of beauty 
is here analysed in relation to the entanglement of financial and sexual 
interests incited by gold and the kind of human beauty articulated in golden 
terms; these issues are examined in Rose Tremain’s The Colour (2003) and 
Venus as a Boy by Luke Sutherland (2004) using Marx’s theory  of use 
value and exchange value in the commodity.
By analysing five specific images of human beauty in accordance 
with the emphasis placed on the study of actual instances of beauty firstly 
by Adorno, then by  contemporary critics such as Donoghue, Marwick and 
Steiner, this thesis aims to expound how the relationship between concrete 
beauty and abstract essences of beauty is represented and rewritten in 
post-1980 fiction. Studying the metaphorical operations of fruit, water, ice, 
glass and gold through both their physical properties and their engagement 
with aesthetic philosophies, these images present an interlinked series of 
examples of the way in which fleshly human beauty is transformed into an 
abstracted work of art — and of the consequences of this change. Fruit, as 
the most fleshly  image, comes first, followed by the dissolution of forms 
and bodies enacted by water. This unfixed, chaotic vision of human beauty 
is then gradually  petrified, solidifying into ice, sublimated by glass and 
finally abstracted altogether in the mineral opacity of gold. Transformation 
is the key concept and driving force in each of the novels studied here, and 
in the argument put forward in this thesis. Transformative changes of state 
within fictional narratives allow readers to challenge the dichotomy of 
concrete and abstract beauty, as this division is blurred and manipulated in 
the text. As a result of this the novel form is also beginning to undergo a 
transformation, although it has not yet settled into a fixed state. Perhaps this 
is the point.
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Chapter 1
Fruit
He feeds upon her face . . . 
Christina Rossetti, “In an Artist’s Studio”
 
Since fruits are the matured and developed ovaries of a plant, it is 
no surprise that they have long been used as metaphors related to sexuality 
and reproduction, in art and literature throughout the world. But this is not a 
simple metaphor. When beauty is described using images of fruit, it is 
drawn into the natural cycles of the earth, and develops associations of 
growth and decay. Studying these images in ancient Greek and Norse 
mythology, fairy  tale, philosophical, religious and scientific writing — and 
of course post-1980 fiction — it becomes clear that fruity beauty acts as 
both predator and prey. It can consume its observers, and be consumed by 
them; it consumes itself, and grows anew from its own decay. Historically, 
the fruit metaphor has played a substantial part in portraying human beauty 
as both nourishing and potentially  poisonous, a paradox that taps into the 
uneasy partnership of desire and danger that we will find in every metaphor 
of beauty discussed in this thesis. As these metaphors transform human 
flesh into art, it is appropriate to begin with fruit: it remains fleshy and 
organic like the human body it  represents, but  draws away from the natural 
as apples turn golden and the human body becomes a still life. In 
contemporary  fiction, the static and artificial image of human beauty as a 
still life is examined as it decays under the pressure of changing social 
principles from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, and is grown into 
something new.
 Max Lüthi suggests the connection between narrative and natural 
cycles in his description of the fairy tale as “a world-encompassing literary 
fo rm” tha t “ r e f l ec t s a l l e s sen t i a l componen t s o f human 
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existence” (European Folktale 76). The natural cycles by which we observe 
growth and decay are themselves narratives developed as an aid to our 
understanding of our environment. And when fruit, an object intimately 
involved with, and representative of, these natural cycles as a synecdoche, 
is incorporated into a fictional narrative it brings along its implications of 
fertility and decay. In myth and fairy tale there exists an enduring 
metaphorical connection between fruit and people: in particular, human 
beauty is often described in terms of fruit. A key initial example from Greek 
mythology can be found in ‘The Judgement of Paris’, in which a golden 
apple is offered as a prize to the most beautiful goddess, fought over by 
Aphrodite, Hera and Athena (Capps 23). The flesh of fruit is metaphorically 
correlated with that of humans, both sharing the characteristics of 
desirability, soft fertile ripeness and the fallibility  implied in their inevitable 
decay. This chapter traces the evolution of this metaphor as it is employed 
to interrogate the nature and value of human beauty, figuring beauty 
variously  as an ideal, a temptation and a sin — characterisations which 
fiction since 1980 reworks and interrogates anew.
Fruit appears in all kinds of narratives and in a wide variety of 
disciplines as a representative of the cyclical process in which nature 
sustains itself: the new, growing element consumes the old and decaying so 
that together a fresh structure is formed. The fruit metaphor itself undergoes 
this process in its own artistic development, as post-1980 fiction absorbs 
the images and associations that have been attached to fruit since the 
ancient Greeks, pruning outdated concepts and watering others into further 
growth. When fruit appears in writings as a central element, remarkable 
parallels begin to develop  between apparently disparate narratives. The 
narrative structure of Margaret Power’s 1987 novel Goblin Fruit can be 
read in conjunction with the scientific account of fruit senescence (aging 
and decay) offered by Marianne Hopkins et al in “Regulation and 
Execution of Molecular Disassembly and Catabolism during 
Senescence” (New Phytologist 2007). Catabolism is a scientific metaphor 
that strings together the observable events of molecular breakdown, loss of 
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functionality and eventual death into the abstract idea of a single process, 
decay, repeating itself in all living entities. 
Both Hopkins’ and Power’s narratives are structured around the 
principle that the dead become fuel for the newborn. Reading the two texts 
together, it  becomes clear that their twinned descriptions of this process act 
as metaphors for a larger, more general cycle of regeneration that makes its 
way through all life. This principle applies to beauty  as much as to botany: 
there is only ever room for one dominant party, and the decline of one 
advances the rise of the next. This can be seen especially clearly in fairy 
tales: a poisoned apple acts as the catalyst for the rise of Snow White and 
the decline of her stepmother; the Brothers Grimm mention a “tree with 
golden apples [that] grows from buried intestines or the hearts of beloved 
animals”1; in the Italian tale ‘Apple Girl’ an enchanted girl who lives inside 
an apple emerges bloodied but liberated when her apple is viciously  stabbed 
(Italian Folktales, ed. Calvino 308-10).
Fruit in fairy tales is almost invariably magical, providing either 
healing, and often immortality, or punishment (Aarne-Thompson 207 and 
220). It performs both functions in Christina Rossetti’s 1861 fairy-tale 
poem Goblin Market, on which Power bases her novel2. Rossetti depicts 
sisters Laura and Lizzie, who are tempted by the “Bright-fire-like 
barberries,/ Figs to fill your mouth,/ Citrons from the South” (11) sold by 
sinister “goblin men” (12). Laura succumbs and wastes away almost to 
death having “sucked until her lips were sore” (20) on the fruit, bought with 
a lock of her golden hair: but she is saved by  Lizzie, who confronts the 
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1 In their introduction to the second edition of Kinder und Hausmärchen, 1819 (trans. 
Tatar, The Annotated Brothers Grimm 416).
2 Goblin Market has been extensively studied, from various viewpoints and with many 
agendas. Notably, feminist readings include Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar in The 
Madwoman in the Attic, Lynda Palazzo’s Christina Rossetti’s Feminist Theology and Tricia 
A. Lootens’ Lost Saints: Silence, Gender, and Victorian Literary Canonization. There are 
also many psychoanalytic readings such as Ellen Golub’s “Untying Goblin Apron Strings: 
A Psychoanalytic Reading of Goblin Market”, and economic interpretations, for instance 
Terrence Holt in “Men Sell Not Such in Any Town: Exchange in Goblin Market” and 
Elizabeth Campbell’s “Of Mothers and Merchants: Female Economics in Christina 
Rossetti’s Goblin Market”. As is clear from the titles, many of these readings overlap. 
Nonetheless, I am not ascribing to a theoretical framework beyond my focus on linguistic 
and conceptual metaphor: my concern is specifically with the operation of fruit as a 
metaphor in the poem, and as it is developed by Margaret Power.
goblins and brings back some of the fruit juices for which Laura pines. 
However, in Power’s Goblin Fruit as in many late twentieth-century 
reworkings of fairy tales, the traditional structures that lead virtuous 
protagonists to happy endings are subverted, not with the anarchic violence 
of 1960s and 1970s postmodernist fiction, but with a meditative 
manipulation that wonders how the broken pieces of fairy tale and literature 
might be put  differently together. Zipes argues that many literary  fairy tales, 
as works which continually engage with fairy-tale tradition, “reflect a 
process of s truggle agains t a l l types of suppress ion and 
authoritarianism” (Fairy Tales and the Art of Subversion 178 emphasis in 
text) in their efforts to modify  a tale to make it meaningful to the current 
social context. Since Power’s novel is an explicit rewriting of Rossetti’s 
fairy-tale poem, exploring its metaphorical connections between fruit and 
female beauty to address the place of beauty in 1980s Britain, Zipes’ stance 
is justified; Power’s sustained criticism of beauty’s figuration as a sinful 
temptation enacts precisely the kind of struggle against suppression — of 
women as carriers of dangerous and damning beauty — that Zipes claims is 
especially accommodated by the fairy tale form.
Using extracts from Goblin Market as epigraphs and setting her tale 
in mid-nineteenth century London – Rossetti’s own Victorian artistic scene 
– Power digs deeper into the metaphorical possibilities of fairy-tale fruit to 
tell a story of chaste maidens who wither on the tree, and plucked, ravished 
women who thrive on the juices of their dead sisters. Yet whether or not 
Power is aware of it, her alternative plot is neither new nor arbitrary: it  has 
been occurring in nature for millennia. As Hopkins et al write, “A 
distinguishing feature of senescence that sets it  apart from other types of 
programmed cell death is the recovery  of carbon and nitrogen from the 
dying tissue and their translocation to growing parts of the plant such as 
developing seeds” (201). Senescence, or the aging process, is a slow and 
useful kind of death, since the carbon and nitrogen that dying cells produce 
is transferred to new growth to be used as fuel. Decay nourishes nascent 
life. 
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The fairy tale form provides an appropriate vehicle for exploring the 
cycles of growth and decay because it presents people as parts of a whole, 
like leaves, roots and seeds that make up a plant. Each character has their 
own place and function within the plot: in Lüthi’s words, characters 
“unknowingly  find themselves at the point of intersection of many lines and 
blindly satisfy  the demands that the total structure places on them (64-5). 
The inescapable process of growth, ripening and decay that is so evident in 
the fate of human beauty is documented and lamented in the metaphor of 
fruit: the Greek myth of the beautiful Persephone (Proserpina in Ovid and 
Proserpine in Goblin Fruit), who must  spend half the year in the realm of 
the dead so that new life can emerge in spring, uses the life cycle of human 
beauty to express the cycle of the seasons which mirrors it. Significantly, it 
is because Proserpina has eaten seven pomegranate seeds (six in some 
versions) that she ties herself to the Underworld: she has entered into its life 
cycle and become part of its revolving physical existence (Ovid, 
Metamorphoses 200-1). 
It is a common fairy-tale trope that one must never eat in the 
otherworld if one hopes ever to leave. In the old English tale ‘Childe 
Rowland’ the eponymous hero is given the following advice when he sets 
off to rescue his brother and sister: “after you have entered the Land of 
Faery, bite no bite, sup no drop; for if in Elfland you sup one drop  or bite 
one bite, never again will you see Middle Earth” (English Fairy Tales 
197-8). As Diane McGee writes, “in eating, we transform food into our own 
flesh” (Writing the Meal 22), so once one enters the organic processes of a 
world, one is caught in their cycle and, having taken nourishment, will 
inevitably become nourishment in turn. What these narratives reveal is that 
human beauty does not simply decay and vanish; like the fruits to which it 
is so similar, a dying beauty actually fosters its budding successor whether 
it wants to or not.
So, when Goblin Fruit’s ethereal waif Ida (based on Lizzie Siddal, 
the short-lived wife and muse of Christina Rossetti’s artist brother Dante 
Gabriel), dies from an overdose of laudanum, her former friend Fanny — 
ripe, fleshy and concupiscent — rises to prosperity. The cycle is echoed in 
the second part of the novel, in which the death of the chaste young Eleanor 
allows her spinster cousin Eliza to blossom into sexuality and art — with 
Eleanor’s husband, Nicholas Suiter. Throughout, the painter Nicholas feeds 
on the beauty of these four women, sapping their lives to increase his 
artistic fruitfulness, just as the artist  in Christina Rossetti’s poem which 
opens this chapter feeds upon the face of his muse to produce a beauty 
“Fair as the moon”, not “wan with waiting” as she actually  is (Poems and 
Prose 52).3  Nicholas’ painting of Eliza as Proserpine is the final image of 
Power’s novel, clearly based on Dante Gabriel Rossetti’s painting 
Proserpine (1888) which also provides the cover art for the edition used 
here.
In this painting of dusky blues and browns, the contrasting crimson 
of Proserpine’s lips is matched only by  the red of the split pomegranate she 
holds, centering the fleshy  sexuality  of the painting in these two images. 
Both are full and ripe, deliberately proffered to us but held back by a 
restraining hand, just as Proserpine herself is both returned and retained by 
Hades in the myth. The small but provocative sliver of pomegranate flesh is 
a nod to the Baroque tradition, which, according to Albala, nursed an 
“obsession” (The Banquet 83) with fruit. He advocates the straightforward 
sexuality of fruit, and explicitly connects it with eating: “Even if fruit  was 
depicted as a symbol of decay, mortality, rebirth, or whatever, the sensual 
and almost erotic attention to the texture and glistening skin of ripe wet 
fruit gives some indication of how interested diners were in eating 
it” (ibid.). Here again the metaphorical connection of fruit and human is 
consolidated by the desire to assimilate one into the other, the eroticised 
appeal of the fruit described as enticing the diner like a bewitching female 
beauty.
D. G. Rossetti maintains this eroticism, though more subtly, at the 
centre of his painting with just a small slice of fruit. Alluding to the Biblical 
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3 Burlinson argues convincingly that ‘In an Artist’s Studio’ is “almost certainly” (Christina 
Rossetti 49) modelled on the relationship between Dante Gabriel Rossetti and Lizzie 
Siddal, as is Goblin Fruit.
image of the serpent in Genesis, the twist of Proserpine’s neck has a 
distinctly  serpentine appearance, borne out by the sinuous folds of her 
gown, supporting Eliza’s complaint in Goblin Fruit that Nicholas has 
painted her as “a veritable Lamia” (91-2). A figure of Greek mythology 
who was turned into a half-woman, half-serpent monster, Lamia is often 
connected with Lilith, of the Biblical Apocrypha. Lilith was turned into 
another such monster because of her refusal to lie beneath Adam, an 
insubordination echoed by Eliza in her determination to have Nicholas as a 
lover, but on her own terms as a fellow artist. Unfortunately, any obstacles 
in Eliza’s way, such as her cousin Eleanor, must be defeated and converted 
into fuel for Eliza’s efforts. It is perhaps the truth in Nicholas’ 
representation of her that troubles Eliza.
Having unravelled all these threads of association in one small 
section of Goblin Fruit, the immense productivity of the fruit  metaphor is 
evident. Power’s novel assimilates the Christian tradition that presents both 
women and fruit as sexual and sinful, an idea that has decayed over the 
twentieth century as women’s roles and rights have been interrogated. 
Power reincarnates the metaphor of the serpent and the stories of Lilith (and 
Lamia) in a positive rendering of an insubordinate woman, who 
manipulates her lover’s obsession with feminine beauty  into a liberated life 
for herself. The natural cycles of decay that feeds new life remains 
dominant, but not oppressive, as Power shows how to win the game without 
breaking the rules — a development from the compulsive rule-breaking of 
1960s postmodernist fiction, in which works such as Robert Coover’s 
Pricksongs and Descants (1969) deconstruct the narratives and metaphors 
of fairy tales into disjointed fragments, challenging the ascription of 
meaning to these components. In post-1980 fiction, however, the metaphor 
of fruit and its relation to beauty stays intact, but not unchanged.
 
64
Green and Golden Apples
One of the key fairy-tale images of life and sexuality  is the apple. Its 
history as a metaphor is very long, and includes a distinct pattern of 
association between apples and feminine beauty, representing beauty’s 
lustre and its decay. By 1629 there was an apple variety  in England known 
as ‘Woman’s Breast’, reflecting the ubiquity of the association as noted by 
Palter in The Duchess of Malfi’s Apricots and Other Literary Fruits (31). In 
the Walpurgisnacht scene of Goethe’s Faust (1808) the title character 
suggestively tells a young witch referred to as ‘Die Schöne’ (the beautiful 
one) that he has been dreaming of “an apple tree,/ on which two beautiful 
apples glowed” (122, my translation); the witch invites him into “her 
garden” (ibid.). Along similarly occult lines, Toussaint-Samat observes in 
A History of Food that “In esoteric cults and white magic the apple is the 
feminine symbol par excellence, associated with Venus. If you cut an apple 
vertically into two exact halves you can in fact see some resemblance to the 
female genital system” (621-2). Although there may  be some forcing of the 
connection in Toussaint-Samat’s halved apple, it supports the equation of 
women with apples that has been made so many times. 
The relation to white magic and also the occult (if you cut  an apple 
horizontally in half it displays “a perfect five-pointed star, the pentagram, a 
key to the occult sciences” (ibid.)) draws us back to the fairy tale, a realm 
of superstition and magic. Snow White is poisoned by  an apple whose 
white and red complexion mirrors her own, and it is only while a piece of it 
remains lodged in her throat that she is contained in her glass coffin. This is 
in fact a reversal of the usual function of the apple in myth and fairy tale, if 
the glass coffin is held to symbolise chaste seclusion: in Genesis, Eve’s bite 
of the apple causes her to be banished from the paradisal stasis of Eden into 
a world of knowledge and action, while in the ancient Greek myth of 
Atalanta the heroine is tricked out of her sworn virginity by  apples. The 
most swift-footed of girls, Atalanta vows only to marry the man who can 
outrun her. A suitor succeeds by throwing golden apples in her path to 
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distract her — these were a gift, significantly, from Venus, the ultimate 
seductress (Ovid 415).
As well as the Atalanta myth there are the apples of immortality 
which sustain the lives of the Gods in the ancient Norse Edda (Sturluson 
36), and in one of Hercules’ labours he must acquire a golden apple from a 
tree in the possession of Atlas, the fierce king of Africa (Keightley  251). In 
late ancient Greek art the three Graces were depicted holding golden apples 
(Palter 24). What is clear about these fantastical apples is that their 
enhancement by  golden colour or magical properties distances them from 
real, natural apples: mythical and fairy-tale apples emphatically  belong in 
the world of art where they symbolise wealth, beauty and the ultimate 
object of pursuit. What is required is that they are abstracted from nature 
into an enhanced, artistic perfection. This is also required of human beauty 
— Snow White’s beauty, which mirrors the red and white apple that 
poisons her, is sublimated into its famous perfection when it is contained in 
the glass coffin, static and untouchable as a picture. The legacy of Snow 
White is evident in Goblin Fruit, which depicts Nicholas’ relationships with 
women as defined by their role as muse for his painting: his deepest, 
everlasting love is for Ida, whose remote chastity and silent stasis render 
her a work of art even in life. Her image, therefore, endures while his other 
lovers are forgotten.
Apples hold a place of singular importance in Western culture as the 
Christian fruit of sin, whose enticing beauty hides its mortal danger. In 
Latin this symbolism is embedded in the apple’s very  name, malum, which 
is “a homonym of the Latin for evil” (Toussaint-Samat 622). They are the 
very first fruit mentioned in the long list of perilous delicacies in Rossetti’s 
Goblin Market, which builds an exemplary picture of tempting loveliness, 
“Sweet to tongue and sound to eye” (11). It  is the apple in particular that 
expresses the dual nature of the fruit metaphor, its deceptive image that can 
mask poisonous flesh. The tendency  of apples to rot — and in the process 
to contaminate other apples near them — has inspired the equation of 
corrupted apples with women’s untrustworthy  sexual virtue, from Catullus 
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to Shakespeare and beyond (Palter 25). In contemporary culture, the apple 
taps into our fears for our own integrity, in Sceats’ words, our “uncertainty 
about how much the self is influenced, changed, nourished or poisoned by 
what is taken in” (Food, Consumption and the Body in Contemporary 
Women’s Fiction 1). Are we really  what  we eat? If we are, how should we 
respond to the smooth, juicy, fleshy  lure of the apple, which we have been 
taught to equate with sin and punishment? 
Not only in the Christian tradition, but also in its connection to 
virginity and marriage (Atalanta) and to everlasting bodily life (the Edda), 
the apple represents the sensual. For Adam and Eve it is disobedience made 
flesh, and propels them into sexuality as well as the mortal world of labour; 
in Giambattista Basile’s seventeenth-century fairy tale ‘The Serpent’ this 
wily creature succeeds in winning a king’s daughter by turning all the fruit 
in the royal orchard to gold, combining material and sexual lust 
(Pentamerone 169-176); and the Italian tale ‘Pome and Peel’ tells of two 
boys conceived by the eating of an apple, and who display  a corresponding 
beauty — one “ruddy as an apple skin” (95), the other “white as apple 
pulp” (ibid.) — braving the curse of a wizard to kidnap his daughter for 
their pleasure (Calvino 95-8). The apple signifies the transgressive choice 
of the sensual over higher, rational joys. It also includes the punishment 
within itself, causing death, disease or magical afflictions such as the 
growth of horns (Aarne-Thompson 207).
A. S. Byatt’s 1990 novel Possession, to which we shall return in the 
Glass chapter, uses the apple as an intricate metaphor for growth and 
temptation, focusing on the creation of a new life at  the expense of the old. 
The plot alternates between the story of two Victorian poets, Randolph Ash 
and Christabel LaMotte, who begin a secret  affair (Ash is married) that 
takes them first to Yorkshire and then LaMotte to Brittany, where she bears 
their child. The other narrative is set in the 1980s, where two academics, 
the beautiful Maud Bailey and the unassuming Roland Michell investigate 
the mystery of Ash and LaMotte’s affair, eventually feeding on it  to develop 
their own. The colour green makes a number of notable appearances 
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throughout the novel, in connection with Maud, Christabel and the glass 
that acts as the dominant metaphor for their beauty — and especially in 
moments of change, where the metaphors begin to shift. Green suggests 
nature, plant life and deep water; a lively  colour. Maud makes her first 
appearance dressed in green, “a long pine-green tunic over a pine-green 
skirt . . . long shining green shoes” (38), Roland notices that  she “smelled 
of something ferny” (39), and her bathroom is also predominantly green — 
“a chill green glassy  place . . . huge dark green stoppered jars on water-
green thick glass shelves” (56). 
Byatt consistently describes her shades of green through natural 
similes — plants and water. It is this constantly refreshing wash of green 
that prevents Maud from seeming utterly cold and dead in the glass boxes 
that contain her like a contemporary Snow White, and intimates her 
potential for a more lively  and dynamic kind of beauty. The Latin for 
‘green’, viridis, is related to ver, meaning ‘spring’, as well as virga, or 
‘green twig’ from which we derive virgo — virgin (Ferber, A Dictionary of 
Literary Symbols 89). Such etymologies suggest that the generation of life 
does not have to be segregated from virginity, and offer a precedent for 
Maud’s green chastity in which she is productive in an artistic sense. Viridis 
is, however, also related to vir, or ‘man’, from which we have ‘virile’ as 
well as ‘virtue’ (ibid.). The colour green always has an undertone of 
sexuality vital to its life-giving associations. Maud does not evade this.
The Brothers Grimm observe in their preface to volume II of the 
first edition of Kinder und Hausmärchen that “The epic basis of folk poetry 
resembles the color [sic] green as one finds it throughout nature in various 
shades: each satisfies and soothes without ever becoming tiresome” (Tatar, 
The Annotated Brothers Grimm 409). It is a curious claim that folk poetry 
(in the work of the Grimms this is synonymous with folk and fairy tales) 
resembles the colour green, suggesting that green holds specific and 
obvious associations also present in fairy  tales. This strangeness may, of 
course, be attributed to the difficulties of translation, but Byatt in her 
introduction to Tatar’s edition takes the statement at face value with the 
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explanation that  the green of the forest was central to “German perception 
of German folklore” (xx). She refers to this in conjunction with Lüthi’s 
observation that the colour green “is almost never specifically mentioned in 
folktales” (ibid. xix), despite its significance: unlike the moral binary of 
white and black, the preciousness of gold and silver, the modest  virtue of 
leaden grey and the red of blood, green seems to provide an 
unacknowledged background to fairy  tales rather than symbolising a value. 
Although she does not offer any further analysis in this piece of writing, 
Byatt addresses the mysterious omission of green in Possession, adorning 
her female protagonists almost  entirely  in shades of green to highlight the 
natural quality of their beauty. 
It should be noted that although green is rarely mentioned in fairy 
tales, it does appear in several folk legends that found their way  into 
medieval and early  modern literature. In Chaucer’s “The Squire’s Tale” and 
Against Women Unconstant green figures as a symbol of inconstancy; 
equally, the tempting Lady of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight wears a 
green girdle which she gives to Gawain, and the character of Lechery in 
Spenser’s Faerie Queene wears “a greene gowne” (85; 1.4.25). This is in 
keeping with the association of sexuality  with green, and Ferber speculates 
that the changing of the seasons, in which green develops through many 
shades before disappearing entirely, may also underlie the motif (90).
As well as Maud, Christabel LaMotte is also curiously  green: as Ash 
watches her in the opposite corner of the train carriage as they travel to 
Yorkshire to consummate their affair, he studies “the pale loops of hair on 
her temples. Their sleek silver-gold seemed to him to have in it a tinge, a 
hint of greenness, not the copper-green of decay, but a pale sap-green of 
vegetable life” (277). A very clear distinction is made that, at this moment 
of sexual anticipation, Christabel is no longer enclosed in her glass coffin 
but is following in Eve’s forbidden footsteps and entering the world of 
sexual knowledge and danger. The sexual current that runs through so many 
appearances of the colour green illuminates the reproductive aspect of the 
life it signifies: Christabel bears a child, in solitude, in Brittany where she 
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has fled to distant relations for sanctuary. Green, the colour of life, is 
closely connected with apples, which may herald new life, but also 
punishment and death as they do for Eve and Snow White. Possession 
opens with apples, when Roland reads Ash’s own copy of Vico’s Principj di 
Scienza Nuova (1725) in an attempt to trace sources for the poet’s 
presentation of Proserpine (a mythological representation of nature). 
Roland’s note that “Ears of grain were called apples of gold” (4) in ancient 
mythology, refers succinctly  to a large assortment of myths centred around 
golden or magical apples, as we have already seen.
Golden apples reappear towards the end of Possession, when 
Roland thinks back to his first impression of Maud as “the Princess on her 
glass hill” (424) a reference to a Norwegian version of the Atalanta myth, 
according to Byatt in On Histories and Stories (151). She writes that the 
independent solitude of the princess who sits at the top of a glass mountain, 
throwing golden apples from her lap down to her suitors, always attracted 
her (ibid.). Maud, who sits in the Women’s Studies Resource Centre “on an 
apple-green chair” (306), looks down on Roland from the heights of her 
class, beauty and “international reputation” (424). She also entices him with 
clues to the Ash-LaMotte mystery, nuggets of personal information and the 
golden threads of her hair, which she keeps hidden under a scarf. She does 
not show any intention of being a temptress, but Byatt occasionally depicts 
Maud as a new Eve: she puts “a little fan of apple curves onto a paper plate 
and handed it to [Roland]” (270) as they picnic in a paradisal Yorkshire 
setting. This tableau, layered as it  is with the ghostly images of Ash and 
LaMotte’s love affair in the same location, and the older image of Eve 
offering the apple to Adam, is as rich a use of the fruit metaphor as Power’s 
reimagining of D. G. Rossetti’s Proserpine.
 As with golden apples, it is the emphatically artistic, unnatural 
quality of these presentations of human beauty that makes them both 
compelling and slightly disturbing: Eliza is uncomfortable with Nicholas’ 
portrayal of her, and Maud deliberately tries to avoid her beauty being 
pictured as a sexual enticement. Byatt describes Maud with “unpainted 
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lips” (39): however, it is not cosmetics but a different screen of illusion 
which animates the metaphor of beauty: Randolph Ash writes to his wife 
Ellen a piece of trivia, that “the old painters gave an ivory glow to a rich 
skin by painting on a green base — it is a paradox of optics, strange and 
delightful” (461 emphasis in text). The colour green and the life-generating 
sexuality associated with apples is the base on which Christabel and Maud 
are painted, and it is through the metaphors arising from these that they 
come alive, in a self-contained solitude that for the emancipated Maud at 
least, can be refreshed and refashioned to forge connections with others. 
Their green liveliness accentuates the cold beauty that sets Christabel and 
Maud apart: observed as they  are by their admirers, we see them through 
Roland’s and Ash’s eyes in tableaux, such as Christabel in the railway 
carriage or waiting for Ash in bed where her hair in the candlelight catches 
“a hint, there it was, of green again” (283), or Maud offering a fan of apple 
slices to Roland, who tells her at the end, “When I see you, you look alive 
and everything else — fades” (506 emphasis in text). It is the underlying 
tint of green that suggests that Maud and Christabel are not merely pictures 
of beauty, static and untouchable in the seclusion of their glass coffins, but 
have the potential for human connection. Yet it  is also this greenness that 
makes them irrevocably pictures of beauty, ensuring that their animation is 
founded purely on illusion.
When Roland finally, at the close of Possession, attains the 
unattainable Maud and “to use an outdated phrase, entered and took 
possession of all her white coolness” (507), her beauty, which is painted on 
the base of her untouchability, is destroyed and a new metaphor grows from 
its remains. The novel ends with “the smell of the aftermath” (ibid.), in 
which Byatt foregrounds the illusion of life which will underlies the new 
metaphor as well as the old: it is “a green smell . . . which bore some 
relation to the smell of bitten apples” (ibid.). Maud’s beauty  has been 
‘bitten’ into and must  be painted new, a picture in potentia that gives her 
room to manoeuvre within it, but which nevertheless seems — only seems 
— alive.
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“White with Rosy Cheeks”
Byatt’s cannibalisation of old metaphors of beauty, reworked into a 
contemporary  alternative, is essentially similar to Power’s. Both are centred 
around the transformation of flesh into art, where a metaphor such as fruit 
or glass turns human flesh into a particular expression of beauty and draws 
in a corresponding range of associations. In Goblin Fruit beauty  is 
temptation, woven into a complex web in which those who lure are 
themselves lured, and those who feed on others are fed on in turn, echoing 
the cycles of growth and decay in plants. We are first introduced to Fanny 
as a more knowing version of Rossetti’s Laura, enticed by  the mysterious 
male world from which she is prohibited. Viewed by  the painter Edmund 
Le May through the glass of the milliner’s shop where she works, the lively 
Fanny uses her “bright yellow hair” (3) and “peony blue eyes” (ibid.) to 
establish a much more lucrative position as his model and mistress. Fanny’s 
“vivacious looks” (6) form a contrast to her friend Ida, “wraith-like” (ibid.) 
and “Straight  as a wand” (ibid.) with ankle-length “outrageous red 
hair” (ibid.) and “deathly white” skin (ibid.). 
Chaste as Lizzie in Goblin Market but not nearly  as pragmatic, Ida 
is initially  horrified by  Fanny’s new profession: “To have her image caught 
on canvas. To her it smacked of necromancy, a loss of herself” (11). 
However, here the casting of Fanny  as Rossetti’s Laura and Ida as Lizzie 
begins to break down. Ida has no desire for fleshly pleasures but she 
becomes addicted to the role of muse, unable to resist the goblin-like figure 
of Nicholas as Rossetti’s heroine Lizzie does. Equally, the dark and 
reserved artist Nicholas is enthralled by Ida and she comes to crave his 
attention, “That his soul banquet upon hers” (24). 
Power diverges from the framework of Goblin Market to shift 
perspective, examining the more sinister aspects of the Lizzie and Laura 
characters. Like Byatt in the later Possession, Power uses the extensive 
dialogue and description of the novel form to flesh out her fairy-tale 
characters from the “depthless” (78) figures that Lüthi describes into 
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psychologically complex people. So Ida’s chastity  comes to seem self-
absorbed and barren, and Eleanor’s virginal doll-like perfection becomes 
vacuous, especially in the very short section she narrates: “I sit in the 
drawing room and rearrange it in my mind’s eye but I cannot yet quite 
decide upon the perfect decor. It is delicious though to sit and plot like a 
queen in her castle” (69). She cannot achieve Lizzie’s wholesome strength, 
and Eliza — often called Lizzie by Eleanor — may have strength but not 
the selflessness of Rossetti’s heroine, instead taking her sensual joys from 
Eleanor’s husband and ultimately manipulating him into love on her terms. 
Power’s novels implies that Lizzie in Goblin Market presents an impossible 
standard, and Laura a simplistic warning since sensuality can be nourishing 
as well as destructive.
Nicholas sees Ida as dangerous and magical, a siren who tempts 
mortals to their death with her “terrible beauty” (76). Although he exalts his 
desire into artistic inspiration, drawing “repeated haunted images of her 
face, her form” (15), Nicholas’ ecstasy can be identified with the Christian 
concept of ensnarement by the flesh. St Augustine, in his Confessions of a 
Sinner (394 AD), describes a very similar experience: “Bodily  desire, like a 
morass, and adolescent sex welling up within me exuded mists which 
clouded over and obscured my heart” (13; bk. II ch. 4). For Augustine, 
human beauty  is a perilous imitation of the real thing which is God’s 
beauty, conceptually related to Plato’s eternal and abstract Form of Beauty. 
Nicholas’ obsessive rendering of Ida’s image is a spiritual capitulation to 
lust, and his awareness of the danger is evident in his depiction of her as “a 
livid corpse [who] drank rapturously of the lifeblood of her lovers” (15). 
Eating and drinking is a pervasive metaphor in many  treatments of 
lust, particularly religious, so influential that in early  Christian works 
fasting is seen as “the only  method for the suppression of the natural sexual 
urges of the body” (Veronika E. Grimm, From Feasting to Fasting 192). 
Augustine provides an especially illuminating example through his 
consistent use of food or hunger as a metaphor. Prefiguring Nicholas’ 
doomed rapture, he continues in his Confessions, “I defied you [God] even 
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so far as to relish the thought of lust, and gratify it too . . . For such a deed I 
deserved to pluck the fruit of death” (18; bk. III ch. 3). The danger of the 
sensual, for both Power and Augustine, is that the individual who hopes to 
attain it is inevitably consumed by their own desire: they decay as their 
obsession grows.
Ida’s dead-white skin and red hair are as deceptive as the apple, 
“white with rosy cheeks” (Annotated Brothers Grimm, ed. Tatar 251), with 
which Snow White’s stepmother attempts to kill her. Indeed, it is not 
always wise to trust the flawless appearance of a fruit: although many fruits 
have benef ic ia l “an t iox idan t and f ree - rad ica l scavenging 
properties” (Barberán and Robins, Phytochemistry of Fruit and Vegetables 
2), one cannot always be sure that wild fruits do not have “toxic 
effects” (ibid.). Although Nicholas senses the peril in Ida’s flesh, he relishes 
it as a piquant side-dish — until he begins to feel its poisonous effects. Ida 
may seem to take nothing from him, but as she becomes dependent on his 
obsession for her own continuance, having given herself to his canvases, 
she begins to feed on him as well. 
Meeting Fanny and Edmund for dinner, Ida’s need is first  presented 
as corporeal: “Ida’s lack of undergarments began to try  her sorely; her flesh 
was starved” (24), but the connection to Nicholas soon becomes evident. 
She feels threatened by Fanny’s overtly fleshy, ripe-peach beauty that 
“flagrantly asserted the voluptuary  of female flesh” (ibid.), resenting “the 
fondling look that [Nicholas] cast at  warm, blonde Fanny. It was as though 
his soul slavered” (ibid.). Buttoned up to her neck in an unfashionable black 
dress, Ida’s prudery holds her back from her desires, her lack of 
undergarments not a provocative gesture but a mortification of her flesh. 
And yet she still sees herself as ripe for eating — flesh and soul are not 
clearly  distinguished from each other, as Ida presents her flesh to tempt 
Nicholas away from Fanny, but it is not her flesh that she is offering: 
Ida tossed back her loose downfall of red hair and her white throat 
was exposed. Columnar. Gleaming. Her soul craved his addiction. 
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That his soul banquet upon hers. The poisonous succubus of his 
tongue lap her thin blood, eat of her and envenom her soul making 
her his creature; drained, and replete with his bitter juices. (24)
Ida displays her throat as a column in direct defiance of Fanny’s 
organic, fruity  charms, casting herself as a flawless, mineral alternative; 
immortal but “exposed” (ibid.), vulnerable to him. She offers her flesh as a 
metaphor for their spiritual communion, feeding on each other’s obsessions 
with her image in the centre, mediating. Power makes clear that Ida and 
Nicholas never have sex, but in Augustine’s terms their banqueting of souls 
makes them as guilty of the sins of lust  and gluttony as if it were flesh. In 
City of God (413-18 AD) Augustine observes that St Paul’s Epistle to the 
Galatians includes among the “works of the flesh” (City of God 549) not 
only the obvious “fornication, impurity, lust, drunkenness” (ibid.) but also 
sins “which show faults of the mind . . . sorcery, enmity, quarrelsomeness, 
jealousy” (ibid.). Augustine is not a straightforward dualist: while the body 
and soul are distinct entities, he reads ‘flesh’ as it is used in the Bible as 
often denoting “man himself, that is, the essential nature of man”, and not 
merely his body (548). The hunger Ida feels is not literally  for Nicholas’ 
tongue to “lap  her thin blood” (24), but the necessity for a corporeal 
metaphor for this hunger reveals its blind, animal nature. Augustine 
explains that living by the rule of flesh means “living by the rule of 
self” (552). Ida has lost her self to Nicholas’ canvas, as she feared, and it is 
only through his feeding on her image that she can steal a taste of what she 
has lost, now sublimated into art. It is for this that she hungers.
A woman is also torn out from her shelter in an artistic image in the 
Italian tale ‘Apple Girl’, collected by Italo Calvino in Italian Folktales 
(1956). Here, the comparison between an apple and a woman is taken 
further, and the princess and the apple are one. When a queen gives birth to 
a lovely apple, it soon catches the eye of a king who lives conveniently 
over the road. At first he only sees “a beautiful maiden as fair and rosy  as 
an apple” (308), but “the minute the girl realized she was being observed, 
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she ran back to the tray  and disappeared inside the apple” (ibid.). She does 
not speak, and emerges only  to bathe and comb her golden hair while the 
king “looked on” (ibid.). She is cloistered inside the image of her own 
beauty — which is emphatically  separated from her actual, beautiful flesh 
— as surely as Ida. 
The Apple Girl is eventually forced out of her seclusion in an 
especially brutal manner, when the king’s jealous stepmother stabs the 
apple repeatedly  with a dagger, so that “Out of every wound flowed a 
rivulet of blood” (309): clearly  the apple and the girl are intrinsically 
conflated, and the apple is not merely a container but a part of her. This is 
borne out by her emergence, after the ministrations of a fairy, covered “in 
bandages and plaster casts” (ibid.), at which moment she proclaims herself 
disenchanted from the spell and offers herself as bride to the king. This is is 
strikingly similar to Ida’s offering of herself to Nicholas in an attempt to 
preserve his obsessive imaging of her: when the Apple Girl’s metaphor is 
broken open, she resorts to directly proffering herself. It is not only  the 
observer who feeds on an image of beauty, but the beauty  herself relies 
upon it for her continuing existence. 
When Nicholas seeks solace from Ida’s intensity in Fanny’s 
abundant flesh, Ida takes revenge through her own body, his obsession. 
Having refused to eat during his absence of three days, he finds her 
“starved flesh like ice to his touch” (31): Ida is again using her flesh as a 
metaphor for her soul. She accuses him of having “ravaged her soul, 
infected her with his daemonic possession” (ibid.), and the fact that she is 
also “sodden with laudanum” (ibid.) adds another layer to the metaphor, as 
she fills her body  with a bewitching poison that resembles the one already 
addling her soul, and that of Nicholas. Ida is true to her poisonous apple 
image, this new, physical addiction bringing her deathlike appearance — 
shown in Nicholas’ portraits of her as the “beautiful Lady of Death” and the 
Lady of Shalott — into reality upon her body (26). 
Ida withdraws first into “bleak, impenetrable silences locked up 
alone in her bedchamber” (33) and eventually “closed up  into her desolate 
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self” (34). Though laudanum and malnutrition devastate her body, it seems 
that her flesh nevertheless lasts longer than her soul. Seeing her soul spread 
around her on the canvases that  cover the wall, Ida finds herself “created 
anew by his inspiration” (ibid.), yet “bereft” (ibid.) of this fragmented self. 
Augustine argues that the soul can die, even while the body persists, “when 
God abandons it” (City of God 510), which will only  happen when the soul 
abandons God. Wrapped entirely in her narcissistic obsession with 
Nicholas’ image of her, Ida has clearly  forgotten God, looking for her lost 
soul: “She was haunted by the self that was not herself and in her distress 
she had all his portraits of her turned to the wall and the only image she 
would allow herself to gaze upon was that of the spectre in the looking 
glass” (34). It is significant that Ida has become a ‘spectre’, a word that is 
repeated in this passage. She is now depicted as dead in life as well as in 
her portraits, yet still very  much an image — ‘spectre’ comes from the 
Latin ‘spectrum’ meaning to look or see (OED). We do not need Augustine 
to tell us that it  is futile to look for one’s soul in the reflection of a spectre: 
an image of an image of the dead.
While Ida is almost exclusively  visual — she hardly speaks or eats, 
and is never touched — Fanny  caters to all the senses. Rather than finding 
her soul impoverished by modelling, Fanny  is “making lots of tin” (25) and 
already looking around for “a comfortable berth” (26) to settle in once her 
looks have gone, since with her love of all sensual pleasures she knows she 
will “soon run to fat” (ibid.). Fanny’s soul, in fact, is never once mentioned, 
whereas Ida’s is discussed in almost all of her scenes. In Augustine’s 
framework, Fanny’s soul is conflated with her body, identifying her as one 
of the “ungodly” (City of God 511), who exist “not in the life of their souls 
but of their bodies” (ibid.). This is why Nicholas comes to Fanny as an 
escape from the constant haunting of Ida’s soul: Fanny is encapsulated by 
her flesh, never being described in any other terms. 
Nicholas visits Fanny in the early morning when she is only half-
dressed and their mutual desire is unspoken, proceeding purely  through 
body language. Once the conversation has “guttered” (29), Fanny kneels 
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“in a voluptuous attitude” (ibid.) with the “pretext” (ibid.) of stirring the 
fire. There follows a dialogue of the senses, in which they both 
“quaff” (ibid.) wine and the scent of Fanny’s hair oil reaches Nicholas “co-
mingled with the heat and the aroma of wine” (ibid.). In answer, Nicholas 
kneels behind her, “burrowing his mouth in her plump shoulders” (ibid.): 
finally, though she “uttered no sound, yet her body  unmistakably 
acquiesced to his foraging fingers” (30). Unlike Ida’s icy flesh, Fanny’s is 
“warm, very warm” (ibid.), inviting him to feed upon her physically, rather 
than the poisoned and unsatisfying draughts that his soul draws from Ida’s. 
Once again, eating symbolises the surrender to temptation, as it does 
in Genesis and Augustine. To Fanny’s surprise, Nicholas does not simply 
“mount her” (30) and expend his animal passions. Instead, he begins 
“lapping” (ibid.) at her “mount of venus” (ibid.), the term ‘lapping’ evoking 
animals drinking water but also refers back to Ida’s desire for him to “lap 
her thin blood” (24) in a metaphorical reference to her soul. Nicholas, it 
seems, is helplessly governed by  animal urges, and in this case Augustine’s 
extension of ‘flesh’ to include sins of the mind (or soul) that are equally 
self-directed, illuminates Nicholas’ desire for both Ida and Fanny as aspects 
of a single urge: to devour. The two women in fact  share the need to be 
devoured. Ida craves that he “eat of her” (24) and Fanny finds, as he 
“gnawed at her relentlessly until she was almost frightened [that] she ached 
with a desire she had not previously  experienced” (30). Dark and 
“dwarfed” (13), with a “mocking, sensuous mouth” (ibid.), Nicholas is 
presented throughout the novel as one of the “malicious goblin” men 
(Goblin Fruit 41) who tramp down the glen in Rossetti’s poem. But 
although all four of the women in the novel — Eleanor and Eliza too in the 
second part — are drawn by  the goblin’s “evil gifts” (Goblin Market 15), 
Power does not have them sink their teeth into Nicholas’ fruits: he eats of 
them. 
Rossetti’s Laura, of course, also finds herself consumed, by longing 
for the fruits she once tasted, wasting away  in punishment for her sin. 
Power draws out the ambiguities in this presentation of devourment, 
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“earliest and most archaic of fears” (The Bloody Chamber 168) as Angela 
Carter puts it in her short story “The Tiger’s Bride”, with Goblin Fruit 
portraying devourment instead as a dangerous but desirable communion in 
which the self is exchanged for sensual experience. This is an extension of 
Laura paying for her goblin fruit with a “precious golden lock” of hair 
(Goblin Market 19), the movement towards the “Wholly Other” (Lüthi 5) at 
the cost of oneself that is the start of so many fairy tales. 
This movement is often also toward the forbidden, straying from the 
forest path or speaking to “goblin men” (Goblin Market 12). Power’s novel 
opens with the explicit  prohibition of the young milliners to talk to the men 
that loiter outside the shop. In the face of Ida’s hysterical possessiveness, 
Nicholas and Fanny “quaff” (29) the forbidden fruits of sensual passion: he 
deliberately  chooses the delights of sin when he “coolly, slowly” (31) turns 
Fanny  over to “practise sodomy upon her plump, unavailing 
buttocks” (ibid.), an illegal act  in the Victorian era. In his Confessions, 
Augustine addresses the enjoyment of sin in a story about stealing pears. As 
a youth, he and a “band of ruffians” (15; bk. II ch. 4) pilfer a large quantity 
of pears that are “attractive neither to look at nor to taste” (ibid.), without 
even the intention of eating them: they cast the pears before swine. As it is 
for the characters in Goblin Fruit, the taste of forbidden fruit becomes 
metaphorical, and in the pears Augustine tastes “nothing . . . but  my own 
sin, which I relished and enjoyed” (15-16). In fact, the word ‘fruit’ derives 
from the Latin ‘fructus’, meaning ‘to enjoy’, making fruit a natural choice 
of metaphor for pleasure (OED).
In the Christian tradition — this particular aspect of it being 
significantly influenced by Augustine — sensual enjoyment is one of the 
gravest sins, as it is a deceptive distraction from the only  true enjoyment, 
that of God, who is for Augustine “the food of the soul” (17; bk. III ch. 1). 
He also paints sensual pleasure as highly  addictive, finding like Rossetti’s 
Laura that one taste of earthly “pleasure, beauty and truth” (11; bk. I ch. 20) 
leads him into a constant and desperate search for more, ending in “pain, 
confusion, and error” (ibid.) because he should have looked for these things 
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in God. Beverley Clack is correct in emphasising that the crux of 
Augustine’s thought is “less a hatred of pleasure, and more a desire to avoid 
the loss (and resulting pain) of valuing temporal, sensual things” (Sex and 
Death 21). 
In her short story “The First  Time” (The Mermaids in the Basement 
1993), Marina Warner appears to redeem the Devil in an adaptation of the 
theme of decay nourishing new life. Here, pain is converted into pleasure as 
“the serpent” (85), disguised as “Lola — Trainee Customer Service 
Assistant” (ibid.) on a supermarket’s tropical fruit stand, tempts a “hard 
green bright slip of a girl” (86) out of the pain of being discarded by her 
schoolboy lover and on to “my famous primrose path” (96) of pleasure. The 
method of temptation is, of course, fruit. Replacing the traditional apple are 
“tamarillo here, it’s full of rich pulp under the tight shiny  skin . . . There’s 
pitahaya for you too — firm as a pear and slightly  perfumed, like rose 
petals” (91-3) and many more, reminiscent of Fanny’s cornucopia of fruity 
beauty in Goblin Fruit. In a typical late-twentieth-century technique, 
Warner engages directly with traditional motifs and ideas while subverting 
their moral and social associations. However, the hint of a satirical 
undercurrent resists a single interpretation. As in Goblin Fruit, luxury, 
pleasure and voluptuousness are celebrated, with pain and consequence 
acknowledged as a necessary  side-dish. The quest seems to be for a 
pleasure that escapes being overwhelmed by  despair and decay, and in 
Warner’s story it appears that now this is — almost — possible. 
It was not, however, conceivable for Augustine, for whom every 
pleasure was paid for with a thousand agonies, in life and afterwards. 
Augustine is notably  concerned with beauty as pleasure and temptation 
throughout the Confessions, and in the story of the pears his ambivalence 
regarding it comes to the fore. Having initially claimed that the pears were 
unattractive, he then appears to contradict  this statement, writing that “It is 
true that the pears which we stole had beauty, because they  were created by 
you, the good God” (15; bk. II ch. 6). Theirs is not an earthly beauty, as is 
Fanny’s warm plumpness, and so their mode of temptation is not exactly 
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equivalent to her flesh: the pears are symbolic, not evil in themselves (an 
innocent creation of a good God) but for precisely that reason they 
represent sin to the thief. In defiling something that is beautiful in essence, 
feeding it  to the pigs, the sinner has stolen from God and feeds on the 
triumph of his own self-sufficiency. This explains why Augustine speaks of 
tasting the pears when he originally claims not to have eaten any, or at least 
not that he remembers. Later he offers a mere “If any part  of one of those 
pears passed my lips” (15-16 my  emphasis), but this hesitance actually 
betrays the necessity for stressing non-literal consumption, because it  is 
central to the purpose of his story that he has metaphorically tasted the 
pears, to relish “the sin that gave it flavour” (ibid.).  
Denise Gigante observes (in a discussion of Milton) that a Latin 
verb for ‘taste’, sapere, also means ‘to know’ (Taste: A Literary History 
23). It is as true for Augustine as for Milton that “to partake of God is to 
know God, and thereby to know oneself” (ibid.). Language here offers 
Augustine a direct metaphorical transition from sensual taste to religious 
understanding. Augustine’s philosophy is characterised by a conflation of 
the physical and the abstract even while establishing them as opposing 
poles. Food in his works serves as a metaphor both for sin and for the 
rightful knowledge of God, rendering it an ambiguous mediator between 
virtue and vice. Later philosophers such as Kant address this consistent 
conflation of concrete and abstract by aggressively  imposing a separation 
on them: there are no anecdotal fruit metaphors in Kant’s Critiques. 
Instead, genuine beauty  for Kant is distinguished as an abstract 
quality by the requirement that it be separated from base (and physical) 
interests. Such an interest is always linked to “the faculty of 
desire” (Critique of Judgement 36; bk. 1 sec. 2) through the  “delight which 
we connect with the representation of the existence of an object” (ibid.). 
Therefore, any enjoyment of beauty which has an interest in the actual 
existence of the beautiful object (or its image) is impure, and a sensual 
experience rather than a true judgement of beauty. In a genuine judgement 
of beauty, it simply  would not matter whether the represented object exists 
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or not, since only its beauty is appreciated. By establishing his definition of 
beauty in this way, Kant categorically separates any physical aspect or 
appreciation of beauty  from the real quality of beauty, which is made 
necessarily abstract.
However, imposing such a rigid conceptual separation between 
beauty and the beautiful object (or person), Kant’s philosophical framework 
is unable to engage with the ambiguities of human beauty, situated as it 
often is in both the flesh and the abstract. Goblin Fruit presents a portrait of 
the entanglements created by the different modes of appreciating human 
beauty, and it is Augustine’s story of the pears that offers some illumination 
of the problem. Having converted God’s beauty as it  was manifested in the 
pears to his own sinful enjoyment, Augustine writes, “I had no beauty 
because it was a robbery” (15). The phrase seems slightly  odd, a lack of 
beauty not quite logically following from the act of robbery, but because 
the pears are explicitly  a symbol of God’s beauty — emphatically not 
earthly beauty — it is precisely beauty which he has stolen and then thrown 
to the pigs. Fruit serves as a multi-faceted metaphor representing both 
sensual enjoyment in its sweet flesh, and the purity  of divine beauty in the 
beneficence of its creation: clearly what is done with it makes all the 
difference.
This is precisely the case in Goblin Fruit. Ida and Fanny are both 
beautiful, though in dramatically opposing ways, and Nicholas enjoys their 
beauty in opposite ways which make all the difference to how it affects 
them. Fanny is a straightforward physical beauty, all glowing flesh and 
acquiescent sexuality, and it is in these terms that Nicholas enjoys her: 
Fanny’s soul does not make an appearance in the novel because her beauty 
and her actions have nothing to do with it. She is a popular model and 
companion because she causes “no complications, no scenes” (23), being 
entirely  “content to act upon the male senses like a full-bodied red 
wine” (24). As such, Nicholas enjoys the taste of his sin in her 
“juices” (ibid.), but she is in a sense as innocent as Augustine’s pears, 
merely one of God’s beautiful creations, and is fortunate not to be thrown to 
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the pigs. Ida’s beauty, on the contrary, is never portrayed as pure or 
wholesome. 
Although Fanny may be the fleshly beauty, Ida is in fact  the 
poisonous enticement that  lures Nicholas’ soul into its all-consuming 
nightmare. Ida, therefore, is the earthly snare who truly tempts Nicholas on 
to the path of godlessness. Fanny is only forbidden to Nicholas because Ida 
demands the whole of him, which suggests that committing the sin of lust 
with Fanny is a relatively  simple, minor misdemeanour in contrast with the 
selling of his soul to Ida in exchange for some paintings. But, as a “dark 
hobgoblin” (27) he not only gives himself to her, he feeds compulsively at 
the “corpse-like flesh” (ibid.) which has “bewitched” him (ibid.). However, 
unlike with Fanny his feeding is not literal and physical. Just as Augustine 
imbibes only the metaphorical savour of sin from his pears, Nicholas feeds 
purely  on Ida’s image in an unholy communion, with her multiplied face 
“pressed like so many disembodied wafers, to be quaffed with bitter 
wine” (ibid.). Paradoxically, the more he feeds, the more her image 
“consumed him utterly” (19), and in his addiction he feels “his flesh eaten 
out with the desire to attain that image within himself” (20). While 
Nicholas only briefly  gives over his senses to Fanny, he destroys Ida 
completely and luxuriates in both the sin and the punishment it entails. 
“Comfort me with apples, for I am sick with love”
Sin is never treated straightforwardly in Goblin Fruit. The decline 
and death of Ida is good for Nicholas, relieving him of the financial and 
emotional burden she had become and thrusting him into commercial 
success as he becomes an eminent portrait painter. But the cycle begins 
again: in Book II, Nicholas becomes enamoured of the sixteen-year-old 
Eleanor, a naïve version of Fanny with her blonde hair, “ruby” lips (40) and 
eyes of “blue limpidity” (ibid.). The nature of his attachment is, however, 
hidden from us since this part of the novel is narrated in the first person by 
Eliza, Eleanor’s spinster cousin, and is addressed to Nicholas. She 
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observes, for instance, that while painting Eleanor “You were nervous, with 
tremulous hands” (ibid.), but can only  guess the reason; “distaste or 
possibly exasperation” (ibid.). After Ida’s death, Nicholas’ soul is closed to 
the other characters and to the reader, and appropriately he now paints in a 
“glass-house” (39) reminiscent of the fairy-tale glass castle or coffin in 
which life and warmth are frozen in an inaccessible stasis. 
Even when he has married Eleanor, who insists on Eliza continuing 
as her companion, Nicholas remains distant from his wife and it is this that 
sends her into a decline of depression leading ultimately to death. 
Appropriately, she dies of consumption, devoured by Nicholas like Ida. To 
break her down through remoteness, always withdrawing to his glass-
house, may appear in direct contrast to his smothering destruction of Ida, 
but it must be noted that it is only when Nicholas’ attention wavers from 
her that Ida is consumed by jealousy, and this is what develops into hysteria 
and addiction. Having given his lovers a taste of goblin fruit, it is the 
withdrawal that starves them to death, as Laura discovers in Goblin Market 
when she no longer hears “That goblin cry” (27-8) and her golden hair 
turns “thin and grey” (ibid.). Elusive love such as Nicholas’ has been 
represented by fruit — apples in particular — since the Ancient Greeks, 
with Sappho comparing an unattainable young woman to “the sweet apple 
that reddens on the topmost bough” (141; 105a, trans. Barbara Hughes 
Fowler). The myth of Tantalus, whose punishment from the Gods is a tree 
dripping with ripe fruit forever just out of his reach, also provides a vivid 
source for works such as Rossetti’s and Power’s. 
Equally, the biblical Song of Songs explores the complexities of this 
metaphor through a focus on the difficult distinction between the flesh and 
the soul, offering illumination of this problem as it appears in Goblin Fruit. 
Nicholas gives his lovers a taste of “the fruits of his love” (51) and then 
withdraws, ensuring their lasting devotion as they pursue their lost joy. The 
bride figure in the Song of Songs (usually  read as the Church, married to 
God, but this tends to be a restrictive interpretation) likewise finds exquisite 
pleasure in her beloved, only to be deprived of him, consistently expressing 
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her joy in terms of fruit: “As the apple tree among the trees of the wood, so 
is my beloved among the sons. I sat down under his shadow with great 
delight, and his fruit was sweet to my taste” (King James Bible 761).
The Song of Songs is notoriously difficult to interpret, since 
reconciling its obviously erotic nature with ascetic Christian values incurs 
all manner of contradictions. Great assistance is provided by the Glossa 
Ordinaria, a collaborative collection of Biblical interpretations that (for this 
book of the Bible) dates in its present form to 1480/1, though most of its 
explanations come from a range of contributors from the Venerable Bede in 
the seventh century to twelfth-century religious scholars in northern France 
(Dove, The Glossa Ordinaria on the Song of Songs x). Several readings of 
the comparison of the beloved to an apple tree are offered, all of which turn 
on the distinction between flesh and soul to negotiate the problematic 
implication that sexual love is a healthy  and virtuous balm for spirit and 
body: “comfort me with apples: for I am sick with love” (761). Such a 
literal interpretation would have Augustine screaming that sexual desire is 
“wild” (Confessions 12; bk. II ch. 1) and “rank” (ibid.), rendering the sinner 
“foul to the core” (ibid.). But since he also speaks of God as food for the 
soul, something to be enjoyed, it seems perfectly  possible that the Song of 
Songs can be read metaphorically and fitted acceptably into his framework. 
The shade of the apple tree provides “rest” (Glossa Ordinaria 37-8) 
and the fruit “refreshment” (ibid.) clearly enough, but the Glossa Ordinaria 
extends the physical meaning to include a spiritual one. The apple tree 
provides rest from “persecutions” (ibid.) according to one reading, and 
from “carnal desires” (ibid.) according to another. In Augustine’s terms, this 
would cast the apple-tree beloved as a divine love, perhaps representing 
Christ (if anachronism is permitted, since the Song of Songs is in the Old 
Testament) as a physical manifestation of God, giving shelter from the 
“pain, confusion, and error” (Confessions 11; bk. I ch. 20) generated by the 
search for fulfilment in earthly things. However, rest  from carnal desires, 
and indeed from persecutions in general, can also be found in the 
satisfaction of sexual love, so the surface of the metaphor is not disrupted. 
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As long as sexuality  remains on the surface, the metaphorical vehicle rather 
than literal meaning, the theological aspect is not compromised either. God 
comforts and satisfies like sexual gratification, but far more purely and 
completely.
Nicholas in Goblin Fruit offers something other than simple sexual 
pleasure too, even for Fanny with whom his connection is primarily sexual. 
All four of Nicholas’ women are sketched or painted by him at some point, 
and it is this transcendence of their flesh into art, the fruitful mingling of 
their soul with his, that has them literally dying for more. Such an 
experience is not unlike the “sober intoxication of your wine” (Confessions 
44-5; bk. V ch. 13) that Augustine enjoys in the contemplation of God. The 
Glossa Ordinaria explains that  the apple in the Song of Songs is 
“sweet” (39) because in the fruit “the soul understands the source of life, 
while she also perceives it bodily” (ibid.). But this all-encompassing joy  is 
fleeting, as Augustine often laments in the City of God, and the individual 
must continually  work to regain it. In the opening of Chapter 3 of the Song 
of Songs the bride complains that “By night on my bed I sought him whom 
my soul loveth: I sought  him, but I found him not” (761). The setting of this 
scene in her bed appears superficially to be another sexual reference, 
perhaps alluding to her failure to attain the pleasures she has tasted earlier. 
However, she repeats that she sought him, not the pleasure he brings, and so 
it must be concluded that she is in bed alone. How then can she be 
searching for him, if she is lying in bed? Her search must be spiritual, an 
attempt to recover from within herself the reconciliation of soul and flesh in 
a divine joy that suffuses both together. But in her failure, she rises and 
goes “about the city  in the streets” (ibid.) to search, still fruitlessly, as 
Augustine does in his youthful quest for “pleasure, beauty, and 
truth” (Confessions 11; bk. I ch. 20). Only when she has “passed from 
[earthly distractions]” (761), does the bride again find her love.
In Bede’s preface to the Glossa Ordinaria he asserts that “the 
bridegroom in this temporal world afflicts the bride with frequent 
tribulations, by means of which she may  attain to the everlasting realm in a 
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state of greater purity” (1). Nicholas similarly  generates an affliction of 
longing in his lovers that only he can satisfy, and only  if they rearrange 
their flesh and soul into precisely  the right configuration to inspire him. His 
is clearly a more selfish version of the education and refinement of the 
bride in the Song of Songs, and Power implies that  in these complex later 
times one must take responsibility  for the improvement of one’s soul. Eliza 
recognises the snare she has fallen into during their affair and turns 
Nicholas’ strategy of saturation and withdrawal back upon him. Committed 
to the higher concern of her work  — writing about the “plight of slop 
workers and other victims of the sweated workshop” (94) — she uses the 
tribulations of her love for Nicholas to fortify her soul against his lures, 
gaining the independence to search for a more wholesome satisfaction. 
Augustine would approve.
Decline and Fall
 The fruits of many plants are internally fed by nutrients produced 
by the decay  of other parts of the plant, often the leaves (Hopkins et al 
203). Ida and Eleanor, as they decline, both lose the colour of their 
complexions and wither like leaves in autumn. The loss of leaf chlorophyll, 
which gives leaves their colour, “reflecting molecular degradation . . . is 
widely  accepted as being one of the earliest indices of the onset of leaf 
senescence” (ibid.). The loss of colour is clearly  not just a poetic touch but 
the beginning of an irrevocable natural cycle. It is no accident that 
Rossetti’s fairy  tale poem taps into the cycle of the seasons to depict young 
girls withering into premature old age and death: the inescapable approach 
of decay is one of the aspects of human existence that  we find hardest to 
face, and fairy  tales offer us their image sweetened with the 
“otherworldly” (Lüthi 77) and with everything “in order” (ibid. 88). Novels 
such as Goblin Fruit take these cycles and extend them into the smallest 
details of language and metaphor, exploring various ways of understanding 
our inextricable binding to the workings of the world.
87
One of the most widespread and enduring fairy-tale plots involves 
three siblings with a task before them: the eldest two fail, leaving the 
youngest to ascend to victory and prosperity. On a more violent note, two 
rivals often have to fight it out for survival — Snow White and her 
stepmother or Cinderella and her stepsisters provide good examples. 
Equally, if three plum trees are planted very close to one another two of 
them will probably fail so that one flourishes (Brantley 8). Even within the 
one thriving plum tree the process is echoed, as the dying leaves feed the 
growing seeds, nestled inside the fruit. In the narrative of Goblin Fruit, too, 
the decline, defeat or death of an ancillary element “translocates” (Hopkins 
et al 202) nourishment to the story’s “developing seed” (ibid.), the one 
element that will bear fruit. 
Throughout Goblin Fruit Nicholas appears to be the beneficiary of 
his lovers’ declines, taking and fruitfully  multiplying their images while the 
original gradually decays. However, in a characteristic move for a novel of 
this period, a spirited woman succeeds in manipulating the cycle, forging a 
place in it for herself as artist — Maud does the same in Possession, and we 
will see Margaret Drabble’s Ailsa achieve this in The Sea Lady in the next 
chapter. Goblin Fruit, however, is unusual in implying that such prosperity 
can only be bought at  the expense of others, but it  is an honest suggestion 
borne out by the fruit metaphor which lies at its centre. At first, Eleanor is 
as perfectly chaste and composed as a “wax doll” (40), presented by Power 
in a still life with an “epergne . . . of crystallized fruits” (43) which 
“remained intact, unplundered” (ibid.). Displaying the same blonde 
prettiness as Fanny, but transcending the flesh in her quiet virginity, Eleanor 
seems a perfect model for Nicholas, traversing the gap between real and 
ideal. 
The domestic containment of fruit as a symbol of feminine beauty 
also occurs in Alice Thomas Ellis’ novel The Other Side of the Fire (1983), 
which opens with the shattering of Mrs Bohannon’s homely happiness 
when she suddenly falls in love, which happens, significantly, “in a garden, 
as these things will” (7). Ellis tells us, with quiet contempt in her use of 
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capitalisation, that “For fifteen years she had accepted, had taken pleasure 
in, the role of the English Housewife” (8), and that Mrs Bohannon “had 
particularly liked . . . the pantry with its rows of shelves holding jars of jam 
and bottled fruit” (ibid.). Shephard explains that to preserve fruit  it  must be 
weighed down with “heavy solutions of honey, sugar, alcohol or 
vinegar” (Pickled, Potted and Canned 188), completely changing its 
inherent nature. Mrs Bohannon’s frankly acknowledged beauty has been, 
like the fruit, preserved and neatly shelved; unlike, for instance, a growing 
apple tree which, according to Toussaint-Samat, is “naturally 
adulterous” (623) since it will not bear fruit  unless it  is “fertilized with the 
pollen of another variety by  birds or insects” (ibid.). When Mrs Bohannon 
transgresses the taboos on age and incest by falling in love with her 
stepson, she can find no pleasure in bottled fruit but reverts to the 
uncontained state of the live apple tree. Such images of bottled fruit and 
Power’s epergne of crystallised fruit are only appropriate to chastity, and 
cease to function when that is lost.
Soon after Nicholas has painted Eleanor’s “white and flaxen” image 
(40), she begins to be described in similar terms to Ida, first “feverishly 
acknowledging” (44) the admiration of her portrait and then, in the “yellow 
glare” (45) of the drawing room the “pallor of her skin seemed waxen, like 
the starved flesh of a corpse” (ibid.). She then falls ill, in a sequence which 
parallels Goblin Market more closely than any other in the novel. The 
“malignant sore throat” (46) that torments her can only be appeased by 
“red-fleshed melon” (ibid.) from the fruit basket sent  to her by Nicholas, 
and which she calls for “like one bewitched” (ibid.). Ida’s “starved 
flesh” (31) is further echoed by Eleanor’s “parched throat” (46) and 
“scorched lips” (ibid.), all craving Nicholas’ goblin fruits. 
Anne Enright’s 2002 historical novel The Pleasure of Eliza Lynch 
includes a chapter titled ‘A Melon’. The prostitute Eliza Lynch, carrying the 
child of the heir to Paraguay, sails down the Paraná River towards her 
lover’s country and dreams of melon (38). Overwhelmed by the rampant 
growth of South America and of her own body, she decides that “perhaps it 
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is melon that I need. I think about melon, am smitten by melon. I bite into 
the golden flesh and feel the seeds slither in their luscious frill. Is there 
anywhere in this godforsaken place where a melon might be bought or 
got?” (ibid.). Pining like Rossetti’s Laura, in this image Eliza Lynch has 
unwittingly set the standard for her own beauty, which will be craved, 
dreamed of and found overwhelming by all the inhabitants of Paraguay. 
Unlike Eleanor, however, Eliza Lynch takes firm possession of the 
artistic image of herself as a ripe and gorgeous fruit that is soon established 
in her new country, and exploits it so that her observers are the ones 
craving, not she: “Eliza was, in all the mud-coloured world, the most 
beautiful thing. And they  ate her with their eyes” (135). But this eating 
remains metaphorical — only her lover, the heir and later ruler of Paraguay, 
actually enjoys her flesh. Eleanor, on the other hand, allows her image to be 
utterly consumed by Nicholas, and makes the same mistake as Ida of 
conflating her image with herself, and so letting him devour that too.
Even having recovered from her fever, nibbling “daintily  at apples 
and peaches” (48), Eleanor’s appetite remains sickly until her death. Like 
Ida’s wilful rejection of food, it metaphorically  demonstrates the hunger 
that only Nicholas’ mysterious attentions can satisfy. However, this aspect 
of the metaphor reveals a connection between craving for Nicholas and 
craving for death, forging the link between decay and nourishment that  also 
occurs in the botanical world. As parts of a plant senesce, the free fatty 
acids that act  as food for cells are sequestered in “a structurally inert 
form” (Hopkins et al 203) and finally rejected from that part of the plant “as 
voided particles” (ibid.). In plants as well as delicate Victorian beauties the 
onset of death is signalled by the rejection of food. Eleanor lies “white and 
passive” (48) giving Eliza the impression that “her soul was dismantling 
her flesh” (ibid.), in the cultivation of an image that only reaches fruition 
when Nicholas paints her corpse, “the most consummate model I have ever 
drawn” (73). Only  at this point does she return to her original “wax doll 
image” (ibid.). Eleanor’s efforts to become the perfect wife to Nicholas are 
only successful at the cost of her life, when in death she transcends Ida’s 
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mere imitation of a deathly beauty by offering him the real thing. Still, that 
night Nicholas returns to painting his “old subject” (75), Ida, and he dreams 
“not of my dead wife but of that other woman with whom my soul is 
interred” (ibid.). As in Rossetti’s poem which provides the epigraph to this 
chapter, the only beauty that retains a hold on the artist is not the one before 
him, but the abstract beauty “as she fills his dream” (Poems and Prose 52).
The metaphorical is consistently  more powerful than the literal in 
this novel, but it is also more fragile. Though the pale, elusive metaphor of 
perfect beauty does not survive in life, in which the sturdy  pragmatism of 
Fanny and Eliza alone is indomitable, it remains the central and overriding 
image, and one which Nicholas never gives up. He has a dream in which 
Eliza — with whom he has been having an affair, but regards 
contemptuously — has disinterred Ida’s body, which lies entirely 
uncorrupted in “her terrible beauty” (76). Since Ida’s beauty  was always 
deathly, it follows that death itself would only enhance her image, and it is 
from this image of beautiful death that Eliza kneels down to feed; “she 
began to mouth reverently the holy corpse” (ibid.). 
Cannibalism certainly has its place in fairy tales, most memorably 
in the desire of Snow White’s stepmother to eat her rival’s heart (or other 
organs in some versions), and the ravenous witch in ‘Hansel and Gretel’. 
Clearly, in these tales as in Goblin Fruit the eater tries to imbibe qualities of 
the person they are eating, specifically  their youth and beauty. Nikolajeva 
identifies cannibalism as a way in which one can not only  defeat an enemy, 
but “inherit his powers” (ed. Haase 368). But being eaten can also be 
positive, an “initiation” (ibid.), a possibility  which Angela Carter traces to 
its logical, though extreme, conclusion in The Infernal Desire Machines of 
Doctor Hoffman (1972). In this fantastical world where metaphors become 
absolutely literal, thanks to Doctor Hoffman’s mind-bending desire 
machines, the utterly  solipsistic Count is boiled alive — to his great 
pleasure. Informed by the chief cannibal that he is to die so that the chief 
can vicariously “immolate myself, to see how I should bear it” (210), the 
Count happily  demonstrates that to be eaten is to know oneself, and to 
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become oneself most completely. Finally able to fully  experience pain, and 
thereby anchor himself in reality  rather than dream, he laughs “with joy — 
pure joy” (ibid.) and rises “up out of the cauldron in an upward surging 
leap, as of a fully liberated man” (ibid.). Allende recognises this same 
pleasure in her discussion of cannibalism and the eating of vital organs as 
aphrodisiac; the “strength” that one “absorbs[s]” (16) in this way is creative 
and sexual. In Nicholas’ dream Eliza desires the same affirmation of self, 
but through the mediation of Ida’s image, just as the chief cannibal 
experiences death vicariously  through the Count. Ida and Eleanor have 
shown her that the price of absolution is annihilation, so Eliza finds a proxy 
in Ida’s beauty.
In dreaming of Eliza devouring Ida, Nicholas recognises that  Ida’s 
image is the only way into “the chambers of my soul that slept with her 
through eternity” (ibid.). This dream is in itself a metaphor revealing the 
dynamics of Nicholas and Eliza’s connection: after Eleanor’s death, Eliza 
takes to wearing the medieval costumes that Ida wore to model for 
Nicholas, who acknowledges that “she had delved into my props to flesh 
out her wardrobe” (80). In this section, narrated by Nicholas, we are shown 
his resistance to Eliza’s attempts to enthral him, but the fact that in 
‘fleshing’ out her wardrobe she succeeds in transforming her unbecoming 
flesh into an artistic image for Nicholas — “she was like some wind-torn 
reed” (ibid.) — shows how effectively she feeds on Ida’s image, 
appropriating her qualities. 
Eliza is also clearly presented as thriving on the aftermath of 
Eleanor’s death: Nicholas reports her claim to be “exhausted with 
effacement” (81) and wishing to “sit awhile in the sun and be 
replenished” (ibid.), like an overshadowed plant that is finally  able to 
unfurl. His indirect repeating of her speech may appear symptomatic of his 
resistance to her, not allowing her to invade his monologue, but it is 
actually another sign of her success. Like the silent Ida, whose utterances 
are similarly  narrated by others, Eliza has been absorbed into Nicholas’ 
mind, to be used as an artistic image; “I think I said aloud she was a 
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dryad” (80). But, unlike his original muse and his other lovers, she 
continues to force her way in and later does enter his narrative in her own 
voice, to tell him “boldly” (81) that, “Now your wife has been put away 
into the earth you can acknowledge me” (ibid.). 
Although Nicholas tells himself “I thought her pathetic attempt to 
dress like my long dead love a ruse that smote of weakness” (81), and that 
“She was really quite artless” (ibid.), it is Eliza’s own artistry that 
ultimately  secures her a place in his life and a certain degree of freedom 
from her addiction to him. Artifice has always had its own allure, even 
regarding that most natural of objects, fruit: Laura Mason observes in 
Sugar-Plums and Sherbert: The Prehistory of Sweets that “Unseasonal fruit 
that has never been near a tree is a recurring theme in confectionary” (99), 
and such “perfect orchard produce and berries . . . shaped from marzipan or 
cast sugar” (ibid.) was, from the Renaissance to the Victorian era, “as 
valued for its artifice as the originals were esteemed for freshness” (ibid.). 
Eliza’s carefully  constructed image of enigmatic glamour appeals to the 
artist in Nicholas, who feeds compulsively on this untouchable, inhuman 
kind of beauty. Having cultivated Nicholas’ infatuation, Eliza exploits it to 
establish a life for herself sharing rooms with him as fellow artist rather 
than kept mistress, earning money and independence by writing lurid gothic 
romances. 
Wendy Steiner illuminates the radical nature of Eliza’s actions: 
“Before modernism, few women could speak publicly about how it felt to 
be an artist, a person concerned with beauty  . . . And yet, female subjects 
were everywhere to be found in the arts” (Venus in Exile xvi). Eliza only 
manages to sustain her transformation into an artist  by channelling the force 
of the muse’s beauty, ensuring that she remains for Nicholas an echo of Ida 
in pale, wild eeriness. She must  live a double existence as both artwork and 
artist, and thus adds an extra facet to Steiner’s comment that “In the 
nineteenth century  [women] symbolized artistic beauty” (ibid.). It  is only 
by feeding on the old tradition of women as beautiful inspiration for art that 
Eliza can evolve into an artist herself. Like Maud and Christabel in 
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Possession, her determined commitment to both her love and her work just 
about pulls her through, when weaker women have fallen by the way.
Power has just one small caveat, that  suggests another factor in 
Eliza’s success. A little earlier, Nicholas observes that of all his lovers, 
Eliza is “most like a fleshly yellow-haired model I once had a fine time 
with . . . In the eyes and the mouth both full and troubled, lies her 
fleshliness” (82). Intending primarily  to tap into Ida’s spiritual hold on 
Nicholas, Eliza has also recreated the pleasures of Fanny by offering 
Nicholas her flesh, wrapped as it  is in the ghost of Ida’s image. So he paints 
her as Proserpine, having “just eaten of one grain of a pomegranite 
[sic]” (92) to represent not only  her “fleshly mouth” (ibid.) but also her 
fruitfulness, admitting that  she has “blossomed” (ibid.). Nicholas’ 
interpretation is that  “her [romance writing] work is the root  of her 
ingesting in some dark and alien Hades” (ibid.), failing to acknowledge that 
he stands in for that underworld figure. The root aspect of the plant 
metaphor, which has not so far appeared in the novel, indicates the natural 
process of feeding on the dead: it has been emphasised that  Eleanor and Ida 
are both in “the earth” (81), but  Eliza’s foray down into its darkness is only 
temporary, like Proserpine’s, sending down a root to gather sustenance. 
However, Hades’ possession endures. Nicholas knows that when Eliza has 
been “paid a small sum for her stories” (93) she “sometimes relaxes” (ibid.) 
and he can once again make her “the breathless, mad creature I hold 
captive” (ibid.).
Yet the final word of the novel is Eliza’s. Knowing that she will 
never have the kind of fleshly or even spiritual beauty to keep Nicholas 
captive in their blue room on whose walls “pomegranite [sic] bearing trees 
entwine convulsively” (91), she regards her work as the currency with 
which she will instead buy her own freedom. To escape her addiction to his 
poisonous love, Eliza plans an inverted version of Lizzie’s defeat of the 
goblins in Goblin Market. She keeps “copious notes on the world” (94), and 
“the facts . . . impregnate” her (ibid.) rather than her lover’s seed, so that 
the book she will write about Nicholas’ underground artistic world will buy 
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her out of it: “I shall give him the book in lieu of a portrait” (ibid.). If this is 
a portrait of Nicholas, then the suggestion, appropriately subtle for a 
successor of postmodernist metafiction, is that Eliza’s book is Goblin Fruit. 
Having saturated herself in his sensuality  — both physical and 
spiritual — like Lizzie assaulted by goblins but refusing to eat, taking back 
the “juice that syruped all her face” (Goblin Market 37) to her pining sister, 
Eliza instead returns the crushed fruit  to the goblin. Faced with his own 
image, “he will feast on me and find the fruit loathsome” (94), so that 
finally “he will not proffer the pomegranite” (ibid.) that ensnares her and 
Eliza will be free of all compulsion. Just as Augustine rises out of the 
“morass” (Confessions 13; bk. II ch. 4) of sensual desire to eat the food of 
the soul that is God, Eliza can rise out of sensual desire to pursue her only 
true fulfilment: “I am alive when I am writing” (94). Having fed on all the 
faces around him, Nicholas will finally be poisoned by  his own. Eliza 
exploits the intricacies of the fruit metaphor, with its merciless feeding 
chains and sensual beauty, to direct its nourishing elements to herself and 
the toxic parts to Nicholas. She achieves this by  deliberately  constructing 
her beauty  using the decaying fruit  image provided by Ida, establishing 
herself as the new life which is fed by  the old. Perhaps biology is not 
destiny after all.
95
Chapter 2
Water
In H2O and the Waters of Forgetfulness (1985) Ivan Illich writes 
that “the twentieth century has transmogrified water into a fluid with which 
archetypal waters cannot be mixed” (7), referring to the abstraction of 
water, as symbolic element, into the chemical compound H₂O. The 
urbanisation and technological progress of the twentieth century, in this 
view, have overpowered our understanding of water as a symbol of “the 
whole of potentiality; it is fons et origo, the source of all possible 
existence” (Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion 188). However, in the 
contemporary  novels Joanna by Lisa St Aubin de Terán (1990), Sarah 
Waters’ Fingersmith (2002) and The Sea Lady by Margaret Drabble (2006), 
the symbolic fecundity and changeability of water remains present as a 
driving force of the narrative, so that the “water we seek” (24-5), in Illich’s 
lament, “the fluid that drenches the inner and outer spaces of the 
imagination” (ibid.), has not been lost at all. And its endurance is due to the 
“nearly unlimited ability to carry metaphors” (ibid.) that enables water to be 
employed in the three novels explored here as a shifting, slippery and 
subversive metaphor for human beauty. Linton offers the important 
qualification that  although “almost anything can be distilled into a watery 
metaphor” (3), the shifting nature of the material concerned means that  “we 
can always (re)turn to water as a means of dissolving the very things we 
have made of it” (ibid.). 
This constant flux is evident in the structure of each narrative 
studied in this chapter, in which constructions of beauty  predicated on 
watery  images are destabilised by their own internal characteristics; beauty 
becomes an unfixed, floating image, divorced from the individual who had 
possessed it and destabilising the narrative that had constructed it. The 
inevitability of this process is made clear by Eliade’s characterisation of 
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water’s symbolic significance: “Principle of what is formless and potential, 
basis of every cosmic manifestation, container of all seeds, water 
symbolises the primal substance from which all forms come and to which 
they will return either by their own regression or in a cataclysm” (188). 
Joanna and the Violent Waters
 In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno establishes beauty as a site of transition 
between the empirical world and the abstracted work of art. Beauty is allied 
with artistic form, as it is in Kant; however, Adorno does not have beauty 
arising out of form, as his predecessor does, but rather beauty arises out of 
fear in a movement towards form. In this way, it straddles the divide 
between external materiality and artistic abstraction which Adorno 
negotiates.
The image of beauty as that of a single and undifferentiated 
something originates with the emancipation from the fear of the 
overpowering wholeness and undifferentiatedness of nature. The 
shudder in the face of this is rescued by  beauty  into itself by making 
itself impervious to the immediately existent; beauty establishes a 
sphere of untouchability; works become beautiful by  the force of 
their opposition to what simply exists. (67)
Adorno describes this transformation from concrete to abstract, via beauty, 
in a curiously  visceral way. It is unclear who or what shudders4  in the face 
of nature’s undifferentiated wholeness, so that the shudder itself becomes a 
metaphor for the imagined reaction of anthropomorphised art. In Aesthetic 
Theory, Adorno consistently figures art as an active agent, rejecting 
constraints, turning against itself or acting upon “materials” (passim). J. M. 
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4 There is a body of critical analysis of Adorno’s shudder — J. M. Bernstein is a notable 
example — explicating the shudder as a memorial experience of fear and suffering. It is, 
however, only the visceral element that has relevance to my discussion here, and so I shall 
not enter into further discourse with writings on the shudder.
Bernstein describes this “act-like nature of works” (The Fate of Art 219) as 
a “sense of being something momentary  and sudden despite the fact of their 
being actualised as durable products” (ibid.), but I would take the sense of 
an artwork’s agency implied by  Adorno as a more emphatic and human 
ability  of art to commit actions. Bernstein does, however, interpret 
Adorno’s shudder as being “released by  the work of art” (220). This 
humanisation of art and artworks, though it may well incur philosophical 
questioning, foregrounds the specifically human aspect  of the tension 
between concrete and abstract. Flesh and mind, even in aesthetic 
philosophy, collide and pull apart in what seems to be a doomed attraction 
of opposites. 
 In the detachment of artistic form from the ‘fleshly’ materiality  of 
nature, Adorno’s aesthetics are predicated on the same kind of separation of 
art from flesh which this thesis argues is essential to the presentation of 
human beauty  in fiction. Donoghue also discusses this binary as a particular 
contemporary  concern, echoing Adorno’s privileging of form over matter in 
his claim that “form entails the conversion of matter, so far as possible, to 
spirit. At the moment of conversion, form and beauty  seem to be one and 
the same” (107). The sense of conflict  between two opposed elements — 
the fixed and the fluid — is perfectly expressed in the metaphor of water, 
which pervades the descriptions of beauty in Joanna, The Sea Lady and 
Fingersmith. In these novels, the mutable nature of the watery beauty on 
show causes it to become a slippery, shifting attribute, capable of changing 
its form and even separating itself from one person and attaching itself to 
another, as in Eliade’s words, “Principle of what is formless and 
potential” (188); beauty in Fingersmith, in particular, slides from character 
to character as their very identities slip from beneath them.
 Kitty, in Lisa St Aubin de Terán’s 1991 novel Joanna, is an image of 
human beauty  who strives towards the fixity  of form out of horror for the 
uncontrollable physicality  of the natural world. In this sense she enacts the 
formation of artistic beauty described by Adorno, but  the specific 
metaphors with which de Terán drives this narrative, metaphors of water 
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and emeralds, challenge the validity of Adorno’s purely abstract theory 
through the complexities of their material and metaphorical existence. The 
narrative of Joanna is divided into four parts: Joanna initially  relates her 
account of her childhood, when she was called Joan and was tormented by 
her mother, Kitty, and comforted by her grandmother, Florence. The second 
narrative is Kitty’s, offering both explanation and some rewriting of her 
abuse of Joanna; thirdly we are given Florence’s perspective; and finally 
the circle is closed with Joanna’s narrative of the present, as she prepares to 
die. Kitty is the focus of the novel, the enigma whose magnetising beauty 
and mercurial temper are figured in the images of water (particularly the 
sea) and emeralds that are handled in all four narrative strands. The act of 
divorcing human beauty from the flesh, from the individual who possesses 
it so that it  may be immortalised in art, is played out in Kitty’s traumatic 
oscillations between the material world and the formality of an aesthetic 
existence. 
 Early in her narrative, Kitty establishes the metaphorical binary 
which her beauty straddles, recalling how in her childhood she aligned 
herself and her beauty with the natural world.
. . . the tropical waters of my eyes. People called them emerald eyes, 
but I liked the men who said they were like the sea. Cartier, the 
jeweller’s in St Helier, sold emeralds, and Maman had a brooch 
with one. But  they were only stones. Water is better than stones; it 
wraps itself around the stones every day, twice a day, and drags 
them out to sea. (116)
Kitty  locates the power of water in its movement, the dynamic force which 
overpowers the inertia of stones, and she harnesses this power in the beauty 
of her eyes. As her daughter notes when recalling her childhood, “She could 
frighten people just by  looking at them, and she could make people do what 
she wanted” (21). Kitty’s green eyes flash through the novel as a locus of 
the unpredictable but mesmerising dynamic of beauty. Movement is also 
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crucial to Adorno’s conception of art, as an active agent engaged in 
subjugating empirical materials into artistic form: “Art can be understood 
only by its laws of movement, not according to any set of invariants” (3). 
Although artistic form is by nature fixed in form, it cannot remain so in its 
fusion with the fluid empirical materials with which it is constructed. In 
Kitty’s case it is precisely the dynamic aspect of the water, which she 
claims as a metaphor for her own beauty, that ultimately disrupts and 
destroys the crystallised aesthetic form in which she wants to live. Having 
first claimed water as the medium of her artistic form, her constructed 
beauty is menaced by the unstable nature of its material. 
 She marries Nelson Allen, Joanna’s father, because he “could 
describe the sea as though I were looking out at it, and had grey eyes like 
the rough waters around La Corbière Point” (146). In him she recognises 
the kind of beauty  she values — her own, powerful and changeable, 
mirrored in his eyes. But even in an aestheticised, metaphorical form, water 
in this novel retains its disruptive agency  as a driving force of the constant 
movement of art identified by  Adorno. In marriage, Kitty is forced into a 
full engagement with the empirical world whose “overpowering wholeness 
and undifferentiatedness” (Adorno 67) she fears: it  is not acceptable for a 
wife to remain an untouchable beauty, and when Nelson is finally  unable to 
restrain himself Kitty  finds her carefully  guarded form invaded by the 
natural forces of change and growth. She leaves Nelson before she even 
realises she is pregnant.
 The violence that Adorno sees in the imposition of artistic form on 
empirical material is certainly  present  in Joanna, but the direction of the 
violence is (in part) reversed. For Kitty, the crystallised forms of beauty are 
violently  attacked by the proliferating and uncontrollable physicality  of the 
natural world. Her perception of her pregnancy is based on a total disgust 
for natural growth: “he planted his huge tainted seed in me and it grew, in 
secret, inside me like a fungus in my womb” (158). Her expressions of 
disgust stand in counterpoint to the purificatory and cleansing aspects of 
water, described by  Illich in his history of water. “One very  special way in 
100
which the dual nature of water shows is water’s ability to purify as well as 
clean. Water communicates its purity by touching or waking the substance 
of a thing and it cleans by washing dirt  from its surface” (27). The 
distinction between purification and cleansing is important to Kitty, who 
requires both the erasure from her body of any superficial trace of nature’s 
physical processes (such as Joanna’s birth, which scars her badly) as well as 
the metaphorical purification of her spirit from the suffering in her past. 
 Illich continues, explaining how the chemical properties of water 
enable its metaphorical construction into a spiritual purifier, since water 
“acts as a solvent (it ab-solves), detaches these leftovers of past activities 
and disengages the person from an encumbrance” (29). In this context 
memories and past deeds acquire a character of dirtiness, burdening the 
individual who can only start afresh when it has all been washed away. The 
solvent nature of water arises from the “lack of rigidity in the hydrogen 
bonds between liquid water molecules” (Davie, Fundamentals of 
Hydrology 3); this accounts for its chemically  unstable nature, which allows 
water to assimilate and dissolve other substances with which it comes into 
contact. Adorno’s conception of the fluid and unstable nature of art’s 
material element is perfectly embodied by water, as both substance and 
metaphor: as Kitty  discovers, the changeability and movement that enables 
water to wash away dirt and memory can just as easily sweep away the gifts 
of beauty it has bestowed upon her. It  is up to her daughter to harness the 
mutability of water to develop an equally changeable beauty of her own.
 From this point in Kitty’s narrative after she recounts Joanna’s birth, 
she begins to privilege emeralds as the presiding metaphor for her beauty, 
gathering them from her admirers and wearing them to set off the 
dangerous sparkle of her eyes: “All that I own I own in emeralds, the stones 
I have gathered to repay my wrongs and the soft stones of my own 
eyes” (155). The possibility of making this shift  is illuminated by Adorno’s 
argument that “Artworks are static as much as they are dynamic” (106), 
their transcendent “instant  of appearance” (ibid.) as art predicated on this 
balance between the fixed and the fluid. Donoghue’s earlier suggestion that 
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form and beauty are one in the exquisite moment of conversion to artistic 
form (107) offers an explanation for Kitty’s desire to inhabit that  moment 
continually, in her fixed form of beauty. The identification of this as 
specifically a transitory  ‘instant’ or ‘moment’ makes clear the inevitability 
of her failure to remain there. Kitty finds consolation and attempts to find 
balance in fixed, hard form, and from this position turns the violence she 
has suffered back on the principle of dynamic nature which injured her — 
now embodied in her daughter Joan. 
 As Joan’s grandmother Florence reveals in her own narrative, over 
halfway  through the novel, Joan has “lovely  eyes, grey eyes like her 
father’s that reminded one of the sea” (244). Coming just after Kitty’s 
account, this statement offers some retrospective explanation for Kitty’s 
antipathy  towards Joan, whose huge size at birth almost killed her 
diminutive mother. Nelson’s sea-grey eyes, reproduced in Joan, confront 
Kitty  with a daily  reminder of the violent disruption of her beautiful form, 
mocking her with the water metaphor that betrayed her. Equally, Joan 
continues to grow uncontrollably; in Kitty’s words, “It grew like an 
enormous maggot” (178), and Joan reaches six feet by  the age of twelve. 
The lifelong battle that  rages between them embodies the tension which 
drives the novel, between abstracted beauty and dynamic materiality. The 
complexity of their relationship, in the destructive need that binds them and 
yet is continually  productive (for the progress of the narrative and 
ultimately  for Joanna herself), challenges Adorno’s restriction of art’s 
movement to one direction only. He claims that “Art acquires its specificity 
by separating itself from what it developed out of; its law of movement is 
its law of form” (3), yet in Joanna we clearly  see that the concrete materials 
of the novel, in particular water, are sublimated into metaphor without 
being separated from their physical nature. This material power is what 
animates the water metaphor into becoming a disruptive agent instrumental 
to the action and structure of the novel. Watery beauty thereby becomes a 
destabilising agent of change, through its own changeable nature.
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 An intimation of the force for change inherent in water is given in 
the opening of the novel. Joanna, recalling her childhood, formulates the 
desired “miracle” (3) that  “could make Mother love me” (ibid.) in terms of 
water, by wishing that she could acquire a less offensive shape, “as 
indistinguishable from the mass as any drop of water in that cold 
sea” (ibid.). Kitty’s anger towards Joanna, her “ripples of discontent” (38) 
manifest themselves as physical violence: “For years she had slapped and 
pinched me until I wept. It was a seemingly endless flow of tears, provoked 
as by a recurring tide” (9). The image of water which underpins both their 
identities, but in opposing ways, continues to push them apart and draw 
them together again in a tidal pattern. In Kitty we are presented with the 
clear, green-eyed but perilous beauty of water, powerful and changeable; 
the latter description is also true of Joanna’s relationship with water, but the 
emphasis in her character is on the chaotic power and proliferation of 
nature. 
 Illich claims that “water is always dual” (5), therefore requiring two 
opposing manifestations such as Joanna and Kitty. This is also true in a 
chemical context, as a “water molecule can be described as bipolar, which 
means that there is a positive and negative side to the molecule” (Davie 3). 
The hydrogen atoms have a positive charge, while the oxygen atom has a 
negative charge, pulling in opposite directions while still bonded together. 
‘Bipolar’ is a loaded word, one that could also be speculatively  applied to 
Kitty’s psychological state — and Joanna remarks of her young adulthood 
during World War II that the “war brought out in my  contemporaries the 
very things I had always felt in myself, the symptoms of manic depression. 
It was in me to swing from one extreme to another” (106). Joanna’s most 
profound swing occurs when she casts off the stigma of large, red-haired 
ugliness which has plagued her youth, and becomes in her words “a painted 
lady” (83). Here she does not refer to actual make-up but to her 
transformation into beauty, into an integrated artistic form — though 
emphatically not a fixed form, like her mother. 
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 Joanna’s transition from ugliness to beauty is oceanic: “my body, 
which had always worked against me with only  an undertow of something 
pulling admirers towards me like a gathering tide, began to work for 
me” (ibid.). Once she begins “to be known as a beauty” (ibid.), Joanna 
embarks on a series of marriages and love affairs, always changing her 
image — “cutting my hair in a new way, learning to dress” (105) — and 
relishing the changes in her body as she bears four daughters. She states 
that “I was moulded by the recurring tides of my loves” (107), and this 
watery  ability  to adapt is what enables her to float on her beauty  through 
the war, with “history welding our times into such drastic and different 
shapes” (ibid.). Kitty, holding to the past and to her fixed form of beauty, is 
cast adrift on the waves of madness and is institutionalised. 
 The metaphor of water, consistently connected to human beauty, 
washes through the text of Joanna in a wave of structural disruption. 
Functioning in a perpetually  transitional state, neither fully  physical nor 
fully  abstracted, the water in the novel materially  shapes the text  and 
interrupts the movement from empirical to immaterial which for Adorno 
defines art. 
In the impulse of every particular element of the artwork towards 
integration, the disintegrative impulse of nature secretly manifests 
itself. The more integrated artworks are, the more what constitutes 
them disintegrates in them. (68)
Zuidervaart observes how this inescapable return of the disruptive 
empirical has profound implications for Adorno’s philosophy, explaining 
how the text  of Adorno’s work “resembles a continually shifting 
constellation” (47). Rather than adopting a conventionally  linear approach, 
following established philosophical processes of logic, Adorno’s writing 
embodies the watery dissolution of concepts which for him are not isolated 
entities but organic and fluid: “there is no first principle, no origin, no arche 
or Archimedean point from which philosophy may proceed” (ibid.). This of 
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course has come to be considered a postmodern attitude, as explained in the 
introduction to this thesis. In the above quotation from Adorno, the tidal 
circularity of his argument becomes clear; having initially established the 
violent imposition of artistic form on the empirical material, he then traces 
the disruptive return of the empirical and the necessity of this fluid 
movement to the continuing existence of form, which always seeks 
equilibrium. Adorno’s ‘definitions’ of art  and beauty  do not themselves 
remain fixed, instead reflecting the mutable nature of their subject. This 
illuminates the particular relevance of Adorno’s philosophy to this chapter 
on water, since the association of mutability and the disruptive potential of 
water as a metaphor, which are present in the novels studied here, shape the 
structure as well as the content  of Adorno’s aesthetics. Zuidervaart suggests 
this when he aligns Adorno with other radical philosophies: “Besides 
providing a clue for understanding Adorno’s own writing, his rejection of 
first principles announces an opposition to logocentrism and 
foundationalism that links him with many pragmatist, poststructuralist, and 
feminist philosophers” (ibid.).
 Adorno is also, in this sense, aligned with the character of Joanna, 
whose narrative rejects the conventional upper-class values of her 
grandmother and the ideal of isolated fixity embodied by her mother. The 
primary tensions of the novel constellate around beauty, the aesthetics of 
the human form, and so it is this locus that is fundamentally disrupted by 
the movements of water in the text. A symbol to which Kitty attaches 
particular personal importance is the lighthouse of La Corbière, off the 
coast of her homeland, Jersey. The island of Jersey  itself, as well as the 
lighthouse, are fixed but isolated points surrounded by the sea, which is 
how Kitty sees herself; the lighthouse gains in significance as her own 
untouchable fixity is increasingly threatened. The four narratives are 
fundamentally separate accounts, largely the same story  delivered from 
three isolated positions and encircled by Joanna herself, titular narrator and 
embodiment of the growth and changeability  of the natural world. Under 
the pressure of Joanna’s presence and the inescapable water metaphor that 
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runs through the whole text, the isolation of each narrative is broken down: 
connections proliferate and discordance between the narratives places them 
in tension. 
 One moment in Kitty’s narrative, for instance, acknowledges and 
thereby perpetuates the dissolving of textual boundaries by figuring Joanna 
as a cancer that has proliferated in all parts of the story: “Just as the redhead 
had planted a cancer in our lives, as its father had planted one in mine, as it 
had filled the forty-five square miles of Jersey with the ineradicable seed of 
its destruction, so gradually  it managed to plant its cancer in Maman’s 
side” (184). The cancer is related to the water metaphors in its disruptive 
ubiquity and incessant shapeshifting. This literal (within the text) and 
metaphorical cancer is present in all four of the narratives, constantly 
changing its form: in Joanna’s first, childhood narrative it figures only as 
her Granny’s slightly ominous limp, an image taken and elaborated in each 
of the following three narratives to become Florence’s cancer. This tumour 
is an emblem of all the ills that their annual visits to the seaside are 
intended to wash away; a metaphor for Joanna’s prodigious growth and 
later her sexuality; for Kitty’s madness and finally, for Joanna, the cancer is 
Kitty  herself. Each of these elements are also figured in water images, 
suggesting the curious paradox that water itself is contaminated as well as 
being the great purifier, taking us back to the dual nature of water identified 
by Illich. The messiness of these connections testifies to the novel’s 
dissolution of narrative and metaphorical boundaries, insistently threatening 
the lighthouse isolation of each story as the surrounding waters encroach.
 The circularity  of the cancer metaphor reflects the novel’s narrative 
structure, moving forwards in pursuit of Joanna’s racing development but 
also back into memory, and ultimately  closing in a circle with the return to 
Joanna’s narrative voice ending the stories of all three women. The back-
and-forth motion of this narrative, returning persistently  to the same 
memories and finally coming back to its origin but in a new form, echoes 
the tides that mesmerise Kitty, Joanna and Florence as they  stare out to sea 
on holiday in Selsey, and the unpredictable tides of circumstance that 
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cruelly overturn all their hopes. Adorno’s recognition of the ineluctable 
return of the natural and its force of disruption in the work of art suggests a 
connection between Joanna herself and the narrative she constructs, a link 
forged by her challenging and ever-changing beauty: 
Decomposition at the same time releases the immanent  counterforce 
of art, its centrifugal force. — [sic] Ever less is the beautiful 
achieved in a particular, purified form; beauty is shifted to the 
dynamic totality  of the work and thus, through heightened 
emancipation from the particularity, advances formalization at the 
same time that it melds particularity with the diffuse. (68-9)
It would seem that Kitty’s quest to exist in a perfect form of static beauty is 
bound to fail, as the subjugated empirical materials from which an artwork 
is formed continue to assert their dynamic presence. Joanna is clearly 
representative of this principle, never entirely subdued by the violence 
inflicted on her by  Kitty  (the artistic principle). But does Joanna finally 
triumph? Her oceanic narrative, whose tides return to the same stories and 
rewrite them from another character’s perspective in a continual challenge 
to a single, fixed interpretation, does indeed ‘decompose’ the fixity of 
Kitty’s beauty as Adorno claims it must. 
 We last encounter Kitty restrained in a mental institution, her 
beauty gone but the flashing emeralds of her eyes still so powerful that  she 
has to be kept in a separate room to avoid frightening the other patients 
(254). Yet Joanna still craves a reconciliation, or at least some kind of 
recognition, from her mother; she does not find it, refusing to repeat in her 
narrative the last words Kitty  speaks to her, and which are sufficient  to 
prompt Joanna to a suicide attempt. However, in this desire for 
reconnection with her mother as the symbol of beauty, Joanna’s narrative 
streams into an integrated form, a whole. As Kitty loses her beauty Joanna 
discovers her own very different version, one of plenty and proliferation 
(especially in her ample hair and breasts), in the manner that Adorno claims 
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“beauty is shifted to the dynamic totality of the work” (68-9). The novel 
supports Adorno’s insistence that beauty still requires form to exist, in the 
way that the narrative, driven by water images and reflecting them in its 
tidal structure, finally coalesces into a circle that accepts its own closure — 
Joanna’s approaching death. 
 It does indeed appear that through her “heightened 
emancipation” (ibid.) from the fixed particularity  of her mother’s beauty, 
Joanna has in her liberty  circled back to the form of beauty she had 
rejected, through her narrative that “melds particularity with the 
diffuse” (ibid.). The inevitable progression of time becomes conflated in its 
fixed specificity with Kitty’s type of beauty, destroying Joanna’s sexual and 
natural chronology: “The clock has annihilated my darlings and broadcast 
all my old kisses to the muddy waves . . . It takes me back to Mother. Even 
its precision seems to be synchronised by the ruthless mechanism of her 
eyes” (258). It is the waves that take Joanna back to Kitty, the sea which 
she has herself imbued into her narrative as a shaping metaphor, but which 
remains influenced by Kitty, whose presence transforms the regularity  of 
the tides into the ‘precision’ by which Kitty has always defined herself.
 However, Joanna has a parting shot. The metaphor of cancer, with 
which Kitty has identified her daughter, is co-opted in the very  last lines of 
the novel by Joanna into a final challenge to the fixed form of beauty. 
Joanna twists the metaphor to reimagine Kitty, through her emeralds, as the 
cancer: 
 I imagine the cold in my spine to be a perfect emerald that will 
shatter when I go . . . What would my  whole life have been like if I 
could have seen you as a glittering jewel and that only, a flawless 
precious stone? Gems have no meaning . . . Emeralds and glass 
look much the same in this darkness. (260) 
A formal symmetry is created in Joanna and Kitty’s picturing of each other 
as their own tumour, but in Adorno’s terms this imposition of form destroys 
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the living growth imaged in the cancer. Joanna’s last line, conflating 
emeralds and the inferior glass, is an act  of resistance to the all-
encompassing tyranny of form, undermining the perfect particularity  of 
Kitty’s emeralds.
Soup, Ink, River: Dirty Water
Adorno’s elaboration of the tension between fixity  and mutability  in 
art  bears a particular relevance to the postmodern techniques of 
intertextuality and the reimagining of traditions that continue to feature in 
much post-1980 writing — and especially neo-Victorian fiction, which 
refers to a notable trend of contemporary  fiction set in the Victorian period. 
As Voigts-Virchow writes, “neo-Victorian appropriation destabilises 
complacent assumptions about the static, homogenous character of either 
the Victorian or the contemporary period” (113). In the case of Sarah 
Waters’ Fingersmith, the metaphorical binary upon which the Victorian 
ideal of (feminine) beauty is defined — clean/dirty, white/dark, contained/
uncontained — is subverted and finally unravelled completely. Water is 
intricately  bound up with this ideal in its traditional cultural role as cleanser 
and purifier, since “water, which has always been perceived as the feminine 
element of nature, in the nineteenth century was tied to a new ‘hygienic’ 
image of woman, which was itself a creation of the Victorian age. Only the 
late nineteenth century tied female nudity as a cultural symbol to the tap 
water of the bathroom” (Illich 1). 
In the contemporary hands of Sarah Waters, this hygienically  watery 
image of beauty is sullied by the pervasive presence of dirty  water in the 
narrative, taking on the forms of soup, river water and ink. Adorno 
articulates the operation of this kind of modified metaphor: like the ever-
growing Joanna, the dirty  water of Fingersmith represents the “gravitational 
pull” (133) of “the amorphous” (ibid.) in the integrated work of art, a force 
which “increases the more thoroughly art is organised” (ibid.). However, 
this disruptive water becomes a structuring principle — “It  is exclusively 
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the amorphous that makes the integration of the artwork possible” (ibid.) — 
which shapes Waters’ narrative into a subverted binary reflecting the binary 
of feminine beauty  which she destabilises. The twinned narratives of Sue 
and Maud initially reflect their own positioning on the binary of beauty 
(Maud is the white, clean beauty; Sue is dark, plain and unclean), but in 
their separate accounts of the same events this dichotomy begins to dissolve 
into shifting confusion. Ultimately, their divided narratives blur into an 
amorphous mass, as the protagonists strive to overcome their physical and 
metaphorical separation to be joined in their love.
 The neo-Victorian narrative is itself already a reflection, a 
contemporary  rewriting of the Victorian that may  distort  its subject, just as 
Maud’s narrative, following and doubling Sue’s, subverts the story that it 
reflects. Therefore, Fingersmith’s narrative assimilates the “Assumed, 
mistaken or secret identities [which] are stock plot features in Victorian 
novels” (Voigts-Virchow 118), and intensifies the blurring of distinctions 
thus created until the narrative itself seems to suffer a mistaken identity. 
Voigts-Virchow offers the theory that this “would propose neo-Victorianism 
as a kind of third space, not Victorian, not contemporary. The faux 
Victorian novel is a fascinating area of tension between the Victorian and 
the contemporary, a hybrid space of mimicry, camouflage and assertions of 
difference” (112). The hybrid nature of the neo-Victorian narrative is thus 
dissolved into a large undifferentiated space where categorical distinctions 
collapse. This concept is especially  pertinent to Fingersmith considering 
that the metaphor of water is the agent of this dissolution, as it breaks down 
the carefully distinguished metaphors of its Victorian predecessors. Such 
reworking enacts the moment Adorno describes, “When artworks are 
viewed under the closest scrutiny, the most objectivated paintings 
metamorphose into a swarming mass and texts splinter into words. As soon 
as one imagines having a firm grasp on the details of an artwork, it 
dissolves into the indeterminate and undifferentiated, so mediated is 
it” (134). 
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 Neo-Victorian fiction is itself a close scrutiny of Victorian fiction, 
and in its mediation of nineteenth-century  texts it embodies the experience 
of splintering that Adorno describes as inevitable. Novels like Fingersmith, 
which as the author affirms takes the sensation fiction of the 1860s as its 
springboard (Armitt 2007 116), disrupt their Victorian narrative models 
with this close attention that plunges their narrative into the splintered and 
amorphous. Considering Adorno’s consistent employment of watery 
metaphors (for example, the repetition of ‘dissolves’) to articulate this 
process, it is little surprise that the aptly named Waters also engages water 
as a driving force of narrative disruption. As in Joanna, these water images 
gather in a whirlpool around feminine beauty, in particular its dislocation 
from a single, fixed attribution to one character to become a floating 
signifier, and also beauty’s role in the artistic imposition of form on to 
Adorno’s “unformed nature” (133).
 In her self-conscious position as neo-Victorian writer, Waters has no 
qualms about giving her characters Dickensian, descriptive names: Maud 
Lilly is so named to illustrate the lily-whiteness of her beauty, immediately 
placing her on the pretty side of the Victorian binary. We first see Maud 
from Sue’s perspective, when the latter has come to serve as her maid in a 
scheme to marry Maud to Richard Rivers (a slippery character), despoil her, 
consign her to a madhouse and take her fortune. However, to Sue, with her 
“sharp” face (11) and “plain brown” hair (6), Maud shines like a 
“pearl” (142), and she falls in love. But while Sue slips easily over 
gendered sexual boundaries, Maud is contained, secluded within her uncle’s 
house and the constricting version of femininity he has imposed on her. 
Trained to be quiet and fastidiously clean, with her hands always protected 
by white kid gloves, Maud is both attracted and disturbed by the dirty  water 
that continually threatens to sully her beauty. Refusing to eat the eggs 
provided for her breakfast — symbols of generation and proliferating life 
— Maud will however consume the “Clear soup” (92) which Sue then 
orders, “Clear as you can make it” (ibid.). The repetition of clarity 
demonstrates Sue’s assimilation of the clear-water image constructed 
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around Maud, perpetuating the sense that her white, “buttoned up” (66) 
beauty is constantly  in danger of contamination. By willingly eating the 
soup, Maud also participates in this construction. 
 Water, then, is permissible to the clean, white beauty but only  in a 
perfectly  pure and contained form. Seeing that her white gloves “had got 
splashed” (92) by the soup, Maud is visibly disconcerted by  the idea that 
“the water has a little fat in it” (ibid.), though Sue assures her that “It’s only 
water” (ibid.). This significant phrase is soon repeated, when Maud is made 
uneasy by  the dirty river that runs past  her uncle’s house: observing its 
changeability, she remarks that  “In the autumn, it floods . . . and all the 
rushes are drowned. I don’t  care for that” (93). Her implied fear of 
drowning in uncontained waters, ‘the amorphous’ as Adorno would term it, 
lies in contradiction to her subsequent resentment of the ice that will 
contain the river: “I think it is freezing already. Do you see how it 
struggles? It wants to flow, but the cold will still it” (ibid.). The water is 
already sending ripples of disturbance through the narrative, muddying the 
clarity  of Maud’s characterisation with contradiction and uncertainty. How 
contained is she really? And does she wish to flow like the river, or be 
protected from its flooding mass?
 Perhaps the key  to Maud’s paradox — one we shall encounter again 
in The Sea Lady — lies in the nature of her construction as clean white 
Victorian beauty. Waters makes it explicit that this is a construction, 
portraying Maud, particularly through her own narrative, as having been 
shaped by her surroundings and her sinister uncle; an imposition of artistic 
form on unruly matter, it  would seem. Not only buttoned up in gloves and 
corset, Maud’s very flesh seems to be carefully  contained. Sue observes 
that “Her face was as smooth as wax” (76), implying Sue’s perception of 
her as an innocent, a tabula rasa for their mercenary scheme. However, 
despite the sculptural form of Maud’s face, “her voice [is] like 
water” (ibid.), suggesting again a desire for the freedom of fluidity. Later, a 
moment in Maud’s narrative presents a distorted reflection of this one, 
when she implicitly  ascribes this construction of her — water contained by 
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wax — to the influence of her uncle’s house. Mr Lilly’s “particular 
mania” (194) is pornography, and he enlists his orphaned niece Maud to 
copy out, catalogue and read in company  the pornographic texts he collects. 
In this scenario are planted the seeds of the metaphor of ink as dirty water; 
the books that populate this story  are all morally tainted. It is to this 
corruption that Maud refers when she muses on “the darkness and the 
silence which fills my uncle’s house like water or like wax” (ibid.). 
 The echoing of Sue’s perception of Maud as water contained by  wax 
turns this later statement  into a suggestion that Maud has been formed in 
this way by the house, her environment. Swyngedouw in Social Power and 
the Urbanization of Water (2004) explains the physical and metaphorical 
interdependence of people and nature, through the network of social, 
commercial and symbolic processes which combine to form our unified 
conceptions of each. This idea offers particular illumination of the 
construction of Maud’s character through her network of relationships with 
her surroundings: especially including water, as we shall see.
Every  body and every  thing is a cyborg, a mediator, part social, part 
natural, lacking discrete boundaries and internalizing the multiple 
contradictory relations that redefine and rework them. Take the 
example of urban water. Drinking tap water combines the 
circulation of productive, merchant and financial capital with the 
production of land rent and their associated class relations; the 
ecological transformation of hydrological complexes and the 
biochemical process of purification with the libidinous sensation 
and the physiological necessity of drinking fluids; the social 
regulation of access to water with images of clarity, cleanliness, 
health, and virginity. (18)
The cyborg is a reference to Donna Haraway’s 1985 essay  “A Cyborg 
Manifesto”, a philosophical discussion of our interdependence with 
technology; Haraway’s theories invite such extensions as Swyngedouw’s, 
113
as the concept of the cyborg is predicated on the dissolution of categorical 
ontological boundaries and on the fundamental hybridity of human life. 
Swyngedouw’s argument is that as soon as humans begin to process nature 
— initially in agriculture but now in an enormous variety of ways — we are 
implicated in it and become part of it, our processes of involvement with it 
modifying our conceptions of ourselves and nature. 
 Swyngedouw’s example of urban water, which undergoes many 
processes and transformations before becoming the clean, purified drinking 
water that was first established in the Victorian era, clearly implies through 
the associations of “cleanliness, health, and virginity” (Swyngedouw 18) 
how water is anthropomorphised and people are correspondingly made 
watery. The feminine beauty ideal built on the metaphor of clean(ed) water, 
noted by Illich as a Victorian creation arising coincidentally with the 
development of the bathroom (1), is established by Waters only for the 
purpose of immediately  muddying it. In this she affirms Swyngedouw’s 
claim for the permeability  and instability of ontological boundaries; we are 
already bound up  with water, and so Maud could not possibly escape 
contact with the soup and dirty river water as they are connected facets of 
both her surroundings and the symbol upon which her identity is built.
 The muddying of the beauty metaphor appropriately, inevitably, 
spills over the narrative boundaries to influence the structure of the text. 
The plot, in which Maud is the innocent mark in the scheme carried out by 
Sue, Mr Rivers and Sue’s adopted mother Mrs Sucksby to trick her out of 
her fortune and leave her in a lunatic asylum, is dissolved and distorted 
when it is reflected in Maud’s narrative, which is twinned with Sue’s. It is 
Waters’ privilege as a contemporary writer that she can retrospectively undo 
the strict ontological distinctions underpinning Victorian writing. Adorno 
describes the ontological framework of the nineteenth-century  artwork as 
an effort towards a fixity  of form isolated from physical materials or 
processes: “During the nineteenth century aesthetic semblance was 
heightened to the point of phantasmagoria. Artworks effaced the traces of 
their production, probably because the victorious positivistic spirit 
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penetrated art  to the degree that art aspired to be a fact and was ashamed of 
whatever revealed its compact immediateness as mediated” (135). 
 The subversion of this isolation of the artwork is evident in the 
anachronisms present  in Fingersmith, observed by Voigts-Virchow in “the 
faux London lowlife slang of Waters’s character narrators [which], 
therefore, appears as a curious mixture of historically  contingent and 
contemporary, muddling notions of an indigenous and alien Victorian 
cant” (119). The self-conscious muddling of historical boundaries belies 
Llewellyn’s claim that “this contemporary fragmentation of narrative 
structure at the level of the historical narrative has been mirrored in 
contemporary  fiction’s own attempt to return to the seeming security of 
coherency of narrative structures and textual order as represented by the 
nineteenth century” (28-9). Llewellyn does not seem to have read 
Fingersmith closely enough: the structuring principle of the entire narrative 
is, conversely, the muddling of ‘coherency’ and ‘order’ with no discernible 
nostalgia for the structures of the nineteenth century. 
 This is achieved primarily through the deconstruction of Maud’s 
character as the white, innocent beauty. As the elaborate scheme unfolds it 
transpires that she is not its mark; Sue is, and further, she is not Maud Lilly 
— again, that is really  Sue. The beauty binary upon which these two 
characters have been placed in opposition to each other begins to collapse 
when Maud and Sue challenge the distinction between them by having sex, 
fusing and confusing “the soft wet corners of our lips” (142). This 
dissolution becomes an active force in the narrative at the very end of Sue’s 
first account, when instead of Maud being left at the madhouse, Sue is 
abandoned there under Maud’s name and identity (174). Her assertion that 
she is Sue Smith5, the maid, only serves to confirm the claim that she is 
mad. When Sue realises she has been tricked, she looks back at Maud and 
the beauty that had predicated that slippery identity is gone, having come 
unfixed: “Her face was thin, her hair was dull” (ibid.). However, the 
hardness and fixity that had previously  seemed to forcibly contain the 
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5 Sue’s pseudonym as the maid. Her real name is actually Trinder — or so she thinks.
moving waters of Maud’s ‘real’ self are now emphasised, as the deliberate 
construction of her persona becomes clear. While her “eyes were wild, with 
tears starting in them” (ibid.), these are fake; “beyond the tears, her gaze 
was hard. Hard as marble, hard as brass” (ibid.). 
 Water no longer functions as a coherent signifier of natural freedom 
constrained by violent artistic form. Instead, in Maud’s artificial tears its 
significance has become contingent and subject to change, or ‘volatilized’ 
in Adorno’s words: “Under micrological study, the particular — the 
artwork’s vital element — is volatilized; its concretion vanishes. The 
process, which in each work takes objective shape, is opposed to its fixation 
as something to point to, and dissolves back from whence it came” (134). 
Under the scrutiny which neo-Victorian narratives apply to their nineteenth-
century models, the particular images and the empirical matter from which 
they  are formed — water in this case — become active and subversive in 
response to the shaping form of the artwork. Water rebels against a single 
metaphorical signification.
 This subversion occurs again in the infiltration of ink (as dirty  
water) into Maud’s character. It transpires that she was never innocent at 
all, never clean in a Victorian moral sense. She has spent most of her life 
reading and copying out  pornographic texts, sullying her fingers and her 
soul with their filthy inscriptions. Sue was not teaching her the arts of love 
as she supposed, but had been manipulated into the role of seducer so as to 
be seduced into a loyalty to Maud. The narrative which Maud presents, 
after Sue’s, is a mirror image, recounting a mercenary  plot — the same plot 
as was recounted before — but  in distorted, altered form. The places of 
Maud and Sue are reversed when the latter is left in the lunatic asylum; but 
when they are reversed a second time, with Sue identified as the child of 
rich Mrs Lilly, who sought shelter at Mrs Sucksby’s, the real mother of 
Maud, Waters is not returning to the security of a neat Victorian structure as 
Llewellyn asserts. Rather, she is parodying this structure and the 
convolutions required to reach such a semblance of order. 
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 In line with Swyngedouw’s insistence on the inextricable 
interconnection of the elements of human existence, Adorno’s description 
of the artwork’s illusion of unity helps explain why Waters’ self-conscious 
mockery of it is an important subversion. “No artwork is an undiminished 
unity; each must simulate it, and thus collides with itself” (138), a collision 
enacted by the narratives of Sue and Maud. The simulation of unity, 
evidenced by the too-neat plot reversals of Fingersmith, in unavoidable, 
since when “Confronted with an antagonistic reality, the aesthetic unity that 
is established in opposition to it immanently  becomes a semblance” (ibid.). 
The impossibility  of an integrated artistic unity  is due to the elements — 
water here — which have been utilised to produce it; “The integration of 
artworks culminates in the semblance that their life is precisely  that of their 
elements. However, the elements import the heterogeneous into artworks 
and their semblance becomes apocryphal” (ibid.). The twists and 
subversions of the water metaphors and the narrative driven by them are 
testament to the fundamental instability  and fertility of water as an element, 
both physically and metaphorically. Any beauty predicated on water 
metaphors, therefore, must be equally slippery.
 The slipperiness of beauty in Fingersmith, as well as in Joanna and 
The Sea Lady, demonstrates the potential of beauty as a socially 
destabilising force. Steiner writes that “Many people, fearing a pleasure 
they  cannot control, have vilified beauty  as a siren or a whore” (xxi), and 
the metaphorical connection of beauty with water shows how 
uncontrollable it can be. However, in Fingersmith Waters harnesses the 
mutable and subversive nature of her artistic elements, and concludes by 
embracing Sue and Maud within the dirty water that has flowed continually 
around and through them. Unable to forget Maud, Sue hunts her down in 
her (now deceased) uncle’s house, with only  two servants and the library of 
pornographic books for company. Maud is not only writing for her living, 
she is writing pornography, recording her subversive longing for Sue, “all 
the words for how I want you” (547). Despite her shock at this mode of 
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living, Sue can only  gaze at Maud’s face, on which her inky fingers have 
left “smudges of black” (ibid.):
I still could not bear it. I quickly  reached and stopped her wrist; then 
wet my thumb and began to rub at the flesh of her brow. I did it, 
thinking only  of the ink, and her white skin . . . She turned her head 
and put her mouth against my palm. Her lips were soft. The smudge 
stayed black upon her brow; and after all, I thought, it was only ink. 
(547.)
The unstable image of Maud’s clean, white beauty has returned to enthral 
Sue, and it is the impulse to keep her beauty clean that prompts Sue to 
touch her, “thinking only of the ink, and her white skin” (ibid.). However, 
the physical softness of Maud’s lips recalls Sue from her nascent 
reconstruction of Maud as an aesthetically fixed construction of beauty. 
This realisation allows her instead to redeem the dirtiness of the ink, and of 
Maud’s watery  beauty, by  embracing the very mutability that makes water 
subversive and threatening. If water is constantly changing, then its 
physical and moral purity is not a fixed characteristic; waters are 
perpetually moving, mixing and washing dirt  away. The black smudge that 
seems to besmirch Maud’s beauty is, therefore, “only ink” (ibid.); which is 
itself, of course, “only water” (92-3).
 Isobel Armstrong in The Radical Aesthetic (2000) expands on the 
subversive potential of beauty  which is implied in Adorno’s meditations on 
its instability  and the inevitable return of its empirical elements. She is 
specifically responding to Terry Eagleton’s discussion of the aesthetic as a 
bourgeois property in The Ideology of the Aesthetic (1990), in which he 
assigns this political association to the aesthetic on the basis of its 
amorphous materiality. For Eagleton as for Adorno (though their 
articulation of this and their agendas are different), beauty transcends the 
messy material world: “Within the dense welter of our material life, with all 
its amorphous flux, certain objects stand out in a sort of perfection dimly 
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akin to reason, and these are known as the beautiful” (Eagleton 17). 
Although, like Adorno’s violent imposition of artistic form on the material, 
the orderly ‘perfection’ Eagleton identifies is distinguished from matter by 
its kinship  to reason, he considers this “kind of ideality” (ibid.) to “inform 
their sensuous existence from within” (ibid.), so that  aesthetic beauty is a 
property  of material entities, rather than having an abstract existence itself 
like Plato’s Form of beauty. It is due to this physicality  of beauty that 
Eagleton sees in it  “the first stirrings of a primitive materialism” (13) which 
ultimately implicates the aesthetic with materialistic bourgeois ideology. 
 In Armstrong’s reading, what is essentially “wrong with the 
aesthetic” (30) for Eagleton is its messy instability, its material nature, 
taking us back to the dirty water of Fingersmith that constantly  threatens 
artistic form. She describes the aesthetic in distinctly  watery (and Adornian) 
terms:
It is viscous enough as a concept already: the process of creation, 
the art object, the experience of its reception, the theorizing of it as 
concept and praxis — all these are comprehended in the term 
aesthetic. But for Eagleton the aesthetic is positively  runny. It is 
both everywhere and nowhere. It secretly  confounds the distinction 
between fact and value . . . It collapses sign and thing . . . It 
dissolves cognition and percept . . . (Armstrong 30-1 emphasis in 
text)
Armstrong’s emphasis on viscosity, confounding, collapsing and dissolving 
cast the aesthetic in precisely the same role that water plays in the narrative 
of Fingersmith, although it is specifically beauty that figures in the novel. 
The consistence with which we have seen beauty  and water figured in the 
same terms of instability, subversion and change suggests that they are 
essentially  related on this level, and that their active combination in an 
artistic work has the potential to enact a substantial subversion of ‘fixed’ 
social traditions and artistic forms. 
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 This is certainly an appropriate interpretation of Fingersmith, 
ending as it does with a lesbian couple reading and writing pornography 
while maintaining a loving relationship. Swyngedouw’s conception of 
human-environment relationships, as a shifting set of processes and 
inextricable ontological interdependence, implies the scale on which water 
is an appropriate metaphor for human cultural productions: his model is “a 
process-based episteme in which nothing is ever fixed or, at best, fixity is 
the transient moment that can never be captured in its entirety as the flows 
perpetually destroy  and create, combine, and separate” (21). Maud’s beauty 
may rise out of the dirty water in moments of aesthetic perfection, but these 
moments are transitory, and are profoundly part  of the waters from which 
they  emerge. Only a conception of beauty which is predicated on the 
subversiveness and changeability of its material can therefore endure — a 
beauty which is attempted in The Sea Lady.
Siren on the Rocks
 Ailsa Kelman, the female protagonist  of Margaret Drabble’s 2006 
novel The Sea Lady, is first introduced to us in her stately sixties, flirting 
her way through a party dressed like a mermaid “in silver sequinned 
scales” (1):
She had all at her command. She liked the random, promiscuous 
mingling, the screeches of false laughter, the dull murmur of 
platitude, the conviviality of strangers, the sparkle of bracelet and 
necklace, the clean flicker and colour and sheen of the female 
fabric . . . (9)
In this passage Drabble establishes the rippling watery style sustained 
throughout the novel, and which from the beginning is central to Ailsa’s 
construction of her own ever-changing oceanic beauty. Drabble’s short 
clauses with their repeated grammatical form — the waves of nouns and 
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their object complements — create a tidal rhythm always returning to Ailsa 
herself, who has them “at her command”. Further, the ‘sparkle’, ‘flicker’ 
and ‘sheen’ add a visual evocation of water to accentuate the rippling 
rhythm. 
 In accordance with the symbolic fertility that Eliade identifies as 
central to human perceptions of water as “germinative, containing the 
potentiality  of all forms” (188), the promiscuity of the party that Ailsa 
enjoys so much is reflected in her own identity. Having chosen to present 
an academic award in a dress whose “bodice was close-fitting, and the 
metallic skirt clung to her solid hips” (1), Ailsa’s appearance is boldly 
sexual as well as distinctly watery; “She gleamed and rippled with smooth 
muscle, like a fish” (ibid.). Consciously harnessing the fascination of the 
mythical siren, her dress “flared out below the knees, concealing what 
might once have been her tail” (ibid.). The fact that this lengthy and 
seductive characterisation hinges entirely on a dress is significant in 
revealing the deliberately constructed nature of Ailsa’s beauty. This 
construction is affirmed throughout the novel, as in the figuration of her 
underwear as literally structuring: undressing after the event she “unhooked 
her white boned armour from her full soft breasts” (18). In restructuring her 
flesh, which is ample, supple and adaptable to different shapes, Ailsa 
exploits the fluidity  of her body and identity  to develop a magnetising and 
resilient beauty  that is very clearly  a work of art — in Adorno’s terms, an 
equilibrium of material and form.
 This meeting of form and flesh is highly sexualised in the novel, a 
coupling which echoes the water symbolism observed by Illich in creation 
myths, where water “tends to stand for the original couple — more often 
than not for the twins who before creation lay in each other’s arms” (5). 
The “promiscuous mingling” (Drabble 9) of water so embraced by Ailsa is 
not an arbitrary  or ineffable metaphor, but  is one of its chemical properties: 
“Even H₂O, that pregnant compound that emerged from the eighteenth-
century laboratory of French chemist Antoine Lavoisier is shockingly 
promiscuous — it  goes and bonds with practically everything once it 
121
escapes the lab!” (Linton 4). The conjunction of the scientific and mythical 
perspectives is neatly  paralleled in The Sea Lady by the relationship 
between the siren-like Ailsa and the marine biologist Humphrey Clark that 
forms the core of the narrative. Some reviewers (such as Rebecca Seal in 
The Observer, 6th August 2006) have regarded the relationship between 
controversial feminist Ailsa and conservative scientist  Humphrey as 
unlikely, yet they  are joined by the nature of their medium, water. Their 
attraction is described primarily  in sexual terms, possessed as they are by 
the fertile promiscuity of the water which is their element; Humphrey 
studies it and dives frequently for his research, while Ailsa embodies it  in 
her beauty and swims at every opportunity. 
 The metaphor of water functions as a structuring agent in The Sea 
Lady differently to the way  it  does in Joanna. While in de Terán’s novel 
artistic form is aspired towards, doing violence to the natural which 
threatens it in return, Drabble’s narrative is built  around the desire to return 
to the fluidity  and freedom of water, of nature. While Adorno’s complex 
and multivalent  arguments initially  emphasise the violent imposition of 
form over material, he subsequently describes the retaliation and then co-
operation of the material:
 . . . those artworks that succeed rescue over into form something of 
the amorphous to which they ineluctably do violence. This alone is 
the reconciling aspect of form. The violence done to the material 
imitates the violence that  issued from the material and that endures 
in its resistance to form. (65)
The notion of ‘rescuing’ the amorphous into form is an uncannily  perfect 
description of the movements of Drabble’s narrative. After the party at 
which we meet Ailsa, she employs a meditation technique to help  her sleep 
which involves the narrativisation of herself, body and spirit, into water. 
With no sense of the amorphous as threatening, but rather finding a 
maternal comfort in “the dark sustaining waters of the womb” (19), Ailsa 
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sinks into a trance in which “the bones dissolve, the flesh melts away, the 
body dwindles, and the past liquefies” (ibid.). Echoing the ripples of the 
repeated clause structure in the passage describing the party (9), this watery 
prose again transforms Ailsa into a creature of the sea. The hope for 
liquefaction of the past evokes the metaphorical ability  of water to purify 
the spirit, “Breaking up all forms, doing away  with all the past, water 
possesses this power of purifying, of regenerating” (Eliade 194). In Ailsa’s 
meditation the natural, empirical element of water is sublimated into a 
spiritual sanctuary, an abstract space in which one can transcend the clutter 
and contingencies of life. This process operates in a similar manner to the 
process by which Adorno describes the artwork imposing form on matter in 
order to rise out of it. It seems odd to employ matter for the purpose of 
escaping it, but it is in fact essential to eliminate the threat of nature by 
transforming it into something different — otherwise, as Adorno has 
described and as we have seen in the fate of Kitty, nature will return with 
vehemence. This process will appear again in the final chapter of this 
thesis, Gold.
 Therefore, in Drabble’s foregrounding of water as a physical 
substance, but one which governs the artistic form of the narrative, she 
enables its sublimation into a dynamic balance of opposites. Adorno writes, 
“Only when art’s other is sensed as a primary layer in the experience of art 
does it become possible to sublimate this layer, to dissolve the thematic 
bonds” (7) that keep nature separated from the artwork, indicating the 
possibility of resolving the conflict of form and nature by  sublimating 
nature entirely into the abstract. Here Adorno employs watery  language 
himself to express these concepts (such as ‘dissolve’, one of many watery 
terms in Aesthetic Theory), as Drabble does throughout her novel. With the 
grammatical construction of the meditation passage structuring the text into 
a fluid, tidal form, and the impetus of the plot driving Ailsa and Humphrey 
back to their memories and mistakes together in order to absolve them, 
Drabble sublimates water into narrative form without entirely  sacrificing 
the materiality of the water. Its wetness may only be invoked, but the 
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fluidity and amorphousness that constitute its physical form are still present 
in the movements of the text, and the beauty of Ailsa. Insofar as writing can 
aspire to the condition of water, this writing succeeds. Adorno too claims 
that aspects of the empirical must be assimilated and deployed by the 
artwork as form, so that “The synthesis achieved by means of the artwork is 
not simply forced on its elements; rather, it recapitulates that in which these 
elements communicate with one another” (9). The violence enacted in the 
meeting of form and material in Joanna is, it seems, not necessary here.
 It is clear in Adorno’s writings, as well as the watery novels 
examined in this chapter, that the precarious equilibrium of form and matter 
cannot be other than transitory. The dynamic nature of the constitutive 
material of the artwork can only be fixed for a moment, which gives birth 
to beauty: “Every artwork is an instant; every  successful work is a 
cessation, a suspended moment of the process, as which it reveals itself to 
the unwavering eye” (Adorno 7). Steiner offers a conception of beauty that 
broadly agrees with Adorno’s, describing its fluidity and fleeting 
crystallisation as essential to its nature as a process rather than an attribute. 
She writes, “Beauty is an unstable property because it  is not a property  at 
all” (xxi); instead, beauty “is the name of a particular interaction between 
two beings, a ‘self’ and an ‘Other’” (ibid.) in the aesthetic moment. With 
this distinction Steiner adds a human element that is appropriate to the 
sexuality and generation so structurally (and conceptually) vital to The Sea 
Lady, Fingersmith and Joanna. Once again, water shows itself to be a 
perfect embodiment of beauty: as Linton argues, water should be 
considered “primarily  as a process rather than a thing . . . On this view, 
things such as H₂O do not constitute the fundamental reality of water but, 
rather, are fixations that occur at the nexus of the water process and the 
social process of producing and representing scientific knowledge.” (4). 
The abstract and the concrete meet again here, in the chemical and social 
processes involving water, echoing Adorno’s depiction of the interaction 
between form and material. This interaction occurs again in The Sea Lady, 
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in two moments of fixation that briefly  arrest  the flux of the narrative with 
an image of perfect beauty.
 It is with particular narrative self-consciousness that Drabble 
presents Humphrey and Ailsa’s moment of “Perfect Happiness” (221), 
when they embody perfect beauty  and are fully  aware of it. This self-
awareness, of both narrator and protagonists, is appropriate since the 
crystallisation of the otherwise restlessly  rippling, changing narrative is a 
significant event that occurs only twice in the novel. At these moments the 
relationship  between Humphrey and Ailsa which causes all the tumult of 
the story is briefly fixed, and the rest of the narrative washes round these 
isolated points as around Kitty’s beloved La Corbière lighthouse in Joanna. 
In the first  of these moments, Drabble emphasises both its transitory nature 
and its eternal fixity  in memory (and by implication, in the text), employing 
water once again to express the instability  of the medium in which the 
tableau floats:
Humphrey Clark and Ailsa Kelman have known Perfect Happiness. 
They  have known it and named it. It has a place, and the place has a 
name. It is a memorable name. Their lives will flow outwards and 
onwards, bearing them helplessly away  from this place and from 
each other, but here they  are together, in this place and in this 
moment, and they lie calm and still, with the peace that comes from 
satisfied desire. (221)
The deliberate statement of location and naming fix this moment in discrete 
specificity, accounted for in both concrete and abstract terms. Drabble’s 
blunt declaratives emphasise the act of fixation involved in creating this 
effect — “They have known it and named it” (ibid.) — while briefly halting 
the otherwise shifting, multi-clausal stream of the prose. This does not last 
long; as soon as the immortal (or almost) crystallisation of the moment has 
been established, it is washed away in the relentless wave of clauses 
describing the “flow outwards and onwards” (ibid.). It remains as a 
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memory but significantly in the present tense, simultaneously static and 
dynamic.
 Drabble’s self-conscious correlation of form and content emphasises 
the constructed nature of the moment of beauty, echoed in many instances 
of Ailsa’s own structuring of her beautiful image. Adorno asserts the role of 
self-consciousness in art as vital, writing that “Artworks become 
appearances, in the pregnant sense of the term — that is, as the appearance 
of an other — when the accent falls on the unreality of their own 
reality” (105). Here he is discussing the aspiration of art to transcend the 
material from which it  is made, and then to transcend itself, moving beyond 
its own form towards the ‘something more’ that is implied in the work 
(ibid.). In this statement the term ‘pregnant’ suggests the potential for 
generating something more, and it is precisely in the movement beyond the 
text, through the self-consciousness that implies an outside, that this 
transcendence is achieved. Equally, this ‘something more’ must be other to 
the artwork, and so the instant of appearance that characterises successful 
art is an appearance of an external other. Steiner’s concept of beauty as an 
interaction with an other runs parallel to Adorno’s here, suggesting the 
human embodiment of this process found in ancient metaphors of water as 
a coupling (Illich 5) and in the connection between Humphrey  and Ailsa in 
The Sea Lady. This young, beautiful couple are in harmonious interaction 
with each other (as others) as well as their beautiful surroundings. The 
transcendence of the ‘something more’ is “known” (221) and 
“named” (ibid.), as they inhabit the isolated moment in the full knowledge 
that it  is an isolated and significant moment of perfect  beauty. Outside of 
this moment is necessarily implied the rest of the narrative, the rest of their 
lives which will act as the foil for this transcendent instant. Of course this 
ineffable ‘something more’ cannot be grasped; once this moment is over it 
will be the ‘something more’ to be ever after desired.
 Perfect beauty and happiness are born of water. Humphrey and 
Ailsa “lie flat on their backs beneath the blue sky  on the warm wooden 
deck of a large boat that rocks gently  on the infantile blue waters” (221). 
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Their supine, inactive position, placed between the symmetry of blue sky 
and blue water, embodies the moment of balance between matter and form. 
For once, nature and its artistic representation have arranged themselves in 
peaceful harmony. The description of the sea’s colour as ‘infantile’ 
foreshadows the soothing effect of its motion “like the movement of the 
waters of the womb” (ibid.) in Ailsa’s later life. Recalling Ailsa’s 
meditation technique, which consists of the aspiration to return to “the dark 
sustaining waters of the womb” (19), this moment represents a 
metaphorical fulfilment of that wish. In this novel, the mythical fertility  of 
water produces beauty (Adorno’s ‘pregnant’ artwork) and so this beauty is 
the ‘something more’ in which Ailsa and Humphrey briefly  rejoice, having 
transcended their fleeting existence. 
 It is precisely their unwonted inertia, their fixity, that allows the 
beautiful surroundings to become a setting for their own beauty, a display 
case for the unified image they present. Doing nothing but sitting pretty, 
they  are “in their sexual prime, and they know that they  are beautiful. They 
are beautiful to each other and to any  observing human eye” (222). In the 
second sentence is recalled the two interactions that are required to create 
this instant  of appearance, the observation within the artwork of its other 
(“They are beautiful to each other” (ibid.)) and the observation of an 
audience outside the artwork. Here again is a nudge of self-consciousness, 
the external gaze which integrates the disparate parts of the artwork into a 
whole. Finally, to draw attention to their momentary inertia, their lazy 
sunbathing is cast as “paying tribute to the processes that have brought 
them together to this Aegean paradise” (ibid.).
 Positioned as it is after we have met Humphrey and Ailsa in their 
solitary old age, we are all too aware that this moment of golden youth is 
fleeting. And although the imposition of artistic form, in the symmetry and 
fixity of the scene, suspends the free-flowing movement of the water-driven 
narrative, it  is to this fixed moment that the characters, and the narrative 
itself, long to return. Adorno notes the paradox inherent in this desire, 
asserting that the “instant of appearance in artworks is indeed the 
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paradoxical unity  or the balance between the vanishing and the preserved. 
Artworks are static as much as they are dynamic” (106). This is echoed in 
Swyngedouw’s description of contemporary socio-natural existence as a 
“process-based episteme in which nothing is ever fixed or, at best, fixity  is 
the transient moment that can never be captured in its entirety as the flows 
perpetually destroy  and create, combine, and separate” (21); transient fixity 
is an essential part of the process, a notion which succeeds in reconciling 
the paradox of a work that is both static and dynamic. In the conscious 
crystallisation of Humphrey  and Ailsa’s memory as “Perfect 
Happiness” (221), given a title and painted in clear lines, this moment of 
beauty becomes the node of their failed relationship, a fixed point which 
they  cannot destroy, ignore, or return to. Therefore, they have “frozen rather 
than killed off their connection” (324), exemplifying Adorno’s insistence on 
the inescapability  of the natural in the work of art — the water that 
characterises their relationship does not disappear, but is transformed into 
ice and glass.
 Drabble achieves quite a remarkable reconciliation of this 
paradoxical desire for both the freedom of water and the eternal moment of 
beauty. Throughout the novel, Ailsa has hoped that “she may learn to swim 
freely once again, in the three dimensions she was born for, not live as if 
trapped in a flat and frozen pane of glass” (19). Humphrey has watched fish 
in aquariums, observing how some “are not aware of the glass . . . But 
others dash themselves against the glass” (28-9) and wished he could “hack 
his way out of his imprisoning self” (29) into “a new dimension” (ibid.). In 
these recurring images glass functions as the petrified form of water, just as 
sparkling and transparent, but entirely imprisoning; a violently imposed 
form, such as Kitty’s emeralds in Joanna, that does not allow for the 
mutability of living matter. 
 This is not the eternity  that will satisfy Humphrey  and Ailsa, who 
need the water from which they are made to be freely moving, but in 
harmony with the rest of the elements involved. At the close of the novel, 
when after decades the former lovers have been brought back into contact 
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by the machinations of the semi-mysterious Public Orator (who both is and 
is not their childhood friend Sandy  Clegg), Drabble orchestrates a grand 
reconciliation. Nature is co-opted by form to create a framing containment 
for the water that is nonetheless allowed to flow, as the protagonists are led 
by Sandy Clegg to a tidal pool “formed by an arc of rocks, which reaches 
across and encloses the little bay, forming an irregular circle. It is a bridge 
of natural rock, its breaches reinforced here and there by small artificial 
boulders of cement and aggregate” (338). Drabble is careful to emphasise 
both the natural aspect of the pool as well as its artificial formation, 
combining the two in the augmentation of the pool with a subtle patchwork 
of manmade materials. 
Waiting for the rising tide to fill the pool, we are prepared for the 
past to be cleared away for Humphrey  and Ailsa, as the narrator remarks, 
“It has been a journey of purification” (339). As they watch — the 
necessary  observers who unify  the artwork — the water “beyond the brink 
gathers and swells and rises” (ibid.), coming from a transcendent ‘beyond’ 
to absolve the watchers. Finally, the semi-natural containment is breached 
and “a solitary little spurt of seawater bravely splashes over . . . followed by 
a trickle, which becomes a stream, and then a little waterfall” (ibid.). In a 
neat escalation, carefully  formed, the water driving the narrative is released. 
Significantly, the water is not escaping from the pool’s containment, but 
rushing into it; equally important is the certainty that it will only remain 
there briefly, for a moment, before flowing back out with the receding of 
the tide. 
But external observation is not enough, and so Ailsa seizes the 
chance to “swim freely once again” (19), restructuring her now 
“sagging” (340) flesh one more time as she “squeezes herself 
clumsily” (ibid.) into a swimming costume and dives in. In the context of 
the narrative it  is absolutely true that  “the sea is in her blood, and her salt 
blood meets the salt water” (ibid.) since it  is the oceanic metaphor that has 
constructed her character, and so it  is vital that she jump in for the scene to 
be a full meeting of abstract form and concrete material in all its 
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manifestations. It is in Humphrey’s observation that the absolution offered 
by the water in its temporary  balance between chaos and order is achieved. 
In a realisation akin to Adorno’s definition of art as both dynamic and 
static, Drabble bestows upon her character a second instant of 
transcendence:
. . . it comes to him that forgiveness need not be maintained in time. 
It may come in an instant, like grace. It need not endure. One may 
be redeemed in an instant . . . They  have forgiven one another, for 
this instant, and that will suffice. (341)
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Chapter 3
Ice
 With the freezing of wild water into ice it may seem that we have 
left movement and instability behind, transported to a realm of static, 
perfect purity. This is not the case. Though it is water that has hardened into 
solid form, ice is still water, and it retains the dynamic characteristics of 
this substance. In I May Be Some Time: Ice in the English Imagination 
(1996) Spufford describes how the ice of the Arctic “is a conjurer, whose 
revelations come as tricks, the quickness of the air deceiving the eye” (88): 
he refers to the mirages created by a landscape of infinite whiteness in 
which the eye has no reference points and so it hallucinates them. The 
figuration of ice as beautiful but deceptive will be explored in detail in The 
Snow Child (2012) by Eowyn Ivey and The Ice Queen (2005) by Alice 
Hoffman, novels which are structured around a female figure whose cold, 
mysterious beauty is consistently expressed through metaphors of ice. 
 Another very  recent novel, Alexi Zentner’s Touch (2011), also 
employs a metaphor of icy beauty in the memorable image it presents of the 
narrator’s father and sister arrested in the moment of their deaths, in a river 
that freezes the drowning pair just as their hands reach towards each other, 
almost touching. In this image the operations of the ice metaphor are 
clearly  revealed, as the ice comes to represent an illusory preservation of 
human beauty. Motionless and perfectly preserved, the tableau in which 
father and child reach for each other can be seen “through the plate of 
frozen water covering them” (25) all winter. Yet though it comes to appear 
to the other characters as a sacred and eternal image, rendered tragically 
beautiful by the screen of crystalline ice, in the sudden thaw of spring their 
bodies are washed utterly away. 
 The metaphor of ice appears to transform human flesh into immortal 
artistic beauty, but this is always deceptive. A transformation does indeed 
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occur when human beauty  assimilates icy qualities, but ice is itself neither a 
stable nor static substance and so an icy  beauty is subject  to sudden change 
or destruction. Pyne writes in The Ice (1986) that “Ice is a plastic art” (17), 
his study of artistic representations of the Antarctic consistently 
anthropomorphising ice in a similar movement to the contemporary novels 
studied here. Ice is also, for Pyne, a profoundly aesthetic substance 
characterised by unpredictable change, its “fabrics constantly reform, 
recrystallize, and reorganize” (12). Such change is inherent to ice because it 
is composed of water, subject to environmental influences that can reform 
its structure or melt it back into a liquid. 
 Therefore, we will have to wait for a further shift from nature 
towards artistic form, in glass, before we approach anything like immortal 
beauty; as an artificial substance formed of natural materials, glass as a 
metaphor for human beauty negotiates the boundary between nature and 
art. It is also a substance less vulnerable to change, and therefore more 
suitable to represent a human beauty immortalised in art. The glassy beauty 
central to a novel like A. S. Byatt’s Possession will also be shown to 
contain refined essences of fruit, water and ice within its enclosure, 
engaging with their metaphorical associations. In the meantime icy beauty, 
like the glaciers that shape the polar regions, offers mere glimpses of 
eternity  which unexpectedly shift and destroy themselves in the “dynamic 
transformation of the ice” (Spufford 82).  
 Further, ice has been figured as a dangerous female beauty, as in 
Gillian Slovo’s 2004 novel Ice Road. Here, a cleaner aboard a Russian ship 
trapped by ice in the Arctic describes how the male crew are 
“bewitched” (9) by the ice: “courting them, offering herself up, and I saw 
them carried away by her scale and beauty” (ibid.), even while their lives 
are threatened by this “living, breathing, menacing thing. I have heard its 
crystals whisper in the air . . . I have even heard it scream” (40). This 
combination of magic and menace underlies the figure of ice as a metaphor 
for human beauty in each of the novels studied here, their authors drawing 
on the contradictory natural properties of ice, both static and dynamic like 
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Adorno’s descriptions of artistic beauty  (Aesthetic Theory 106). The 
fascination and terror of such blankness and unpredictability  come to the 
fore in Ivey’s The Snow Child, in which the Alaskan winter melds with the 
emotional landscape of the protagonists, whose childlessness and sense of 
emptiness prompt them to create a little girl out of snow; however, their 
beautiful icy creation will not  stay still under their shaping hands. Equally, 
in The Ice Queen by  Alice Hoffman, the protagonist  who tries to keep 
herself as cold and contained as Hans Christian Andersen’s Snow Queen 
finds her carefully  constructed existence melting and rearranging beyond 
her control.
 We have already  observed in The Sea Lady the transitory  nature of 
beauty, in which for an instant form and matter pause in equilibrium in the 
manner described by  Adorno: “The instant of appearance in artworks is 
indeed the paradoxical unity or the balance between the vanishing and the 
preserved. Artworks are static as much as they are dynamic” (106). This 
instant of appearance is the brief emergence of beauty as the successful 
balance within the artwork of form and material. Moving on from the water 
metaphors that express this process so effectively, what has changed during 
the freezing process is that, in ice metaphors, form and material have more 
completely fused into one. The ambiguous substance emerging from this 
fusion, ice, is both static and dynamic in its fundamental nature. Unlike the 
closing image of Drabble’s novel, in which the sea is partially contained by 
picturesque rocks, ice images do not require an external entity  to contain 
the wildness of their water. The solidified water contains itself. In this 
elemental merging water achieves the total dissolution of boundaries 
toward which it so clearly  strove in Joanna and Fingersmith, becoming 
both form and content. 
 The Snow Child and The Ice Queen illustrate how ice can infiltrate 
human flesh and transform its beauty into a cold and magical version of its 
former self, this new beauty  harbouring a constant tension between the 
stasis of ice and the dynamism of the water that forms it. This is the tension 
which, according to Adorno, “those artworks that  succeed” (65) can only 
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resolve by  rescuing “over into form something of the amorphous to which 
they  ineluctably do violence” (ibid.). Icy  beauty, therefore, must somehow 
accommodate the restless movement of water since this is an intrinsic part 
of its own form. However, the dynamic nature of the natural material — in 
this case, both flesh and water — which ice attempts to subjugate under 
artistic form responds violently  to its constraint. This creates a circle of 
tension: “The violence done to the material imitates the violence that issued 
from the material and that endures in its resistance to form” (ibid.). Ice 
transforms flesh, giving it an artistic form that appears as a pale, chill 
beauty, but the violently restless nature of the water that creates ice can 
break through the boundaries of this form at any time.
Courting Death
 The Snow Child opens with its protagonist, Mabel, courting death 
by ice. Middle-aged and childless, she has moved to Alaska with her 
husband Jack in search of silence, away from the “neighbor children 
playfully hollering” (3) in reminder of her one stillborn child. Unable to 
face the darkness of her second Alaskan winter, Mabel walks down to the 
river, to the most “treacherous point” (6) of its frozen surface, hoping to fall 
through and drown in the roaring water beneath. This introduction of ice, 
hand in hand with death, is a recurring motif in both novels studied in this 
chapter, as well as Touch, in which the freezing of the river is the final seal 
of death. The nameless narrator of The Ice Queen, who wishes her mother 
to death on an icy night, becomes obsessed with the details of dying and 
even wishes herself into a closer acquaintance with the Reaper. Ice may be 
a transformative metaphor, turning fallible human flesh into an exquisite 
and diamond-hard perfection; nonetheless, the price of this transformation 
is high, as life cannot survive in such frozen conditions. The Snow Child 
and The Ice Queen engage with the fairy tale tradition to demonstrate this, 
each taking and transforming a well-known tale to explore the perilous 
magic of icy beauty. 
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 Ivey’s novel reworks the Russian tale of Snegurochka, the snow 
child, in which a little girl made of snow comes magically  to life to delight 
— briefly  — a childless old couple. Hoffman takes Hans Christian 
Andersen’s ‘The Snow Queen’ as her source tale to see what happens when 
one invites the ice into oneself, striving for an impermeable beauty that 
becomes increasingly inhuman. The networks of ice metaphors that  run 
through these two tales are expanded in the novels, which trace the 
processes of transformation and the negotiations with beauty and death that 
such icy metaphors entail. These networks crystallise around an icy  beauty, 
a woman cold and elusive. This beauty is a paradox because she is too 
frozen — both literally and figuratively  — to be alive in a human way, yet 
she appears as an image of human perfection. The hinge of this paradox 
turns on death: the icy  and the human cannot be joined, as one will melt and 
the other will freeze, both destroyed.
 The Ice Queen and The Snow Child develop the metaphor of icy 
beauty in a literary transformation of the original fairy tales, exploring the 
paradox that this metaphor presents. Jack Zipes considers the fairy  tale as a 
form full of “emancipatory potential” (Breaking the Magic Spell ix) 
because of its transformative nature: in his introduction to The Oxford 
Companion to Fairy Tales he writes, “If there is one ‘constant’ in the 
structure and theme of the wonder tale that  was also passed on to the 
literary fairy  tale, it  is transformation — to be sure, miraculous 
transformation” (xvii emphasis in text). The fact that Zipes can only 
identify — tentatively — one constant in the fairy tale demonstrates the 
dynamic nature of the form, which as he explains is constantly  adapted to 
new social and literary contexts. Here Zipes offers a more positive 
diagnosis for the development of art and literature than Adorno, who 
emphasises the violence of imposing artistic form on the material world as 
an element of bourgeois ideology and its indoctrination. 
 The conflicting views of artistic form as either oppressive or 
radically empowering both hinge on the transformative quality of art: it 
changes what it  touches, but the question of whether this change kills or 
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revives its object mirrors the paradox of the ice metaphors presented by 
Hoffman and Ivey. Ice transforms and preserves flesh in a beautiful form, 
but at the cost of warm human life — it is as “deceptive” (Breaking the 
Magic Spell ix) as Zipes describes the fairy tale, which he claims is capable 
of leading us on “a wild goose chase” (ibid.) after a perfect and ‘authentic’ 
tale that does not exist. There are only specific manifestations of the fairy 
tale which are under constant transformation, just as there are only 
manifestations of human beauty, and an abstract  ideal of perfection such as 
Plato’s Form of beauty remains elusive. The tension between real and ideal 
will be further unravelled throughout this chapter as it is explored in 
Hoffman and Ivey’s contemporary  rewritings of the fairy-tale image of icy 
beauty. This tension runs in parallel to the wider conflict articulated by 
Adorno and Zipes, in which the transformations enacted in and by artworks 
can be tools for suppression or subversion.
 The fascination that this cold and deathly beauty  inspires can be 
seen in Mabel, who although she cannot bear the onset of winter, “cold 
upon the valley like a coming death” (4), seeks solace in precisely this by 
choosing the coldest death of all in the frozen river. In this choice she 
imposes a form on the “Darkness so complete” (4-5) that the “days would 
run together” (ibid.), the void of the Alaskan winter that is too much like 
her own emptiness to be borne. In Mabel’s predicament the threat of nature 
described by Adorno is clearly  embodied, expressing the need to impose 
upon nature the “image of beauty as that of a single and undifferentiated 
something” (67), the need to give form to the formless darkness. We shall 
see in the Gold chapter another couple struggling to survive in the hostile 
indifference of a vast wilderness — New Zealand in this case, in Rose 
Tremain’s The Colour — and in both novels a human beauty  constructed 
out of the natural elements which oppose the characters, ice and gold, 
represents the only solution to “the fear of the overpowering wholeness and 
undifferentiatedness of nature” (ibid.). 
 At first, Mabel can only  conceive of imposing form on her 
surroundings by co-opting them to her purpose of suicide. Walking down to 
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the Wolverine River with this in mind, Mabel incorporates an element of 
iciness into herself, becoming “exhilarated and numb, chilled by the clarity 
of her purpose” (6). By channelling some of the properties of the 
wilderness into herself, and using these icy  characteristics of precision and 
clarity to shape her intentions, she concentrates the menacing 
“undifferentiatedness” (Adorno 67) of nature into a contained “moment . . . 
of black-and-white precision” (Snow Child 6).
 However, Mabel is relying on the predictability of the ice that forms 
the foundation of this moment. She thinks she knows the ice, but it  is more 
“treacherous” (6) than she realises. The visibly  “moving, dark turquoise 
water” (7) beneath the ice should remind Mabel of the unstable nature of 
ice’s constituent material, water, which is manifested in its changing state: 
“When she reached the river’s main channel . . . the ice was no longer 
brittle and white but instead black and pliant” (ibid.). Ice is not the static 
and immutable substance that it appears, but changes and shifts under 
Mabel’s feet just  as Spufford describes the “violent fluidity  of the ice” (81) 
in the Arctic, “With the glaciers calving their huge offspring along the 
coasts, and the sea-ice in motion . . . bobbing, capsizing, re-forming, carved 
into sculpture” (ibid.). It is significant that Spufford ascribes ‘fluidity’ to the 
ice, since its inherent wateriness is its most fundamental, yet most 
frequently forgotten attribute. Mabel is surprised when the ice thwarts her 
intentions; she had been counting on the treachery of its brittleness, but 
instead it  is “pliant” (7) and “the ice gave slightly  beneath her” (ibid.). 
Although she walks out to the point where the ice is known to be thinnest, 
unexpectedly “The ice bore her” (8). Mabel walks home and makes dinner.
 Like The Snow Child, Alice Hoffman’s The Ice Queen establishes 
ice as the handmaiden of death from the very beginning of the narrative. 
The narrator, who is never named, recalls the night when as an eight-year-
old she makes the kind of wish “that could change your life in an 
instant” (4). This is a crystallised instant slightly different from Adorno’s 
instant of appearance of the artwork, but nonetheless one in which disparate 
elements are drawn together in sudden shape, precise and perfect in its way, 
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just for a moment. Adorno emphasises that the way  in which “Every 
artwork is an instant” (7) is due to its being “a cessation, a suspended 
moment of the process” (ibid.). ‘Process’ here refers to the workings of 
nature and art, as well as gesturing towards an abstract notion of process in 
general, which art resists in its imposition of form. 
 Ice appears to be just  such a cessation of the processes of nature, the 
movements of water frozen into stillness and silence. However, as has 
become clear in the Water chapter, the idea of fixity depends on its 
opposite, and requires the presence of mutability  in order to exist: “Art 
acquires its specificity by separating itself from what it developed out of; its 
law of movement is its law of form. It exists only  in its relation to its other; 
it is the process that transpires with its other” (3). A moment of fixity  needs 
to be awash with movement in order to have any significance, just as the 
lighthouse in Joanna becomes meaningful for Kitty as an isolated fixture 
surrounded by sea. Ice embodies this paradox perfectly, providing an 
appearance of fixity  predicated on the very water process it  seems to be 
halting, though the process of freezing is continual; the creation of this 
image of eternal fixity is a process itself, and therefore must be transitory. 
The movements of ice that form an illusory  glimpse of eternity 
make it a highly appropriate metaphorical material with which to shape the 
wish that opens The Ice Queen. The narrator begins, “I made my wish in 
January, the season of ice” (4), in a fit of resentment against  her mother for 
going out to celebrate her birthday, leaving the narrator and her older 
brother Ned at home. Since it is the kind of wish to change a life, the season 
of ice is an ideal time for it, a season of profound and unexpected change. 
Within the narrative, ice functions as a transformative metaphor that alters 
the nature of the surroundings: “The rain had frozen and was hitting against 
the corrugated green fiberglass roof. It sounded like a gun. Ice had slipped 
onto the floorboards and turned the wood to glass” (5-6). In likening the 
sound of the frozen rain to a gun it is turned into a herald of death: the 
operation of ice on wood, an organic and once-living substance, into 
smooth glass is not only another indicator of peril, as the porch becomes 
138
dangerously  slippery — it is also a precursor of further transformations, of 
the natural into the artificial.
 Petulant, the narrator wishes aloud to her mother that “she would 
disappear right there, right then” (6), and the chill deathliness of ice is 
incorporated into the figure of her mother immediately: “My mother 
laughed and kissed me goodbye. Her kiss was clear and cold. Her 
complexion was pale, like snow” (ibid.). In her retrospective narrative, the 
narrator mocks her own failure to realise at this point that she is not the first 
and only ice queen — her mother was there before her, and the cold, silent 
woman that the narrator becomes is an echo of her predecessor. Her mother 
never reaches her birthday party, dying in a car accident for which the 
“police report blamed icy road conditions” (7). Of course, the narrator has 
made clear that the icy condition of her own wishing heart is to blame for 
her mother’s death, but ice is treacherous. Its arrested beauty is a vision of 
death, a glimpse of eternity. Adorno writes that “The affinity of all beauty 
with death has its nexus in the idea of pure form that art  imposes on the 
diversity of the living and that is extinguished in it” (68). In imposing the 
artistic form of beauty on her mother, through the ice and snow metaphors, 
the narrator “subjugates” (ibid.) the human, living manifestation of her 
mother’s beauty  under the art of ice, and so that human life must be 
“extinguished” (ibid.). However, the ice in her mother’s beauty  is 
deceptive, betraying not her daughter’s coldness but her own frozen state in 
which, the narrator comes to understand decades later, her mother left that 
night intending not to come back: death was always in that icy kiss. 
 In precisely the same manner that Mabel imposes form and beauty 
on the ice that oppresses her by  co-opting it into her suicide attempt, the 
narrator’s mother forms herself in an icy  image with the shaping power of 
her cold intention, the narrative she has planned. Telling her story with the 
undisclosed knowledge of her mother’s suicide, the narrator embraces the 
illusory  and changeable nature of ice in a way that she is unable to in her 
youth. Therefore, the ice images in this opening section of the story 
function in a dual, reflected form. On the surface, the iciness of the 
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evening, of the cruel wish, and of her mother’s face create a sense of fixed 
inevitability, of fate that  has cast blame irrevocably on the narrator. Probing 
deeper into this crystallised moment, however, the ice shifts under pressure 
from the retrospective knowledge that nothing of that evening was the way 
it appeared to the protagonist. The instant of the wish gains a formal 
symmetry, in the demise of one ice queen that prompts the creation of 
another, a mirror image. 
 Equally, the understanding that ice is a metaphor of transformation 
destabilises the fixity of the narrator’s memory and incorporates the novel 
as a whole in this instant: Adorno writes that “The synthesis achieved by 
means of the artwork is not simply forced on its elements; rather, it 
recapitulates that  in which these elements communicate with one another; 
thus the synthesis itself is a product of otherness” (9). The paradoxical 
fluidity which underlies the static appearance of ice is an expression of the 
communication between the elements of the artwork as described by 
Adorno, in which the instant of appearance, of art and beauty, emerges from 
the uneasy  synthesis of opposites. A brief equilibrium is achieved in this 
moment, when the narrator’s hidden knowledge of her mother’s suicide is 
synthesised into her description of wishing her mother to death, and of 
becoming her mirror image, a second ice queen. The fusion of conflicting 
elements into form is effected by  the metaphorical language of ice, which 
draws them together within its own paradoxical nature.
 
Tales of Ice and Terrible Beauty
In keeping with the formal artistry of the narrator’s wish, she 
continues to construct her story, and in the process herself, using the 
structural elements of the fairy-tale tradition. The figure of the ice queen is 
explicitly acknowledged by the narrator to have been adopted from Hans 
Christian Andersen’s tale ‘The Snow Queen’, in which the child Kai6 
receives a splinter of the Devil’s mirror in his heart, which then turns into 
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6 In most translations it is ‘Kay’, but this edition reverts to the Danish ‘Kai’ (trans. Diana 
Crone Frank and Jeffrey Frank, 2005).
“a lump of ice” (The Stories of Hans Christian Andersen 175). He abandons 
his close friend Gerda to pursue the ice that enchants him, becoming 
obsessed with the geometric beauty of the snowflakes and ice in the Snow 
Queen’s realm. He is especially  enchanted by  the Snow Queen herself, who 
is “delicate and beautiful but made of blinding, glimmering ice” (172). 
Both this strange, cold beauty and the motif of the icy heart are evoked by 
Hoffman in The Ice Queen, which traces the process suggested in 
Andersen’s tale in which a child unwittingly invites the ice into themselves, 
becoming colder and colder until they are barely human — an ice queen. 
Taking advantage of the pliability of the ice which lies at the centre 
of this tale, Hoffman bends and modifies the traditional structure of 
Andersen’s tale to generate a dynamic equilibrium of beauty, balancing the 
conflicting elements of desire and danger provoked by the icy metaphors. 
This engagement with a previous artwork creates a new “balance between 
the vanishing and the preserved” (Adorno 106) in the reshaping of a 
borrowed structure, which is thereby both preserved and destabilised. In 
this the novel’s structure partakes in and mirrors the nature of icy  beauty as 
both static and dynamic. This method of reworking fairy tale by 
simultaneously  preserving and transforming its elements is advocated by 
Zipes, who describes the “original autonomous power” (Magic Spell xi) of 
fairy  tales as the celebration of “humankind’s capacity to transform the 
mundane into the utopian as part of a communal project” (ibid.). This 
capacity has been subsumed under the kind of “repressive bureaucratic and 
administrative systems” (ibid.) condemned by  Adorno, so that the fairy  tale 
in the twentieth century functions “to compensate for the social injustices 
we encounter” (ibid.) with its transformative dream. Adorno regards art in 
general as operating in this manner, but Zipes offers the fairy tale as an 
example of how literary art may  transform itself again. Late twentieth-
century fiction engages increasingly in these kinds of transformative 
reworkings, and the fairy  tale has often been its chosen vehicle, as in the 
postmodernist fiction of Angela Carter, Salman Rushdie, Robert Coover 
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and Donald Barthelme, and since 1980 by the novelists studied here: 
Power, Byatt, Hoffman, Ivey and Shaw, to name a few. 
The Snow Queen or Ice Maiden of folkloric and fairy-tale tradition 
revived by  Andersen and Hoffman is an embodiment of death. Lederer 
explains one of her early incarnations in his psychoanalytic study  of 
Andersen’s tale, The Kiss of the Snow Queen (1986): “In Norse mythology 
a goddess called Hel rules over Niflheim, or Niflhel, a cold and misty place 
whither go those dead who have died not in battle but by illness or old age. 
Niflheim is the Land of the Dead and Hel is the Queen of Death” (29). Hel 
is a cold beauty, whose embrace (whether depicted as metaphorical or 
literal) is lethal. Andersen’s Snow Queen echoes this dangerous beauty  in 
the two kisses she gives to Kai: at the first, “Her kiss was colder than 
ice . . . It was as if he was going to die — but only for a moment, and then 
it felt good” (175); at the second he “forgot all about Gerda, Grandmother, 
and everyone at home” (ibid.). Like the cold, snowy goodbye kiss given by 
the narrator’s mother in Hoffman’s novel, the Snow Queen’s kiss has the 
effect of passing on her coldness to Kai. He no longer feels cold, but  when 
Gerda eventually  finds him he “had become quite blue with cold — almost 
black, in fact” (200). He is almost dead, spared only by the Snow Queen’s 
refraining from giving him a third kiss: “‘Now you won’t get any more 
kisses,’ she said, ‘Because then my kisses would kill you’” (176). The Ice 
Queen develops the story of one kissed by the Snow Queen and her 
eventual redemption by a man of fire. Hoffman freezes Andersen’s story  in 
the moment before Kai’s rescue, to explore in more detail the perilous 
attraction of icy beauty.
Hoffman’s narrator echoes the sentiments of A. S. Byatt in her essay 
“Ice, Snow, Glass” (2000), in which she articulates her sense of something 
“secretly  good, illicitly  desirable” (Histories and Stories 155) in fairy-tale 
figures of icy beauty  such as Andersen’s Snow Queen and the girl who sits 
at the top  of a glass mountain in Andrew Lang’s ‘The Glass Mountain’, far 
above her hapless suitors. Such isolation and remote beauty  is desired by 
the narrator of The Ice Queen strongly enough to narrate herself into 
142
Andersen’s fairy tale, becoming a figure of untouchable coldness herself. 
After her mother’s death, she composes her own tale of ice which embodies 
the same paradox evident in Mabel’s suicide attempt in The Snow Child, 
that of attempting to escape the perils of ice by making use of that very 
material. In her story a young girl, “treated cruelly, by  fate, by  her family, 
even by the weather” (8), gives up speaking and stands outside in the snow 
until “she was made of ice” (ibid.). Her transformation echoes that of her 
mother which she has just described, pale snow and ice infiltrating “her 
flesh, her bones, her blood” (ibid.) in the same way. It also invokes the state 
in which Gerda eventually finds Kai in the Snow Queen’s castle in 
Andersen’s tale; “so stiff and still that you would think he had frozen to 
death” (201).
 Like Andersen’s Snow Queen and Byatt’s interpretation of icy 
beauty in fairy  tales, in the tale told by Hoffman’s narrator the freezing of a 
person renders her “like a diamond . . . so beautiful now that everyone 
wanted her” (Hoffman 8), ossified into a formal vision of beauty like the 
snowflakes with which Kai is obsessed: she becomes a work of art. Equally, 
like Mabel on the frozen river, the instant of freezing into art is also a 
handshake with death, enacting a conscious escape from the vicissitudes of 
living into inertia and near-oblivion. This is why “Nothing could hurt her 
anymore” (ibid.), because the capacity  of ice to transform substances has 
turned her heart “a pale silver color . . . so hard nothing could shatter 
it” (ibid.). However, the ice queen’s boast that nothing can shatter her heart 
implies the truth that the narrator’s heart has already been shattered by her 
mother’s death, and so the best she can hope for is to arrest the 
fragmentation of grief for as long as possible. 
 In an act of resistance to Adorno’s emphasis on the transience of the 
‘instant’ of beauty  in art, the protagonist extends this moment for thirteen 
years, living as “queen of the ice” (ibid.). Nonetheless the static appearance 
of ice is always illusory, as Spufford reminds us of the Arctic “sea-ice in 
motion . . . bobbing, capsizing, re-forming” (81). The narrator’s brother 
Ned reintroduces the movement of ice into the narrative, explaining the 
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paradox of the “Physiologically impossible” (8) ice queen: “In such low 
temperatures, her heart would actually freeze and then burst. She’d wind up 
melting herself with her own blood” (ibid.). The freezing process is 
incommensurable with human life, and so an icy human beauty  would be 
doubly destroyed, her humanity frozen and her ice melted. Such a work of 
art is possible only for the briefest moment.
 The Snow Child also expands on the implications of the presence of 
icy  beauty in human life. Like the narrator of The Ice Queen, Ivey’s 
protagonists Jack and Mabel do not  initially  realise that they are enacting a 
fairy  tale — but when they do, they are caught by the magic and propelled 
forward through the known narrative. Though the icy beauty they encounter 
is “fantastical and impossible” (Ivey  86), they remain in thrall to its 
bewitchment. Ivey includes the Russian fairy tale ‘Little Daughter of the 
Snow’ in the appendix to her novel, this version written by Arthur Ransome 
(Old Peter’s Russian Tales, 1916). In this framed narrative, the children 
Vanya and Maroosia are told the story of ‘Snegurochka’, the snow maiden 
who is formed from snow by a childless old man and woman, and who 
comes to life to delight them until the moment they  seem not to care for 
her, when she melts away into water. The self-conscious artistry of the tale, 
in which the storytelling itself becomes part of the story, is an important 
component repeated in the old man and woman’s artistic creation of the 
snow child. The self-awareness of artistry is vital in revealing the dual 
existence of ice as both artistic object of beauty and unpredictable natural 
substance; such a beauty will inevitably  change and disappear under its 
creator’s hands, and this is the concept at the core of both Ransome and 
Ivey’s narratives. 
 Ivey weaves this process of creation and loss into her narrative, 
which constructs its vision of icy beauty with as much deliberation as Jack 
and Mabel fashion their snow child. It begins with the uncharacteristic 
impulse of the couple, on the first  snow of winter, to build a “little snow 
girl” (47). With Mabel “shaving away  the snow and narrowing the 
outline” (44) to make a skirt, Ivey establishes the language of artistic 
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production in forming the ‘outline’ of her icy  beauty. Jack continues the 
artistic construction with his pocketknife: “Sculpted in the snow were 
perfect, lovely  eyes, a nose and small white lips. She even thought she 
could see cheekbones and a little chin” (ibid.). Mabel’s response, repeated 
twice in quick succession, is “She’s beautiful” (ibid.), and in the adoption 
of the feminine pronoun the snow child is coming to life already. The 
concept of perfect loveliness is elaborated throughout the narrative, 
particularly in the symmetry of snowflakes, which will come to act as a 
metaphor for the snow child herself, and in the sense of magical 
impossibility  that  continues to bind Ivey’s novel to its source tale: such 
perfect icy beauty is too good to last in the human world. 
 This ice is also deceptive, like that examined in The Ice Queen and 
in the opening of The Snow Child when Mabel attempts to co-opt it to her 
suicide attempt. Ice simply  will not stay still, however static it may appear 
to be. When Jack wakes in the night after making the snow child, he sees 
through the window “a flicker” (47), and then “at  the edge of the forest, he 
saw it again. A flash of blue and red” (ibid.). Zipes distinguishes 
“miraculous transformation” (Oxford Companion to Fairy Tales xvii) as the 
one constant of the fairy-tale form, and such transformation is evident here, 
in the flicker and flash of the miraculous snow child that Jack sees. This is 
the moment of transformation in Ivey’s novel, centred around beauty  and 
occurring at its advent as if beauty were a force for change, just as it is The 
Ice Queen, Joanna, The Sea Lady, Fingersmith and Goblin Fruit. Having 
been attributed perfect beauty by Mabel, the snow child is transformed into 
flesh — or an icy approximation of flesh. Transformation also occurs in a 
brief moment, the ‘instant of appearance’ by  which Adorno characterises 
beauty, and accordingly  the snow child appears in flickers and flashes. 
Zuidervaart unravels the paradoxes of Adorno’s theory, writing that, “As 
images, artworks are the duration of transience. As apparitions, they  are 
instantaneous explosions of their objectified process” (196): therefore, 
works of art are suspended visions of the process of their own creation, but 
simultaneously explosions putting this process into effect. 
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 The process of the snow child’s creation is built initially on mere 
flickers, with the repetition of terms such as “glimpsed” (55), 
“glancing” (56), “slight” (47, 55) and “quick” (47, 55). Lüthi describes the 
fairy-tale narrative style as predicated on the repetition of key  elements, 
which give symmetry to the tale while preserving its enigmatic nature, 
since these repeated elements are never expanded upon (51). Ivey borrows 
this fairy-tale technique in her repetition of flashes and glimpses, but the 
novel form in which she is working requires greater depth and detail than 
Lüthi attributes to the fairy tale. Therefore, in order to evolve her narrative 
into a full exploration of the icy  beauty  she has introduced, Ivey builds 
detail into the fleeting moments of appearance in a gradual disclosure of the 
snow child as a fully-developed character. This method of engagement with 
the fairy  tale is employed by a number of contemporary writers, in 
particular Byatt and Shaw in their detailed elaborations of the glass coffin 
in Possession and Cinderella’s slipper in The Girl with Glass Feet, and 
which will be examined in the next chapter.
 However, there is further significance to this process of creation that 
involves its own suspension, and which is so clearly demonstrated by the 
fairy-tale form. Zuidervaart explains the implications of Adorno’s claim for 
art: “As both process and instant, the artwork is social history, productively 
frozen into an imageless image, and receptively  thawed in a mediated 
moment. In this moment, possibility  appears to be actual” (196). Here, 
Zuidervaart appropriates Adorno’s own repeated use of ice and water 
metaphors to describe the nature of art as freezing and thawing, metaphors 
whose natural, physical origin helps articulate Adorno’s argument that 
artworks employ material from the empirical world and thus remain 
implicated in it. Art is not purely abstract, even if its workings render the 
material world abstract to an extent. 
 The importance of art’s involvement with the external world is 
made clear by  Zuidervaart’s claim that in the experiencing of art 
“possibility appears to be actual” (ibid.), so when art is assimilated into 
human life it is “mediated” (ibid.), connected to the empirical world and 
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appearing to have an actual existence within it. In this way the artwork 
becomes part of “social history” (ibid.), acting through its audience. This 
may explain why art forms such as the literary fairy tale and twentieth and 
twenty-first-century fiction have consistently used water and ice metaphors 
for human beauty, because such metaphors mirror the engagement of 
people with art that is both fluid (in process) and frozen in a moment of 
stasis. As Zuidervaart states, “Experiencing art amounts to becoming aware 
of an immanent process in the instant when it  is suspended” (ibid.). It is in 
this awareness that Zipes identifies the potential for social transformation 
within the literary transformations of image and convention in the fairy-tale 
form. If art can engage with human life, then the metamorphoses it  presents 
can be extended into social change.
 Jack and Mabel’s encounter with an apparently magical child made 
of snow is itself an intrusion of fairy  tale into their empirical lives. Jack’s 
first glimpse of the snow child reveals only a “flash of blue and red” (47), 
but the second shows the “red scarf at the neck, and white hair trailing 
down the back” (ibid.) that they had given their snow child, and so these 
instants of appearance engage in a further process of narrative creation. 
Mabel’s experience repeats her husband’s, as she sees first “Blue fabric. 
Red fur” (55), which crystallises into “A child, slight and quick in a blue 
coat” (ibid.) and a red fox at  her side. From initial colours, the snow girl is 
given shape, or a partial shape, flashes of detail such as scarf, hair, coat. 
She also leaves behind footprints, an apparent proof of her physical 
existence, yet they  contain magic too: Jack is “unsettled” (50) when he 
realises that the child-sized footprints “began at the heap of snow and led 
only in one direction” (50-1), suggesting that the snow child they created 
has come to life and simply  walked away. Equally, when the weather turns 
colder “the child’s tracks became edged in frost” (54), turning them into icy 
works of art which “trailed sparkling and delicate through Mabel’s 
thoughts, and left her feeling as if she had forgotten something” (ibid.). 
 The memory prompted in Mabel by the footprints is the fairy  tale of 
‘The Little Daughter of the Snow’, further implying that the child they  have 
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glimpsed has leapt straight out of a book, an artistic creation come to life. 
Although Jack and Mabel attempt to explain the little girl’s existence 
rationally, discussing whether any of the neighbouring families could be 
missing a child (57), and worrying about “a little girl alone outside in the 
freezing winter” (54), they are reluctant to give up the magic of their 
glimpsed snow child. The impossibility of the situation, in which a 
snowman comes alive, coupled with the apparent evidence to support it — 
footprints “exposed as truth in the cold light of day” (49) — prompt Jack 
and Mabel to regard the event separately from the rest  of daily life, into 
which it simply does not fit. 
 Like Kitty’s withdrawal from the physical world in Joanna, the 
beauty towards which Jack and Mabel reach transcends the everyday, and 
would not survive being dragged into it. Adorno expresses the self-
sufficiency of art which requires such a separation: 
Inherently every  artwork desires identity with itself, an identity 
that in empirical reality  is violently  forced on all objects as identity 
with the subject and thus travestied . . . Only by  virtue of 
separation from empirical reality, which sanctions art to model the 
relation of the whole and the part according to the work’s own 
need, does the artwork achieve a heightened order of existence. (5)
The snow and ice which form the snow child are both physical and magical, 
of the material world but transcending it. The violent forcing of artistic 
form on empirical reality, in which the empirical must conform to the 
artwork’s identity, takes the materials of ice and snow out of the physical 
world and into a fairy-tale realm of impossibility, where beauty  breathes 
life into inanimate objects. Ivey’s narrative foregrounds this paradox, 
sustaining its description of the everyday world that Jack and Mabel 
inhabit, while weaving into this world the glimpses and images of a 
magical snow child, who herself seems to have come from a story. Jack and 
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Mabel have little choice but to separate these two types of experience, and 
accept that they seem to have fallen halfway into a fairy tale.
Ice Boxes: Construction and Containment
 One central way  in which Jack and Mabel maintain this precarious 
balance between the everyday world and the magical is by emphasising the 
artistic nature of the snow child, as a creation over which they  should have 
some control. Mabel observes the snow child consciously as a picture, first 
in the memory of an illustration to the Snegurochka fairy  tale recalling how 
“In one picture . . . a child reached with her mittened hands down to . . . the 
old man and woman who had formed her from snow” (54). Later, when she 
catches her first glimpse of the child, she likens the vision of flashing blue 
coat and red fox fur to “the flipping black-and-white pictures she had seen 
in a coin-operated illuminated box in New York City” (55). However, this 
picturesque red fox who accompanies the child as if it is her familiar 
disrupts Mabel’s containment of the snow child in pictures. At her first 
clear sighting of the snow child Mabel follows the “glancing blue eyes and 
small, impish face” (56), but reaching the spot she finds “a red fox where 
the child had been” (ibid.). Attempting to track the fox, Mabel is soon lost 
in a “tangle of child and fox footprints” (57), and it is this tangle of magical 
and animal elements that resists the couple’s attempts to characterise the 
child as an ideal of perfectly formed, icy beauty. 
 Their desire to contain her in a pure, otherworldly form expresses 
the “irresistibility of beauty” (68) as Adorno describes it, as “a sublimation 
of sexuality that extends into the highest artworks, [which] is exerted by 
their purity, their distance from materiality and any concern with 
effect” (ibid.). The concept of sublimated sexuality  articulates the 
separation of art and beauty from the material world, an idea frequently 
emphasised by  Adorno, and by  Kitty  in Joanna with her horrified rejection 
of sex. This is the same kind of horror experienced by Mabel, 
“transfixed” (56) when she discovers the fox where the snow child had 
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been, “eating some dead thing . . . blood spattered on the snow and smeared 
the fox’s muzzle” (ibid.). The conflation of the snow child and the fox, 
which heads away “along the girl’s path” when shooed by Mabel, imposes 
the brute materiality of the world in which the child appears to live, 
complete with the “silvery  intestines, tiny bones, blood and feathers” (ibid.) 
that are unavoidably part of outdoor survival in an Alaskan winter. 
 It becomes increasingly important to Mabel especially  that the snow 
girl exist as a magical beauty separate from such disgusting reminders of 
physical mortality; in this she diverges from Jack’s less squeamish 
fascination with the paradox that the snow girl presents. Initially his 
reaction is similar to his wife’s when, examining the child’s footprints, he 
finds a “dead snowshoe hare beside the doorstep” (49-50). Shocked by  this 
intrusion of dead flesh into a mysterious fairy tale, he takes the time to 
ascertain that it had been killed by human means — “strangled, most likely 
with a thin snare” (50) — and then throws “the dead hare as far as he could 
into the trees” (ibid.). It only  becomes clear to him later that the hare was 
an offering from the snow child, a realisation that increases his desire to 
unravel the paradox of the otherworldly but simultaneously animal child 
living wild in the woods, in contrast to Mabel’s determination to retain the 
fairy-tale purity  of the snow girl’s image. Before this point, however, Jack 
dispatches the dead hare and then, not satisfied with the apparently magical 
transformation of his snow girl, he follows the footprints, observing that 
they  “didn’t  seem like the tracks of a lost child” (50), but in their “loops 
and turns” (ibid,) more like those of “a wild animal, a fox or 
ermine” (50-1). And indeed, the child’s tracks are “joined here and there by 
another, different set . . . Fox” (51): concluding that the fox does not seem 
to be stalking the child, Jack decides that it must be her companion. 
 Jack’s acceptance of the union between supernatural mystery and 
animal physicality  enables him to understand and later communicate with 
the child more effectively than Mabel, as he comprehends the two-way 
synthesis which, as we have seen, Adorno posits as a key movement of art: 
“The synthesis achieved by means of the artwork is not simply forced on its 
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elements; rather, it recapitulates that in which these elements communicate 
with one another; thus the synthesis itself is a product of otherness” (9). 
The making of a snow child entails not merely  the shaping of snow with 
love, but a fusion of physical material and abstract form in which both 
remain active, communicating with each other. The fox is an integral 
component of the image of the snow child because it keeps her material 
aspect dynamic, keeping the ice that forms her in the empirical realm so as 
to prevent her slipping entirely into fairy tale, becoming an abstract idea of 
beauty. This communication between opposing elements is what draws an 
artwork into a complete whole, maintaining the equilibrium of abstract and 
concrete, form and matter — this is “the reconciling aspect of 
form” (Adorno 65), and Jack’s acceptance of the paradox underpinning it is 
the only  thing that prevents the snow child from fading entirely from his 
and Mabel’s lives.
 Mabel is overwhelmed by the magic and beauty  of the snow child, 
only at times able to consider her as a human child rather than a fairy tale. 
The snow that surrounds their isolated cabin itself comes to seem connected 
to the child, who appears immune to the cold and runs across snowdrifts as 
if weightless. In one instance she appears to Mabel framed perfectly by ice, 
when the steam from the basin freezes on the cabin window into “thick 
frost unfurled in feathers and swirls across the glass” (83). In a continuation 
of the image of the child’s frosted footsteps, the frost on the window takes 
on an artistic aspect: “Lacy  white vines grew in twists and loops, and icy 
flowers blossomed” (ibid.). The metaphorical growing of impossible, 
beautiful ice vines and flowers establishes a frame for the equally 
impossible and beautiful child, who is also presented as an artistic work 
created by Jack and Mabel. As Mabel watches, the frost covers the glass in 
patterns “like fine etching” (ibid.), and when she melts some of it away she 
sees her own creation looking back at her. Crying out to Jack, she describes 
“Her little face, right there in our window. She had fur all around her head, 
like a wild animal” (ibid.). Mabel’s reference to the child’s animal 
appearance once again activates the paradox of her magical and material 
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nature. However, reduced to a simile in a perfectly  framed glimpse of 
beauty, the animal fur framing the child’s face is rendered picturesque, far 
from the image of the fox devouring its prey.
 Later, when Jack and Mabel have coaxed the child, who eventually 
discloses that her name is Faina, into their house for occasional meals, the 
girl sees Mabel’s sketchpad. In the following passage, the narrative presents 
their dialogue embedded in the prose, without the quotation marks used in 
the rest of the novel. Their disembodied voices, melting into the description 
of Mabel drawing, acquire a dream-like quality  reminiscent of the source 
tale, ‘The Little Daughter of the Snow’, with its concise narrative style and 
“depthless” (Lüthi 99) characters that Lüthi argues are typical of the fairy-
tale form. In this and in her request to Mabel, “Could you draw a picture of 
me?” (121), Faina is abstracted more entirely  into art, despite the intimacy 
that seems to develop  between her and Mabel. In her role as artist Mabel 
poses the child by the window, “so the winter light shone on the side of her 
face and lit  up her blond hair” (ibid.), and once presented to us in this 
portrait style, Faina “never complained or moved” (ibid.). As compensation 
for all the tantalising glimpses of the beautiful snow child, the narrative 
here slows down into stillness so that Mabel feels as if “With each stroke of 
the pencil . . . [she] caressed her cheek, stroked her hair” (ibid.). Her 
connection to Faina is through her beauty, and the act of transforming her 
into a work of art, piece by piece: “She drew the gentle curve of the child’s 
cheekbones, the peaks of her small lips, the inquisitive arch of her blond 
eyebrows” (ibid.). Significantly, Mabel also focuses on trying to “capture 
the wildness” (ibid.) she still sees in the snow girl, but in doing so through 
the act of drawing her she is attempting to contain and reform her material 
nature into pure artistic form. 
 Having actively transformed Faina into a picture of the magical 
snow child that Mabel desires her to be — for then she would be their 
creation and their child — Mabel finds it  increasingly difficult to 
distinguish material from metaphor when observing Faina. With her third 
person narrative that moves easily between Jack and Mabel’s perspectives, 
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and only dips lightly  into other characters’ minds, Ivey is able to blur the 
distinction between actual events and a character’s perception of them. So, 
when Faina asks Mabel if she can draw a snowflake, and then proceeds to 
catch one which “sat in the child’s palm when it should have melted” (157), 
Ivey retains the possibility both that this is a magical child formed from 
snow, and also that Mabel may be deluded, narrating the magic into the 
moment herself. The narrative sustains this balance throughout the novel, 
never settling on either side and therefore keeping the paradox between 
Faina’s material and magical nature dynamic. 
 Ivey’s carefully balanced narrative demonstrates the kind of 
technique that produces successful artworks in Adorno’s terms. According 
to Zuidervaart’s interpretation, ideally  “artistic form is a non-violent 
synthesis preserving divergent and contradictory impulses, sometimes even 
suspending itself for the sake of disparate content” (168). A suspension of 
this kind can be seen in The Snow Child’s lack of a neat explanatory 
ending; the narrative’s refusal to explain to the apparently inexplicable acts 
as a continued disruption to its form, which can never quite draw to a close. 
However, it is precisely this that keeps the narrative dynamic, and gives it  a 
semblance of life. The “non-violent synthesis” (ibid.) of opposing elements, 
the material and the magical beauty of Faina, is made flesh (and word) in 
Mabel’s perception that “The child’s blue eyes were wide and rimmed with 
frost” (157): since we are never given any indication as to whether such 
moments are magic or delusion, they  remain suspended in a dynamic fusion 
of metaphor that melds ice and flesh into an impossible beauty.
 However, even as Faina draws gradually  closer to the couple and 
they  get to know her as a real human child, their growing love for her 
causes them to continue attempting to contain her, to secure her in their 
lives. Each summer, the snow child disappears, leaving Jack and Mabel in 
uncertain hope of her return. Mabel acknowledges her inability to 
understand Faina’s nature, deciding that  “You did not have to understand 
miracles to believe in them” (204), but instead should “hold the little thing 
in your hands as long as you were able before it slipped like water between 
153
your fingers” (ibid.). Here again, she likens Faina to a snowflake, beautiful 
but fleeting. And although she appears to accept the transitory  nature of the 
child, her act  of belief in this miracle serves as an act of containment, part 
of a process that ultimately, inevitably, leads to the final loss of Faina. 
During the first summer that the snow child is gone, Mabel makes her a 
coat, certain that she will be back to receive it. She intends the garment to 
be “sturdy and practical, but befitting a snow maiden” (ibid.), 
understanding like her husband that both aspects of Faina must be 
accommodated, but still taking on the active role of creator, shaping the 
child’s nature into Mabel’s own version of it  — a version that  clearly 
incorporates her desire to be both artist and mother. Accordingly, 
“Snowflakes, embroidered with white silk thread, would cascade down the 
front and back of the coat” (ibid.).
 Each summer, Mabel makes a new coat for Faina, identical to the 
first with its white snowflakes, blue background and white fur trim, but 
each year larger to fit the child’s very human growth. Almost without them 
realising it Faina grows into a woman, and while she retains her magical 
elusiveness she also falls in love with Garrett, the son of a neighbouring 
family. When Faina becomes pregnant the physical side of her nature is 
made visible in her swelling belly, her weight anchoring her to the ground 
so that she can no longer run like a sprite over snowdrifts. Clearly 
transformed from the fairy-tale snow child that she had been into “a tall, 
beautiful young woman” (350), Mabel is able to accept this aspect of Faina 
because the apparently inevitable ending of the Snegurochka tale, with the 
snow child melting away into nothing, now seems impossible. Instead 
Faina is rooted; “she had never seemed so substantial, so full of life” (ibid.). 
 However, Ivey presents two versions of this physicality, with 
Garrett’s mother Esther offering a less idealised picture when she asks, 
“When she’s saddled with a screaming brat  and a sink full of dirty dishes, 
what then? Is she going to stick around long enough to be a wife and 
mother?” (343). Faina’s habit of disappearing for days or weeks into the 
forest must come to an end, and the log cabin that Jack and Garrett build to 
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house the couple once they are married is symbolic of the snow child’s 
containment. Once again, those enthralled by Faina’s beauty wish to 
capture and shape it in a form of their own devising, whether a picture, a 
coat or a house. 
 The cabin, on the night of Garrett and Faina’s wedding, illustrates 
the transitional state of Faina and her place in the narrative. It is unfinished, 
but to Mabel’s eyes all the more lovely without a roof, “like a cathedral 
sculpted of trees and sky” (344). Faina is happy there, unworried by the 
cold — the house does not yet contain her, just as her pregnant body has 
not yet completely bound her to its flesh and the new life growing inside it. 
The wedding is a success. In Zuidervaart’s words, “Adorno thinks of 
artistic form as an identity that makes the nonidentical less alien but lets it 
remain distinct” (168): the formative pressures that have transformed the 
alien little snow child into a wife and mother, part of the family, 
nonetheless maintain Faina’s distinctness, the icy wildness and remote 
beauty that separates her from ordinary humans. 
The Thaw
 The narrator of Hoffman’s Ice Queen consciously  chooses an icy  
existence as a protection against the messiness of human life in which she 
does not believe “that people got what they deserved” (11). As evidenced 
by the fairy tale she invents as a child to articulate her desires, to be 
transformed into ice is to become “so beautiful that everyone wanted 
her” (8) but so hard and impermeable that “Nothing could hurt her” (ibid.). 
But as we have seen, ice is the wrong substance in which to seek eternal 
stasis — at any point the uncontrollable dynamism of water may make 
itself known. And after the freeze comes the thaw: the second wish that the 
narrator makes, after thirteen years of cold, solitary living, demonstrates the 
unpredictability of the ice to which she has consigned herself. Driving 
through a thunderstorm with her brother Ned, she wishes that “lightning 
would strike me” (17). In The Folktale, Stith Thompson observes the 
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importance of wishes to the folk and fairy tale, in particular the binary of 
“wise and foolish wishes” (135). He writes that the details of these wishes 
“vary  a good deal” (ibid.) in their numerous manifestations in tales across 
Europe, but “the idea is always the same, rewards and punishments” (ibid.). 
In The Ice Queen, the narrator’s second wish acts as a punishment for 
making the first — both of them in the tradition of the foolish wish outlined 
by Thompson — and she is indeed struck by lightning. 
 Since this is a novel explicitly  engaging with the fairy tale, the 
potential for sudden change and transformation that lies in the narrator’s 
wish immediately erupts into being, presenting some evidence for Zipes’ 
identification of literary fairy  tale form as a blueprint for social 
transformation. The implausible and the impossible routinely happen in the 
fairy  tale, and sure enough, Hoffman’s narrator soon finds herself gazing 
out of the window at a ball in the sky that is “oddly bright” (20), and 
observing that “the flyswatter I was holding was edged in fire and that the 
fire was dripping down onto the floor” (21). Reminiscent of the icy 
metaphors in which Faina’s eyes are rimmed with frost in The Snow Child, 
or her face is haloed by  ice patterns on a window, Hoffman’s narrator is 
suddenly shaped no longer by  ice but by fire, which outlines her form and 
transforms it. That the fire is ‘dripping’ reminds us of what is happening to 
the ice in which she has metaphorically encased herself. Her wish comes 
true and she is struck by lightning: the ice queen starts to melt.
 At least, she appears to melt. When the narrator wakes up in 
hospital, damaged but reluctantly alive, her icy defences are breached and 
she can now feel what it really means to be an ice queen. The lightning 
strike has made her unable to see the colour red, the colour of heat and 
passion, making her realise that “I had lost something before I’d known its 
worth” (23). As a result, “All I saw was ice; all I felt was the cold of my 
own ruined self” (22). At this point she does not  fully  understand that the 
loss of the colour red makes her feel “completely bereft” (23) of its 
metaphorical power — her observation that “Whatever had once been red 
was now cloudy and pale” (22) is in fact a description of the way she has 
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lived for the last  thirteen years, since her mother’s death. And where she 
had been numb to this before, completely iced over, the encroaching thaw 
emphasises that “Inside, my heart felt frozen” (23) and for the first time in 
years she cries, allowing her icy self to turn back into water, 
“sobbing” (ibid.). And so, feeling frozen, the narrator pursues heat. She 
goes searching for a man known as Lazarus Jones, who had reportedly  been 
struck by lightning and lain dead for forty minutes before coming back to 
life in the morgue, his skin “sizzling” (49) and too hot to touch. 
 The heat of Lazarus Jones is presented in a surprising 
correspondence with the cold of the ice queen. Having tracked down the 
reclusive Jones, the narrator is struck by  his appearance: “What no one had 
mentioned about Lazarus Jones was that he was beautiful” (54). Just like 
the ice queen in the narrator’s childhood story, who is so beautiful that 
everyone comes “to talk to her. But she wouldn’t  answer” (8), Jones has 
become a legendary figure in the area, but none have managed to get close 
to him. His fiery beauty is just as much a defence from the rest of humanity 
as the ice queen’s, and in him she meets her match. The connection between 
his fire and her ice is established in the narrator’s description of Jones’ 
beauty in comparison to her own. She remarks that “His eyes were dark, 
darker than mine” (54), and that “His hair was dark and . . . longer than 
mine” (ibid.). Importantly, Jones outdoes the narrator in these comparisons: 
she has come to see him precisely because he has gone further towards 
death than she has, and she cannot “begin anything that remotely resembled 
a life until I understood death” (55). The correlation of ice and death that 
we have observed throughout The Snow Child and The Ice Queen is 
challenged at  this point, as the narrator attempts to overcome her fascinated 
fear of death and transform it  into a fully  lived life. Having lived in an icy 
approximation of death, unfeeling and uninvolved, Hoffman’s narrator now 
pursues the burning beauty  of Lazarus Jones to shock herself back into the 
human realm, and thus illuminating the workings behind her wish to be 
struck by lightning.
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 The meeting of fire and ice is necessarily  violent, a collision. After 
her first meeting with Jones, the narrator finds that “where he’d grabbed my 
arm heat blisters had risen” (57) and where “he’d whispered to me, my ear 
was burning” (ibid.). The beginning of their affair is confrontational, as 
they  each demonstrate the elemental powers given to them by the lightning: 
Jones breathes fire, setting alight a piece of paper, while the narrator 
wonders what she can offer him; “I had ice in my veins; I was colder and 
more distant than a dark, sunless planet” (84). When they kiss, it becomes 
clear to her that Jones has been craving ice, since the ice bath he was placed 
in after his lightning strike had saved his life “when he was burning up 
alive” (85). What he needs is a “cold woman like me” (ibid.) even though 
“the elements most drawn to each other are the ones that destroy each 
other” (ibid.). 
 This opposition of elements has a fairy-tale precedent in ‘The 
Snow-Daughter and the Fire-Son’ collected in Andrew Lang’s Yellow Fairy 
Book of 1894. Like The Ice Queen, this tale begins with a wish — like Jack 
and Mabel in The Snow Child, it is the wish of a couple to have a child. 
Here, a woman looks out of the window on a snowy day when she makes 
this wish, and when an icicle drops into her mouth she says to her husband, 
“Perhaps I shall give birth to a snow child now!” (206). Of course, her wish 
comes true and she gives birth to a Snow-daughter reminiscent of Ivey’s 
snow child. Like Faina, the Snow-daughter is “white as snow and as cold as 
ice” (ibid.) and “all summer she insisted on spending in the cellar, and in 
the winter she would sleep outside in the snow, and the colder it was the 
happier she seemed to be” (ibid.). The precariousness of this existence 
within extreme cold is made clear when the Fire-son is born, conceived by 
a stray ember from the fire: like Lazarus Jones, “He was as red as fire, and 
as hot to touch” (207). The two cannot  go near each other, and when the 
Snow-daughter marries a king the Fire-son burns him to death, provoking a 
fight between the siblings “the like of which had never been seen on 
earth” (208). We are left with the inevitable outcome, watching “the Snow-
daughter melting into water and the Fire-son burn to a cinder” (ibid.). 
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 The brutal and irreconcilable opposition of fire and ice presented in 
Lang’s tale looms over Hoffman’s narrative with the narrator likening the 
attraction between them to that of “a sparrow to a hawk, a hawk to a 
sparrow” (ibid.). The fact  that she does not specify  who is the hawk and 
who is the sparrow makes clear that they are both equally dangerous and in 
danger themselves. This circularity is characteristic of the beauty presented 
in all the novels studied here: human beauty that is transformed by 
metaphor into art becomes bewitching, perilous, but also vulnerable in its 
transitional state. 
 Adorno employs the same grammatical uncertainty when discussing 
artistic beauty  in Aesthetic Theory, arguing that “great artworks, as 
destructive works, have also retained the power to destroy in the authority 
of their success. Their radiance is dark; the beautiful permeates negativity, 
which appears to have mastered it” (66). In the latter sentence it is unclear 
whether negativity  has mastered beauty or vice versa: they are locked in the 
same mutual attraction and destruction as Hoffman’s narrator and Lazarus 
Jones. Adorno emphasises that artistic beauty arises out of the fear of 
undifferentiated, chaotic nature, with artistic form violently altering the 
nature of its empirical materials (67). A successful artwork must therefore 
be or have been powerfully violent, and so the beauty that emerges from 
this process is imbued with the negativity of the violence which gave birth 
to it. In ‘The Snow-Daughter and the Fire-Son’ the meeting of fire and ice 
is very much a battle, with each trying to overpower the other. These 
contrasting modes of beauty  cannot subsist together, and so in Adornian 
style the artwork is structured around their violent opposition and mutual 
destruction.
 And yet, as we have seen in the Water chapter and in The Snow 
Child, “those artworks that succeed rescue over into form something of the 
amorphous to which they ineluctably  do violence. This alone is the 
reconciling aspect of form” (65). The materiality of the fire and ice that are 
shaped by form into a narrative retains its power to disrupt  that narrative 
form, to the benefit of the artwork. Adorno continues, “The violence done 
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to the material imitates the violence that issued from the material and that 
endures in its resistance to form” (ibid.), arguing that  the form of an 
artwork is equally  shaped by the disruptions it  incurs from its empirical 
source. The apparently inevitable destruction of the embodiments of both 
fire and ice, Hoffman’s narrator and Lazarus Jones, in the manner of their 
fairy-tale predecessors is resisted by these organic forces. 
 The metaphorical beauty  of fire and of ice develops into a 
collaboration that disrupts the conventional direction of their narrative. 
While the elemental meeting of Jones and the narrator is certainly a 
collision, its trajectory is not a straightforward one towards each other’s 
destruction. Only a partial destruction is desired; of the artistic form that 
controls the characters through the metaphorical identification of each as a 
fiery  or icy beauty. The narrator seeks a man of fire to melt  the ice that has 
frozen her heart: Jones desires an icy woman to cool the heat that consumes 
him. Two people are thus presented, entirely overtaken by metaphors, who 
pursue their metaphorical counterpart to destroy the metaphor governing 
themselves in order to return to a more literal and ordinary humanity.
 Although the narrator initially welcomed the ice into herself, taking 
refuge from feeling and uncertainty in the cold, impermeable metaphor of 
the ice queen, she finds after her lightning strike — an encounter with death 
— that she is more alive than she thought. The opposing metaphors of 
beauty, fire and ice, in fact express the same thing: beauty takes flesh out of 
the human realm and into that of art, rendering it strange and untouchable. 
The ice queen and the snow child cannot be accessed by human desire 
because they are too inhuman, their beauty is chiselled out of ice and would 
be melted by human touch, if it did not freeze the toucher to death first. 
Hoffman’s narrator and Lazarus Jones attempt to negotiate this impasse so 
that she can be warmed just enough, and he cooled just enough, to be 
human again. The intensity of her relationship with Jones causes the 
narrator to wonder if “this was the other half of my death wish — half fire, 
half water” (86), when the two of them copulate in a bathtub of ice-cold 
water made necessary  by his burning skin. However, it is for the strength of 
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this sensation, even to pain, that the narrator pursues Jones, remarking that 
“I wasn’t sure I had ever felt anything before” (ibid.). 
 The heat of Lazarus Jones serves to demonstrate the instability of 
the ice metaphor, constructed as it is out of water, an unpredictable 
substance which has been transformed. Ice may  easily change its form 
again, especially when placed in contact with heat. The water in the bathtub 
illustrates the return of the “amorphous” (Adorno 65) to the rigid form 
imposed on the narrator and the narrative by the ice metaphor, a disruption 
of form by the same empirical substance which helped compose it. Water is 
frozen into ice, and by  the machinations of the narrative is melted back into 
water, destabilising and reconstituting the narrative structure in accordance 
with the changeability of ice/water.
 The heat  of passion is the catalyst for a further transformation of icy  
beauty in both The Ice Queen and The Snow Child. After giving birth to a 
son, Faina in The Snow Child initially  seems to embrace motherhood, 
appearing less icy  and magical as she nurses her child. But when the snows 
come — the empirical element returning to the narrative — Faina is 
overwhelmed by the “warm, weighted life” (380) that Mabel now observes 
in her, and falls into a fever. The fire of her passionate relationship with 
Garrett  is transformed into the dangerous fire of fever, threatening the 
construction of family life in which she is contained, as symbolised by the 
cabin. In her illness she is only  placated by  being taken out into the freezing 
snow, stating — without quotation marks, an uncertain and extraordinary 
figure again — “Out here, with the trees and the snow, I can breathe 
again” (373). Ultimately  Mabel must face the ending of the Snegurochka 
fairy  tale which she had so dreaded, in which the snow child melts into a 
puddle of water and is lost  forever. Faina disappears: her blue coat, the 
signifier for Mabel’s attempts to shape and contain her, lies abandoned on 
the makeshift outdoor bed, with her nightgown “still buttoned 
inside” (374). As if having melted away entirely, Faina is gone.
 In the narrative’s ultimate fidelity to the source tale, and in the 
withdrawing of icy beauty from the human world that tried to contain it, art 
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triumphs over the human in Ivey’s novel. In her absence Faina fulfils the 
untouchable remoteness that had always characterised her beauty, and in 
disappearing from the narrative she is abstracted into a further perfection. 
In the epilogue, Jack finds Mabel’s drawings of Faina along with the 
Snegurochka “illustration of the fairy-tale girl, half snow and half 
child” (380). Faina is conflated with her fairy-tale paradigm, herself now a 
purely  artistic creation of “soft pencil marks” (ibid.). Hoffman’s ice queen, 
on the other hand, chooses to relinquish beauty, leaving Lazarus Jones and 
withdrawing herself from both the fire and the ice, beautiful but perilous 
metaphors to which she had been in thrall. She is in agreement with 
Adorno’s arguments regarding the threat posed by artistic beauty: “As if 
they  feared that immortality  would draw out their life blood, even the most 
seemingly neutral objects that art  has sought to eternalize as beautiful 
radiate — entirely out of their materials — hardness, unassimilability, 
indeed ugliness” (66). The beauty of Andersen’s Snow Queen to which she 
had aspired no longer appears attractive, but unnaturally hard and alien. 
 Nonetheless, in the contrasting conclusions of the two novels it 
becomes clear that artistic form and the ‘amorphous’ empirical element of 
art cannot be divided so that one is located in the ice metaphor and one in 
human flesh: in The Snow Child ice resolves into identification with the 
empirical, as Faina escapes constraint by the narrative of family life into the 
wild natural world. As The Ice Queen draws to a close, however, the 
metaphor of the ice queen and all the icy metaphorical language that 
accompanies it  is presented as a rigidly structured artistic form which 
threatens the liberty  of empirical human life. The evolution of this contrast 
demonstrates the dynamic nature of the artwork emphasised by Adorno, 
with the opposing forces of the artistic and the empirical helping to 
constitute each other as well as threatening and attempting to subsume 
them. 
 There is not, therefore, an absolute division between the artistic and 
the human — or the concrete and the abstract — although in all the novels 
studied in this thesis such a division is implied. Rather, the two are so 
162
implicated in each other’s existence and operations that they exist on a 
spectrum, with metaphor and all its linguistic and structural manifestations 
straddling the extremes of flesh and art. The metaphor of icy  beauty is 
constructed from the physical substance of ice, appropriating its 
characteristics and associations of cold hardness coupled with danger and 
unpredictability. These qualities are projected on to the characters’ human 
forms in a physical transformation from flesh to ice; however, this 
empirical ice is abstracted into linguistic imagery and used to create an 
artistic structure that functions in contradiction to the uncontrolled nature of 
its empirical existence. All the opposition and conflict between the human 
and the artistic that  we have encountered in The Snow Child and The Ice 
Queen is internal, enacted in the ever-changing metaphor of icy beauty.
 The Ice Queen ends with the human element in dominance, 
although it is through death — close accomplice of ice — that this is 
achieved. Having become, like Faina, overwhelmed by the heat of her 
passion for Lazarus Jones, the narrator abandons her death wishes and turns 
back to her family to recreate a life, only to find her brother Ned dying of 
cancer. In their contact with fire the ice metaphors that structure the 
narrative around cold, remote beauty and a life of unchanging routine are 
ultimately  destabilised. The narrator’s identity, carefully built on the 
measured relation of her emotionless thoughts and repetitive actions, is 
broken down and made fluid, melted back to water in the desire that 
Lazarus Jones incites. Her narrative and her self begin to pool around him, 
circling him as subject to the neglect of all else; “Throughout the summer 
the only thing I could think about was the road to Lazarus’s” (88). Equally, 
when the narrator manages to escape this whirlpool, the changeless 
environment she had constructed around herself — living alone, dull job as 
a librarian, no friends — is destabilised and altered by Ned’s impending 
death. As her practical counterpart, the scientist sceptical of her fairy tale-
inspired belief in a cruel and disordered world, the loss of Ned unbalances 
one of the oppositions by which she had defined herself.
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 In the last part of the novel the ice metaphors disappear completely, 
replaced by an altered metaphorical lexis of water and air. On his last  trip, 
to see the spectacular migration of thousands of monarch butterflies in Big 
Sur, the narrator describes her brother as looking “like a cloud” (203). The 
inhuman aspect of the ice metaphor that she had embodied is transferred to 
him, but without the cold hardness: Ned’s is a post-human softness, fading 
from life. However, Ned’s transformation does not subsume the human to 
the artistic, and thereby demonstrates that there is no clear distinction 
between the two. The cloud metaphor, developed as they discuss cloud 
types while on the aeroplane (200) and are caught in “a whirlwind of 
monarchs” (205) gives Ned’s death a soft, blurred beauty. The pain of the 
flesh is altered by  these metaphors, as Ned says to his wife, “Everything 
has just changed a thousand times over” (ibid.). The pain of death that 
opens the novel, with their mother’s demise, occurs in “the season of 
ice” (4) and freezes the narrator into an imitative deathly  beauty: Ned’s 
death has a warm, living beauty represented by the cloud of butterflies 
“sleepy, slow, whirling . . . exhausted and beautiful” (205). 
 After this final transformation the narrator rewrites her fairy tale of 
the girl who turns to ice for Ned’s daughter, born after he has died. This 
time, the girl “thought to climb over the mountain instead of standing in 
place and freezing” (207). On reaching the other side, “she started to melt; 
she left a blue river behind her” (208) in a dynamic version of the ice 
metaphor that  accepts both the transformation inherent in ice and the 
transience of human flesh. Having now “counted thirty-two colors of ice, 
from indigo to scarlet” (210), it is evident that the narrator has expanded the 
icy  model on which she had built herself to include all its inevitable and 
unknown metamorphoses, through all shapes and colours and back to water. 
Neither ice nor water are stable enough metaphors to completely transform 
human beauty into the immortality of art: even Faina, who melts back into 
the fairy tale from which she came, leaves behind a son whose living, 
changing life takes over the narrative from his mother’s cold beauty, which 
remains only in pictures and memories. 
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 As we have seen in the metaphors of water and ice, constructed 
images of human beauty  can be destabilised and reformed when the 
transformative capacity of such metaphors (and the fairy-tale form out of 
which they evolve) is harnessed in a fictional narrative. However, any 
reformulation of human beauty predicated on ice or water remains unstable 
and vulnerable to change. The following chapters, Glass and Gold, 
demonstrate the transformative potential of inorganic metaphors of beauty, 
and explore the question of how worthy and desirable the pursuit of 
absolute human perfection really is.
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Chapter 4
Glass
Glass is a paradoxical substance. We can look right through it, but 
cannot touch what we see. It is equally contradictory on the molecular 
level, since the molten glass mixture of silica, lime and an alkali (such as 
soda or potash) flows freely until cooled, but as it solidifies the glass retains 
the “random molecular structure of a liquid” (Klein and Lloyd 9). While 
most solids have a “crystalline structure” (ibid.) that  increases their 
durability, glass is built on shakier foundations. It may seem hard and 
impermeable, but it can be shattered in an instant. Blown glass objects are 
often adorned with tiny bubbles and swirling imprints, the “congealed 
residues of somebody else’s breath”, as Isobel Armstrong describes it  in 
Victorian Glassworlds (4). Yet the image of a person behind glass, or 
someone possessed of a glassy beauty, does not convey humanity  but rather 
a cold, preserved inhumanity. Warm flesh can take on a ghostly, unnatural 
sheen when viewed through a glass screen, and these properties make glass 
the perfect material to represent  a chaste and unattainable type of human 
beauty. With glass, then, we can look but not touch.
Glass appears consistently as a fairy-tale motif, evoking a cold 
beauty so remote and untouchable that it  seems not to be flesh at all, but a 
purely  visual phenomenon. Whether it  is a beautiful princess placed at the 
top of a glass mountain, the flawlessly smooth sides of which prove fatal to 
her suitors; or the glass castles that proliferate in seventeenth-century 
French fairy tales as luxurious prisons; the glass slippers, distaffs, axes and 
keys that represent sexual virtue and beauty; or perhaps most significantly, 
the glass coffin that confounds life and death in its exquisite display of a 
motionless body: evidently glass articulates some important  aspects of 
human beauty. This may be the transformative power of glass as a metaphor 
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since it is itself a material of sublimation, changing from commonplace 
sand and ash into delicate, beautiful objects. 
Contemporary novels Ghostwalk  by  Rebecca Stott (2007) and 
Simon Mawer’s The Glass Room (2009) explicitly use glass as a metaphor 
for transformation: in Ghostwalk it is bound up  with alchemy, turning base 
metals into gold and mortality  to immortality; and for Mawer the 1930s 
glass, steel and concrete house of the title represents a break with tradition 
into a new world. Lüthi writes in The European Folktale that “The folktale 
transforms the world; it puts a spell on its elements and gives them a 
different form” (24). Beauty  has a similar power, especially  as a device in 
fairy  tales, as when Cinderella is transformed from a ragged slave into a 
lovely princess, wealthy and adored — just by becoming beautiful. When 
she flees at midnight, it is the glass slipper she loses that comes to represent 
her superlative beauty, further transforming her into an object  of pursuit. As 
both “medium and barrier” (Armstrong, Victorian Glassworlds 7), glass 
displays beauty and simultaneously  protects it, making that beauty 
unattainable and therefore a prize to be sought.
This is the way that philosophy has viewed beauty ever since Plato 
proposed that beauty was itself separate from beautiful objects, and should 
be pursued as an abstract concept. The apprehension of beauty  in itself as 
“a single form” (Symposium 41; 211b) supposedly  brings greater wisdom 
and delight than the contemplation of transitory physical objects, however 
beautiful they  may  be. When glass is used in fiction as a metaphor for 
human beauty it  visibly enacts this process of detachment, transforming 
warm, living flesh into a hard, transparent image of itself. Such an image of 
beauty becomes, in the two novels studied in this chapter, increasingly 
abstracted from the person who possesses it. Indeed, as the title of A. S. 
Byatt’s Possession (1990) suggests, it  becomes unclear whether the 
characters possess beauty, or beauty  possesses them. The protagonist  of Ali 
Shaw’s 2009 novel The Girl with Glass Feet also becomes possessed by 
beauty, as her gradual transformation into glass renders her body  strangely 
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beautiful in its transparent perfection, but no longer her own; her glass feet, 
“though gracefully shaped, were amputations” (187).
When glass appears as a metaphor for beauty in fairy  tales or 
literature, it almost always connotes chastity, in accordance with the 
remoteness of glassy beauty  from human contact, its separation even from 
its possessor. The Girl with Glass Feet and Possession challenge this 
tradition, exploring the chastity  imposed on their protagonists by the glassy 
nature of their beauty, and their attempts to negotiate a space for human 
connection within or despite the glass encasing them. The fairy-tale 
tradition offers numerous examples of glass as a metaphor for chaste beauty 
— and often as a method of enforcing chastity as well. For instance, in the 
frame tale of the Arabian Nights a demon imprisons his wife in a glass case 
in order to keep her from cuckolding him. For the purposes of the narrative, 
there is no specific need for the case to be made of glass, but it serves as a 
metaphor for the motif of chastity: again, the concept that one can look at 
beauty but not touch (trans. Haddawy  12-13). The qualities evoked by glass 
are more explicitly utilised in Marie-Jeanne L’Héritier’s original fairy tale 
“Finette” (1695-98), which describes an anxious king leaving each of his 
three daughters with a glass distaff that will shatter if they compromise 
their virtue. It is significant that the story’s full title includes the phrase 
“The Discreet Princess”: it is only by resisting the advances of a cunning 
and charming prince (to whom both her sisters succumb and bear children) 
that Finette keeps her magical distaff intact, and reaches a happy ending 
(Beauties, Beasts and Enchantments 77-92). Her sisters are cruelly 
punished and die. 
Finette’s discretion and chastity are conceptually bound up with the 
glass distaff, the central message being that virtue is as precious and easily 
shattered as glass. Virginity  is also made visible by this metaphor, Finette 
literally carrying it around with her in the shape of an archetypal female 
instrument for spinning. The visibility of feminine virtue ties it in further 
with physical beauty: both are on display, and it is precisely this that  incites 
their pursuit, yet all suitors must be resisted to preserve the fragile beauty/
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virtue. The emphasis on chastity in connection with beauty has a clear 
precedent in Plato’s Symposium, developed by philosophers such as 
Augustine and continuing to influence the aesthetics of Kant and his 
successors. The claim that physical beauty must be despised if one is to 
transcend it to higher objects of contemplation is illustrated in Alcibiades’ 
drunken tirade against Socrates. 
The young, handsome Alcibiades enters the symposium in a jealous 
rage at seeing Socrates sharing a couch with Agathon, another bright young 
thing. It is made clear that  Socrates and Alcibiades are lovers, but  although 
the younger man is smitten — “the moment he starts to speak . . . my heart 
starts leaping in my chest” (45; 215e) —  he spitefully relates how Socrates 
rejected his sexual advances, even when all propriety  had been observed. 
When he challenged Socrates for spurning his beauty, he says, the 
philosopher replied, “you offer me the merest appearance of beauty, and in 
return you want the thing itself” (47; 217c). Though Socrates is enamoured 
by the beauty of young men, he remains absolutely chaste since he sees 
their beauty as a trivial, transitory embodiment of ‘beauty  in itself’, which 
is always in his mind. Referring to Alcibiades’ excessive pride, Stanley 
Rosen writes, “Alcibiades is the victim of a human mania where only a 
divine mania will do” — that is, the philosophical mania for abstract 
knowledge (283). For Socrates to satisfy his appetites upon physical beauty 
would degrade it from an image of transcendence to a messy, passing 
pleasure. 
Denis Donoghue, like Byatt in Possession, is keen to keep Plato’s 
aesthetics in contemporary discussion, since Plato’s figuration of human 
beauty as the “paradigm [of] the beautiful, the true, and the 
good” (Donoghue 63) remains influential. One of the key problems of 
human beauty  is that it has come to symbolise these superlative abstract 
values and so “made it more difficult  to protect the beautiful person from 
being merely desired” (ibid.), in either sexual or abstract ways, their human 
individuality becoming peripheral. This is precisely the dilemma which 
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Byatt’s protagonist Maud must negotiate, as shall be shown in the course of 
this chapter.
Plato’s story of Alcibiades stresses that chastity  is crucial to the 
attainment of beauty in two ways, since not only must beauty itself remain 
chaste and abstract, but anyone who wishes to possess it  must  actually 
refuse to gratify their desires. As we have seen in the Fruit  chapter, 
Christian philosophers such as Augustine and his successors develop the 
Platonic dichotomy  of concrete and abstract beauty to the extent that flesh 
becomes a metaphor for sin in general, whether that sin is a physical one 
like lust or a sin of the mind such as anger (City of God 548-9). Physicality 
becomes equated with sexuality, and with regard to beauty, sexuality is seen 
as base and corrupting, destroying the fragility  and cold sublimity  that 
makes beauty  so appealing. True beauty, therefore, can only  be abstract, 
and this applies to human beauty  as much as to any other kind. Here we see 
a clear precedent for all the literary  metaphors that work to sublimate 
human beauty out of the physical realm, so as to make it a morally 
acceptable object of desire. A fairy-tale example of this attitude towards 
beauty is provided by Giambattista Basile, who uses glass as both crime 
and punishment for the corruption of chastity in his tale “Green Meadow”: 
a love-struck prince builds a crystal7  tunnel from the palace to his beloved’s 
bed, but when her envious sisters smash it he emerges thoroughly battered 
and chastened (The Tale of Tales, or Entertainment for Little Ones, trans. 
Canepa, originally published 1634-36 152-6).
Chaste Transformations
Ali Shaw’s The Girl with Glass Feet explores the process of 
transforming flesh into art, interrogating the metamorphoses of fairy tale 
tradition in a detailed novelistic context that rejects the simple inclusion of 
instantaneous magic. In a similar manner, The Snow Child maintains 
Faina’s apparently magical nature within an everyday  human context, 
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7 Seventeenth-century French fairy tales tend to favour crystal over glass, but their 
properties and purposes within the narrative are identical.
describing processes of natural growth and decay (particularly Faina’s 
pregnancy and the killing of animals for food) which oppose the 
spontaneous fairy-tale magic that seems to bring a snow sculpture to life. In 
The Girl with Glass Feet, Shaw describes in relentless detail the visceral 
transformation of his protagonist  Ida MacLaird into glass, from the feet up. 
Artistic, inorganic beauty fuses with flesh in an intricate and painful 
process with an inevitably fatal conclusion. Ida’s human existence is 
threatened much more directly by her transformation into art than, for 
instance, that of Hoffman’s narrator in The Ice Queen, because for Ida the 
metaphor for her beauty, glass, becomes terrifyingly literal.
Both The Girl with Glass Feet and Possession trace the workings of 
transformation through the metaphor of glass, itself a substance 
transformed from sand and ash into sparkling beauty. Shaw’s novel focuses 
on the implications of imposing absolute artistic perfection on human flesh, 
viewing the change as a violent and hostile one to the human element, 
which becomes mere material for artistic form to play with. Such an 
Adornian presentation of the internal conflict within an artwork of form and 
material is challenged by Possession, if perhaps not profoundly 
undermined. Byatt’s narrative negotiates this conflict into a productive 
balance, in which the glass metaphor is not escaped or abandoned in the 
way that Hoffman’s narrator relinquishes ice to reclaim a more human life. 
Byatt’s protagonist Maud remains a glassy beauty, but transforms the 
metaphor itself so as to live as both artwork and artist, maintaining an 
active human existence. Perhaps the stability of glass as substance and 
metaphor in comparison to water and ice may account for the malleability 
of the beauty  it  confers: if handled carefully, its shape can be changed 
without shattering.
Nonetheless, Maud’s acceptance of the glass metaphor that encases 
her still relies on the idea of untouchable, abstract beauty as opposed to 
fleshly  sexuality, in the old mode of Augustine’s Christian philosophy. 
Maud posits the notion of  “celibacy  as the new volupté” (271), taking 
pleasure in the sense of transgression implied in the image of 
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voluptuousness, which is sinful precisely  because of its physical sensuality. 
This “volupté” is itself sublimated here to construct a rarified pleasure that 
derives from sexuality at the same time that it  denies it — a very  similar 
pleasure to God’s beauty for Augustine — a disembodied “food of the 
soul” (Confessions 17). Maud’s sublimated pleasure also bears a 
resemblance to the pleasure enjoyed by Socrates in the Symposium, 
rejecting physical beauty so as to bask in its abstracted form. Glass 
metaphors for human beauty  enact this paradox, but do so differently  in the 
two novels explored here. In contrast to Maud’s abstract sexuality, The Girl 
with Glass Feet presents the onset  of Ida’s glass beauty  as an enforcement 
of chastity, through the increasing impossibility  for Ida’s lover Midas to 
touch her sexually; the glass that painfully encroaches on her flesh and 
organs renders them hard and numb, no longer part of her.
When Ida and Midas meet, on the bleak island of St Hauda’s Land, 
Midas is himself already encased in glass: he views the world through his 
camera lens, transforming his surroundings into art, and is unable to 
connect physically or emotionally with other people. He wants to 
photograph Ida — not to know her — with her “skin and blonde hair . . . 
such pale shades they looked monochrome” (2). With Ida’s glass feet 
hidden in an oversized pair of boots “covered in laces and buckles like 
straitjackets” (3), Shaw establishes a metaphorical lexis of confinement that 
pervades the narrative as part  of the overarching glass metaphor. Midas 
does not yet know that Ida’s paleness is the beginning of her transformation 
into glass, bleaching the tan and “roasted blonde” (5) colouring she used to 
have, in a prelude to total transparency. 
Ida, however, is aware of this. Knowing that her body is effectively 
being abstracted from itself, turned into a cold, hard sculpture of the fleshly 
form it once had, Ida is hungry for human connection. On meeting Midas 
she startles him by offering him a seat with her, and having “shoved him 
playfully” (6) takes his precious camera from around his neck. This is the 
beginning of a parallel process in which Midas is drawn away from the 
abstract romance of his camera screen and engaged in a physical 
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connection with Ida that is threatened by her own metamorphosis into the 
colourless, untouchable perfection that the photographer Midas had so 
admired. Ultimately Ida comes to embody precisely the kind of beauty that 
Midas had initially desired: monochrome, remote and abstracted into the 
stillness of an image. As in many fairy  tales, however, he comes to regret 
the fulfilment of his wish.
The governing image of the text, Ida’s glass feet, engages with fairy 
tale tradition as an interrogative development of Cinderella’s glass slipper. 
The transformative capacity of glass, originating in the miraculous 
transformation by which glass is created from sand and ash, is echoed by 
the metamorphosis worked on Cinderella by  her glass slippers, from a 
downtrodden servant to a beautiful princess. When Cinderella flees the ball, 
the slipper she leaves behind comes to represent her surpassing beauty, 
which is abstracted into this glass object. Ida’s feet, in their fusion of flesh 
and glass, illustrate the sinister nature of the process undergone by 
Cinderella’s beauty. Midas thinks on seeing Ida’s feet that, “These were not 
real, flexible, treading toes, but a play of light  that showed where toes had 
been” (132), making clear that Ida’s physical feet are simply no longer 
there. Instead, her toes are abstracted into metaphor, “that half-world 
between memory and the present” (ibid.) which Midas compares to a photo 
negative, a transparent image that replaces the physical object it portrays. 
However, Shaw makes this process disturbingly visual and gradual, 
situating it physically  in Ida’s body  rather than projecting it on to a 
substitute such as a slipper. In this way Shaw questions the sublimation of 
human beauty into an abstracted perfection that cannot actually be 
accommodated by a human body.
In Shaw’s image of a girl with glass feet we also see a clear 
portrayal of Adorno’s understanding of art as a violent imposition of form 
on empirical material. Ida’s attempts to hold on to her flesh may  be seen as 
the return of the “amorphous” empirical (Adorno 65) which is subsumed by 
artistic form. However, Adorno views the possibility of such a return as 
“the reconciling aspect of form” (ibid.), while there is nothing 
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reconciliatory  about Ida’s struggle against the glass that overwhelms her. 
Still, her flesh and the glass are not quite as oppositional as they appear, for 
while her flesh takes on a translucent sheen in imitation of the glass, the 
glass is correspondingly described as a growing substance, even though it is 
an artificial substance with no movement or feeling. Henry Fuwa, a 
reclusive biologist to whom Ida turns for help, responds to the suggestion 
that she cut the glass out with the statement, “It would only grow 
back” (110). When Midas sees Ida’s feet for the second time he realises 
how the glass is spreading: “Ida’s metatarsals, which he had witnessed half 
visible before, had now vanished in the crystal-clear bodies of her 
feet” (187). In this mutual absorption of each other’s qualities, the glass and 
flesh in this novel enact the dynamic tension that Adorno identifies between 
form and material in the artwork, although as we have seen in The Snow 
Child and The Ice Queen, the two become so involved with each other that 
it becomes impossible to distinguish one element as form and the other as 
material. Their conflict and fusion generates the momentum that develops 
the metaphorical narrative further.
Enlisting the help of her mother’s friend Carl and his eccentric 
former lover Emiliana, Ida embarks on an aggressive counter-attack on the 
glass — on the violent imposition of artistic form. Of course, this attempt is 
doomed to failure because her flesh and the glass are fundamentally 
intertwined, and no longer entirely distinguishable from each other. But as 
Zipes argues in his claim for the literary fairy tale as a form working 
towards utopian ends, the struggle itself is what is essential: “This does not 
mean that the liberating fairy tale must have a moral, doctrinaire resolution, 
but that, to be liberating, it must  reflect a process of struggle against all 
types of suppression and authoritarianism” (Fairy Tales and the Art of 
Subversion 178, emphasis in text). Ida’s struggle is the meaningful element 
in the narrative in this sense; whether she succeeds or not is less relevant 
than her struggle against suppression in presenting the possibility of 
transformation which, for Zipes, is central to a literary fairy tale such as 
this. The possibility  of changing one’s situation, he argues, can be 
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extrapolated from the fairy tale into social and political contexts and 
channelled into the drive for social improvement. In the case of Shaw’s 
novel, it is beauty  that is depicted as a force of suppression, and he does 
indeed present the possibility of fighting against the physical and 
psychological domination of a glassy beauty  ideal. In this the novel appears 
to align itself with feminist  discussions of beauty such as Wolf’s The 
Beauty Myth (1990), but the connection is not sustained throughout the 
narrative since the emphatically social nature of beauty as a construction in 
Wolf’s text is not addressed. Beauty remains magical in The Girl with Glass 
Feet, so although the novel correlates with Zipes’ claim that the literary 
fairy  tale can be employed to promote social transformation, it does not 
explicitly do so itself.
Since the glass is a growing substance, Ida and her helpers try to 
thwart it using its opposite number in the natural world: death. Emiliana 
had previously treated a girl whose belly was turning into glass, and whose 
father had discovered a dead bird with a glass tail; indicating that the glass 
does not continue spreading after death. Carl describes the plan, to 
“paralyse the flesh around the glass, turn it  into a state half dead” (192) 
using jellyfish stings. This idea draws a clear distinction between the death 
implied in the transformation into glass, and a natural death. To turn into 
glass is to die, but to die into a beautiful, artificial form which presents a 
‘perfected’ version of the subject’s original form — perfected because the 
body is unblemished, unmoving and immortalised, like one of Midas’ 
photographs or Mabel’s drawings of Faina. 
The concept of being “killed into art” was articulated by Gilbert  and 
Gubar in The Madwoman in the Attic of 1979 (36). They focus on the Snow 
White fairy  tale, and the motifs of the magic mirror and the glass coffin — 
glass metaphors for human beauty — to demonstrate their point. We will 
turn to the glass coffin now, to further examine how the inhumanity of a 
glassy beauty becomes connected with death of varying kinds. Expanding 
on the distinction between natural and unnatural deaths established in The 
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Girl with Glass Feet, Byatt’s Possession interrogates the idea that to live in 
art means to die from the human world.
Lovely Corpses
Post-1980 fiction continues to be intrigued by the cold, untouchable 
beauty represented by  Snow White in her glass coffin, which has endured 
as an artistic and cultural icon for unattainable human perfection throughout 
fairy-tale tradition. My argument is centred around the idea of detachment, 
and how the containment and distancing of beauty from its perceivers 
effects its sublimation into an eternally preserved image. The glass coffin, 
which holds an apparently dead but beautiful body purely  for the purpose of 
display  (unlike the glass castle or mountain, whose princesses sit alive on 
their summits), is the culmination of the glass metaphor in sublimating 
human beauty into art. It  is perhaps only succeeded by  Shaw’s conflation of 
the coffin with its inhabitant, as the glass metaphor is fully assimilated by 
the flesh it modifies. The operations of the glass metaphor cause beauty to 
become an abstract, two-dimensional entity that can be pursued with 
religious fervour or philosophically  analysed at a safe distance. The glass 
coffin, retaining some distinction between glass and flesh and acting as a 
flat screen in front of the body, turns beauty into a picture.
This is made explicit in the Grimms’ version of the tale, in which 
Snow White’s coffin is placed on top of a hill in a deliberate effort by the 
grieving dwarves to elevate her status and extend her fame — they want as 
many people as possible to see and admire her beauty (Annotated Brothers 
Grimm, trans. Tatar 254). Further, the coffin is inscribed with gold writing 
that declares her name and heritage as the “daughter of a king” (ibid.), 
becoming highly  reminiscent of a display  case, as has been remarked by 
several critics including Elisabeth Bronfen in Over Her Dead Body (100), 
to which we shall return. Bacchilega notes in Postmodern Fairy Tales that 
even before she is put in the glass coffin, Snow White adheres to the ideal 
of static, silent beauty  because she “rarely has a voice of her own . . . In an 
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indirectly silencing move, her speech is reported and summarized” (35). 
Within the context of Bacchilega’s feminist arguments, this implies that the 
narrative style used by the Grimms forces Snow White into compliance 
with a feminine standard of silent, thoughtless obedience governed by 
patriarchal desires. Presumably the glass coffin is then a metaphor for this 
enclosed silence, although this is not explicitly stated by Bacchilega. 
Gilbert and Gubar, however, do make it explicit in The Madwoman 
in the Attic, although with a different emphasis. Theirs is a strongly feminist 
agenda, arguing that Snow White and her stepmother make use of the 
“transparent enclosures” (36) they  are “locked” in (ibid.), not lying in 
passive silence as Bacchilega suggests but “wielding as weapons the tools 
patriarchy  suggests that women use to kill themselves into art” (ibid.). This 
interpretation almost has a progressive feel to it; although the women use 
these ‘tools’ to try  to kill each other, they are still actively using them. But 
what of beauty? Snow White’s beauty is metaphorically connected to the 
glass coffin, through their shared characteristics of untouchable fragility, 
clarity, and exquisite delicacy of form and also through the necessity of 
their connection for the plot; it is only by  encasing her beauty in glass that 
Snow White can be reified into an image of perfection. In criticism that has 
a political agenda, such as the feminism of Bacchilega, Bronfen, and 
Gilbert and Gubar, the diverse implications of the glass coffin image tend 
not to be fully unravelled, a phenomenon that we see again in critical 
treatments of Possession. I intend to examine more thoroughly  the use of 
this metaphor in the novel and the process of turning an individual into art. 
Byatt shows that  the possibilities of the glass coffin are much more 
multifaceted than a study like Gilbert and Gubar’s would suggest. 
 Byatt offers a new Snow White in Possession, one who becomes an 
artist in her silence and stillness, reimagining the significance of her 
boundaries. A late twentieth-century  Snow White in an elaborate and 
malleable tale may apply the understanding gained from second-wave 
feminism of the construction of gender roles to transform her glass coffin 
into something other than a prison. Marina Warner, citing Ted Hughes, 
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argues in Fantastic Metamorphoses that “metamorphosis often breaks out 
in moments of crisis” (16), and she extends this to claim that it is also 
“characteristic of metamorphic writing to appear in transitional places and 
at the confluence of traditions and civilizations” (18). From a feminist 
standpoint at least, this has substantial relevance to the present, in which 
considerations of gender and beauty are in constant transition: it  is high 
time, then, for a reincarnation of the glass coffin. And glass itself, after all, 
is a metaphor for fragility and metamorphosis: the potential has always 
been in it for the shattering of limits.
! Zipes, in Fairy Tales and the Art of Subversion, explains how the 
fairy  tale form has become increasingly amenable to the kinds of 
transformations that are capable of spilling over into agitation for actual 
social change. This text illuminates how the reworking of a metaphor such 
as the glass coffin can provide a model and catalyst for wider changes in 
attitudes to beauty and gender.
The tendency  is to break, shift, debunk, or rearrange the traditional 
motifs to liberate the reader from the contrived and programmed 
mode of literary  reception. Transfiguration does not obliterate the 
recognizable features or values of the classical fairy tale but cancels 
their negativity  by showing how a different aesthetic and social 
setting relativizes all values. To this extent the act of creative 
transfiguration by the author and the final artistic product as 
transfiguration are geared to make readers aware that civilization 
and life itself are processes which can be shaped to fulfill basic 
needs of the readers. Though the liberating and classical fairy tales 
may contain some of the same features and values, the emphasis 
placed on transfiguration as process, both as narrative form and 
substance, makes for a qualitative difference. (180)
The “contrived and programmed mode of literary reception” (ibid.) 
therefore becomes a metaphor for readers’ acceptance of equally 
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programmed social structures, and so the transformation of these in the 
literary  fairy  tale open up the possibility of a similar transformation beyond 
the text.
Byatt interrogates the historical development of the glass coffin as a 
model for human beauty  in Possession. The beautiful academic Maud 
Bailey moves through a series of glassy  rooms as the narrative explores the 
connection between her beauty and her unapproachable frigidity. The 
library at Lincoln University, where Maud works, is described as “a skeletal 
affair in a glass box, with brilliant doors opening in glass” (43), an image 
that directly  associates, through the conjunction of ‘skeletal’ and ‘glass’, the 
concepts of death and display that are characteristic of the glass coffin 
motif. A different emphasis is created by the Women’s Archive at Lincoln, 
which is “housed in a high-walled fish-tank” (43) combining exposure with 
the exaggerated protection of the walls, and yet another is present in 
Maud’s optical-illusion bathroom: “a chill green glassy place, glittering 
with cleanness, huge dark green stoppered jars on water-green thick glass 
shelves, a floor tiled in glass tiles into whose brief and illusory depths one 
might peer” (56). There is no warmth or humanity in these scenes, but 
rather a geometric precision of hard-angled boxes through which Maud is 
transferred, one after the other, to be carefully described in each tableau. 
Byatt depicts Maud in specific pictures, a series of glass cases closing into 
themselves — she moves from the large library to the segregated Women’s 
Archive, and then to her small, self-reflecting bathroom. 
Maud herself exists in an aesthetic parallel with her glass coffins, 
mirroring their glassy  aspects of coldness and hardness: she displays a 
“frigid voice” (48), a “censorious and supercilious gaze” (ibid.), and has the 
complexion of a statue; “She blushed. Red blood stained the ivory” (50). 
Conspicuous in her “excessive elegance” (48), Maud’s “perfectly  regular 
features” (57) and lavish mane of “yellow hair” (ibid.) identify  her as a 
typical fairy-tale beauty, the princess locked into her own image and kept 
there by the gaze of her many  observers. Although this characterisation is 
routinely pointed out  by criticism on Possession, Byatt’s intricate 
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development of the fairy-tale ideal of beauty has not been fully examined. 
Studies tend to focus on Byatt’s engagement with the fairy-tale narrative 
form and the trope of solitude (in connection with the four protagonists — 
Maud, Roland and the Victorian poets Randolph Ash and Christabel 
LaMotte), but the theoretical and metaphorical implications of beauty in the 
novel have so far been glossed over by critics. Julian Gitzen is typical in 
citing as “Byatt’s customary theme . . . the dilemma of the Byatt 
protagonist, who must balance emotional needs against the necessity for 
‘solitude’ in which to create” (87). 
In this interpretation critics are led by Byatt’s own essay “Ice, Snow, 
Glass” (Histories and Stories 155) in which she describes her long-term 
appreciation of the solitude expressed in fairy-tale glass metaphors, her 
youthful perception of “something secretly good, illicitly desirable, about 
the ice-hills and glass barriers” (ibid.) that she explores in her fiction. Byatt 
is ambivalent about the position of the princess isolated in glass: although 
there is for her “something wonderful about being beautiful and shining and 
high up” (ibid.), this is inescapably combined with “the frightening 
loneliness of cleverness, the cold distance of seeing the world through 
art” (156). Maud and Christabel in Possession enact the difficulty  of 
choosing between a working artistic life and the life of love and human 
connection that resolves itself into the role of wife and mother. 
 Critics of Possession tend to travel instantly  from the glass 
metaphors to discussion of these issues, without  analysing the actual 
operations and implications of the metaphors themselves. Jessica Tiffin 
notes several instances of glass in Byatt’s other works but conspicuously 
omits the glass coffin in Possession. Her focus is on glass (and ice) as a 
metaphor for art and narrative, in which “meaning is thus captured in 
stasis” (1), but because her argument is concerned with Byatt’s narrative 
form, she does not extend her analysis of glass metaphors to human beauty. 
Tiffin concludes her discussion of glass with the claim, “Ice and glass 
become a metaphor for art  . . . and for intellectual distance” (117), with 
which I agree but would add that glassy beauty is also deeply entwined in 
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this metaphorical network. The construction of human beauty  as itself a 
work of art, distant and untouchable, is crucial to Byatt’s wider exploration 
of the necessary remoteness and even inhumanity of living an artistic life 
(as artwork or artist, or both).
The princess figure in her glass coffin possesses a very  specific kind 
of beauty. She is white as snow, touched with blood-red and still as a 
corpse. These qualities are coded to represent her as completely idealised 
and inhumanly perfect as a picture. Midas in The Girl with Glass Feet 
illustrates this pursuit of immortal perfection in his obsession with 
photography: the glass of the camera lens takes the place of the glass coffin 
and a person is literally translated into an eternally preserved image. Edgar 
Allan Poe expresses this urge precisely in his claim that “the death . . . of a 
beautiful woman is, unquestionably, the most poetical topic in the 
world” (“The Philosophy of Composition” 1846 223). The prevalence and 
endurance of this deathly image of beauty is exemplified in cosmetic 
advertisements and women’s magazines, who exhort their readers to 
emulate the pallid perfection of the Snow White ideal:
“ROSY CHEEKS . . . Skin clear as Alabaster . . . 
LENNOX’S HARMLESS ARSENIC WAFERS”
 (advertisement in Home Chat, 1900, Beetham and Boardman 91)
 
“VALAZE WHITENER hides discolorations, instantly 
bestows a snowy whiteness to the hands, arms, shoulders and 
throat. Will not rub off.”
 (Helena Rubinstein cosmetic advertisement, Good Housekeeping, 
1926, Braithwaite et al 59)
“Blush in particular is softly powdered and applied low on 
the cheek for a flushed, porcelain effect.”
(Vogue, September 2009, 305)
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As these extracts show, porcelain, alabaster and snowy whiteness 
are deeply persistent adjectives of beauty, revealing the tenacious presence 
of Snow White and her necrophiliac appeal. The function of the coffin is to 
separate its occupant from the human world into one of art and desire 
where alabaster whiteness can be sublimated into an ideal, in a remarkably 
similar motion to Plato’s movement from beautiful bodies to beautiful ideas 
through chaste philosophical pursuit (Symposium 210a-212a). Although the 
Grimms’ Snow White has become an icon for this pale beauty, she is part of 
a larger tradition that has been subsumed by  the focus — particularly by 
Disney — on this single tale. Two centuries before the Grimms collected 
their tales, Basile included “The Little Slave Girl” in his collection The 
Pentameron: The Tale of Tales, or Entertainment for Little Ones (1634-6, 
trans. Canepa 195-8). In this story Lisa, a beautiful girl who was born of a 
rose petal, is apparently  killed by a poisoned comb like the one that  almost 
kills Snow White. Her mother encloses her “in seven crystal caskets, each 
contained within the other” (196), emphasising that although Lisa can still 
be seen, in death she cannot be reached. Like Snow White, she is not dead, 
but in this tale continues growing to womanhood, her glass coffins 
magically growing to accommodate her. 
Another relation of the Grimms’ tale is “The Stork’s Daughter”, in 
which an abandoned child raised by storks is almost killed by ogres, who 
place poisoned nails outside her door by  which she is scratched. Her lifeless 
body is kept in a glass case, and she is eventually  brought back to life by  a 
prince (Aarne, The Types of the Folktale 246). In its various forms, this 
tradition offers a wish fulfilment that Plato would have scorned, taking 
beauty out of the coffin to be married. Of course, the fairy  tale plot  does not 
continue into the realities of wedlock: the glass coffin image serves to 
establish a highly  memorable ideal of beauty as a prize to be sought, and 
the victory itself is as abstract as the goal.
 It  is important that glass is the material for this metaphor, for its 
impermeable hardness as well as its transparency: we must be able to see 
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the woman inside it. This may be a reason why  the glass coffin has endured 
as a motif while its siblings, the gold and silver coffins which appear in 
some versions of the ‘Snow White’ tale type, have sunk from popular 
knowledge (Aarne 245). Gold and silver, in their opacity, act as substitutes 
for the precious beauty  of the coffin’s occupant, which would render this 
invisible beauty too abstract, entirely dehumanised. Glass, however, 
perfectly  preserves the image of the princess — but it is significantly  her 
image. Seen through glass, her beauty is two-dimensional, and if touched 
the coffin provides a single smooth surface. In this way a person is made 
into a picture, separated from themselves into a purely visual realm.
The Eye of the Beholder
If this model of beauty  relies on its status as an image, untouchable 
and eternal, to exert its power, then it becomes necessary for it to be 
observed: Tatar remarks of fairy tales that “Descriptions of beauty  often 
have embedded in them an astonished observer contemplating the 
sights” (Enchanted Hunters 82-3). In Possession, the observer through 
whom the reader is given a sighting of Maud is another academic, Roland 
Michell, a small, unobtrusive man and a mediocre scholar. He is directed to 
Maud in his quest to unravel the mystery of a possible affair between the 
Victorian poets Randolph Ash and Christabel LaMotte, the latter poet being 
Maud’s area of expertise. Roland’s observation of Maud is coloured by his 
sense of inferiority, locked out as he is from her life and her charms. She is 
above Roland in several ways: she is upper-class whereas he is lower-
middle-class, she is much taller than him, more intelligent and 
professionally successful, and more attractive. Small incidents mark their 
divergent status, such as Roland following Maud into the lift up to her 
office; “he was already clambering onto the pedestal she occupied when he 
lunged forward and up, almost too late” (40). 
This perspective may  not be that of a forceful, conquering hero, but 
instead it  establishes Maud as entirely  set apart, so unattainable as to 
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dismiss any thought of conquest. An interpretation in the mode of Luce 
Irigaray’s seminal theory of the male gaze would claim that Roland’s 
position as observer locates him as the figure of power, objectifying the 
passive Maud into “the beautiful object of contemplation” (This Sex Which 
is Not One 26). Because men are the socially dominant gender, their gaze 
has the executive power of approval or change, and so, Irigaray argues, 
female physical appearance has been constructed with male desires and 
demands in mind. However, Byatt’s mistrust of French feminist theory is 
evident in her parodic treatment of Leonora Stern. Christien Franken claims 
that Leonora’s character provides a vehicle for Byatt to specifically 
“ridicule” (89) the ideas of Irigaray. 
Byatt’s narrative also undermines the assertion that the male gaze 
corresponds to power since Roland is systematically disempowered in 
Maud’s presence. Having to admit that he needs to cut their research short 
in order to catch the train home — he cannot afford to stay in a hotel — 
Roland is pressed into staying at Maud’s flat. Intimidated by her affluence, 
intellect and beauty, it is he who remains passive, “as though he was in an 
art gallery or a surgeon’s waiting-room” (51). In the presence of beauty 
which he can only  observe, feeling vulnerable and entirely in Maud’s 
power, Roland is under the fairy-tale spell of beauty that impels heroes to 
scale towers and cut through magical hedges, only he does not have the 
wherewithal to do so. It is an overwhelming and impossible prospect that 
Maud might be more to him than purely visual. Even when they are much 
better acquainted Roland thinks, “Maud was a beautiful woman such as he 
had no claim to possess” (424). 
The fairy-tale plot structure of a beautiful person pursued by one 
enamoured by them is not significantly affected by the gender reversal 
effected in Possession — besides, there have always been tales of heroines 
undergoing trials for their good-looking prince, from Psyche’s pursuit of 
her lost  husband Cupid, taken from her when she breaks her promise and 
looks at  his exquisite beauty, to d’Aulnoy’s “Babiole” whose title character, 
turned into a monkey, persists in following her handsome beloved despite 
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his abhorrence of her form (Beauties, Beasts and Enchantment 438-58). 
Further, when she mistakenly thinks the prince has died, she takes a 
suicidal leap from a cloud but falls into an enormous glass bottle, 
imprisoned there by a wicked fairy so that the prince — who is beginning 
to appreciate Babiole’s charms — cannot marry  her (454). It  is not so much 
a question of gender as of beauty itself, as Plato would say, and the pursuit 
of one so lovely that they are too good for human touch. Tatar reminds us in 
Enchanted Hunters that there are plenty of dazzlingly beautiful men in fairy 
tales, but Western tradition, influenced by Disney, has mostly  dropped them 
(76).
However, it would be too simplistic to read Roland’s position as a 
reversal of gender roles: Elizabeth Wanning Harries writes in “‘Ancient 
Forms’: Myth, Fairy Tale, and Narrative in A. S. Byatt’s Fiction” that for 
Byatt, “Simply to reverse the poles of a tale — to make the wicked 
stepmother the heroine, for example, or to rearrange the sexual economy — 
is to exchange a latent ‘message’ for another, more obvious one, or 
essentially, Byatt  believes, to write propaganda” (ed. Benson 89). 
Increasing subtlety and complexity  is characteristic of more recent fairy-
tale fiction, and Harries is implicitly  criticising writers such as Angela 
Carter, whose gender reversals in The Bloody Chamber of 1979 overtly 
served her feminist agenda.8 
In work such as Harries’ we see the recent move away from 
politically-motivated postmodernist fiction which, according to Steiner, 
inherited a disavowal of beauty from modernism. Steiner articulates the 
rejection of beauty through a fairy-tale metaphor: “In age-old fables about 
female beauty, the fair maiden creates hierarchy and competition . . . 
Modernists had nothing but contempt for this myth, which they considered 
an absurd overvaluation of women, and feminists excoriated it  for 
reinforcing inequality, divisiveness, and patriarchal values” (Venus in Exile 
xix-xx). Useful as these sentiments may have been to the feminist cause, 
literary  fiction is finding it necessary to re-evaluate what human beauty 
185
8 As discussed by Lorna Sage in Flesh and the Mirror: Essays on the Art of Angela Carter 
(1994) and Sarah Gamble in The Fiction of Angela Carter (2001).
means now, and so post-1980 novels attempt to explore the technical 
workings and social influences of the fairy tale (and fairy-tale beauty), 
rather than using the form to serve a political or artistic agenda.
 Byatt affirms in her essay collection On Histories and Stories that 
Possession is a rewriting of the Grimms’ fairy  tale ‘The Glass Coffin’, 
whose motifs she uses to articulate and probe the conflicted relationship 
between desire and virtue (151). As a metaphor for a remote, chaste beauty, 
the glass coffin is particularly useful to a novelistic study of beauty and 
desire because it comes with a narrative attached: that of a beautiful woman 
pursued by a desiring man. Vladimir Propp, in his structuralist 
classification of fairy-tale elements, Morphology of the Folktale (1968), 
describes the fairy-tale princess as “a sought-for person” (79). Byatt builds 
on this in her introduction to Tatar’s translation of the Grimms’ Tales, 
stating that “Princesses are virtually interchangeable” (xix); they are 
depthless figures that fulfil a narrative — and metaphorical — function, to 
be beautiful and pursued. 
 The activity of pursuit traverses the two elements of unattainability  
and desire that constitute the metaphor of the coffin, and expresses the 
impasse that arises when an untouchable beauty  provokes the desire to be 
touched. Once satisfied, the essence of the beauty is destroyed, and so is 
desire. However, this fairy-tale trope is traditionally  situated in the 
perspective of the pursuer, whose concern is the aesthetic quality  of the 
woman they  desire (such as the tailor in ‘The Glass Coffin’ which Byatt 
rewrites). The other side of the coin is the princess’ isolation, which in 
Byatt’s version is highly  valued — indeed it is valued far above the beauty 
it confers upon her. For Ida in The Girl with Glass Feet, however, it is 
imperative that she is not isolated; her second mode of retaliation against 
the glass (the ‘killing’ of her surrounding flesh with jellyfish stings proving 
ineffective) is the assertion of her human physicality in her relationship 
with Midas.
 Shaw places in juxtaposition the strange beauty of Ida’s glass body 
and the beautiful sensations of touch: when she undresses Midas sees “a 
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patch of glass ahead of the rest of the transformation, set into her skin like a 
little window. It offered a view of crystallised bones like specimens in a 
jar” (244). While Ida’s body  parts are fetishised by  their unwonted exposure 
in isolated ‘windows’, with the likeness to “specimens in a jar” (ibid.) Shaw 
makes clear the dehumanising and disturbing nature of the transformation, 
an effect that overrides the beauty of the image. 
 This quality  is emphasised in the subsequent passage when Ida pulls 
Midas on top of her and he finds the image of her glass limbs is ousted 
from his mind by the “flurry” (ibid.) of tactile experiences: “The heat of 
lips; the feathery weight of her hair” (ibid.). However, their passion proves 
no match for the encroaching glass, as Midas’ list of sensations ends with 
“The coldness of her knees. Her inflexible joints. The dead weight of her 
legs” (ibid.). The replacement of semi-colons with full stops conveys the 
loss of movement and momentum in their encounter, which itself congeals 
like Ida’s flesh. Unlike ice, glass cannot be melted by  the heat of passion. 
Their coitus is finally halted by  the pain Ida feels, “like there are knives in 
my pelvis” (ibid.). The untouchable aura surrounding Snow White in her 
glass coffin (and her cold successor in Possession, Maud), is made 
alarmingly physical in Shaw’s merciless questioning of what it really  means 
to transform a person into metaphor in the pursuit of perfection.
 
The Tyranny of Metaphor
 As a manufactured substance glass is more stable than ice, which 
exists in a balance with environmental conditions that can alter its state in a 
short time, either transforming the shape of the ice or melting it  back into 
water. As a metaphor for beauty, then, ice expresses a loveliness which is 
cold and hard but unstable, unpredictable. Glass is not subject to such 
radical changes though it is nonetheless a transformed substance — sand 
and ash morphing into clear glass under extreme heat — which is both hard 
and paradoxically  fragile. In Ida’s final metamorphosis into glass can be 
witnessed the dramatic suddenness of glass’ creation, and its ruthless 
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opposition to the soft fallibility of human flesh. Glass proves to be a 
dangerous metaphor for human beauty, imposing artistic perfection at the 
cost of all humanity, and indeed life.
 Ida’s final change, on a boat out to sea with Midas, belies the 
gradual spread of glass that precedes it. The transformative force of glass 
becomes horrifyingly  evident as Ida finds herself suddenly in the grip  of 
fast, all-encompassing change. The perfect clarity of glass which makes it a 
favoured image of beauty manifests itself in the erasure of the details of 
Ida’s individual humanity: “Her belly’s surface was losing its details of 
moles and follicles” (285). Instead of existing as a body, Ida’s “Flesh was 
receding, leaving a flat screen behind” (ibid.). The concept of glass beauty 
as a screen, which we will encounter again — but differently — in 
Possession, illustrates the capacity  of the glass metaphor to render human 
beauty two-dimensional, an image made inaccessible by the glass screen 
before it. Human beauty recedes behind this screen just as Ida’s life recedes 
from the body that is no longer her own.
 Once again Ida resorts to human connection to combat the glass, 
although in this last, desperate kiss with Midas she knows it is only  to die 
as humanly as possible. Shaw describes her transformation from Midas’ 
perspective, already erasing Ida from the narrative as her change is 
described in tactile and visual terms by  her lover. The language of her 
change becomes increasingly inorganic, in lexis evoking congelation: “Her 
lips were a fading clot” (286), with ‘clot’ becoming almost a visual term 
when paired with ‘fading’. Ida’s flesh is becoming two-dimensional, purely 
visual, as well as glassy. Newly formed glass congeals as it cools, and 
correspondingly, “The lenses of her eyes gelled” (ibid.). Metaphorical 
language is itself transformed throughout this section, which opens with, 
“They kissed with eyes locked on each other’s” (ibid.). This locking is 
echoed in altered form when Ida’s pupils “closed like locks” (ibid.), the 
verb that had expressed the connection between her and Midas now closing 
them off from each other.
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 At the beginning of this passage Ida’s flesh is metaphorically 
mineralised, made inorganic as “Her soft skin leadened” (285), then 
becomes fully  — and merely  — metaphorical; “For a moment her head was 
a glaciated rose, then it was empty” (286). The articulation of Ida’s final 
transformation into glass as mere emptiness is expressive of the total loss of 
Ida’s human self in this change: she disappears utterly  into metaphor and 
memory, as Faina does in The Snow Child. Once initiated the glass 
metaphor is inescapable, not bound by the natural laws of death and desire 
with which Ida tries to resist it. In this sense it is a much more stable 
metaphor than ice, governing the narrative with an unshakeable grip as the 
dominating figurative lexis. However, the sudden transformation which lies 
at the core of glass as a substance also influences its metaphorical 
operations, so that its exquisite and fragile clarity exhibits a remarkable 
strength to enclose and contain human individuals in glassy beauty. This 
quality is explicitly shown in the image of the glass coffin, which has 
endured through centuries of fairy tale and artistic tradition, and which 
dominates Possession. And although Byatt  does not offer the possibility  of 
escape from the glass coffin, she exploits the changeable, malleable aspects 
of glass to transform the metaphor into a new shape.
The novel form allows Byatt to explore the glass coffin from both 
sides, weighing up  the price of beauty and the price of gratified desire with 
the minute specificity of extensive dialogue, detailed characterisation 
(devices not conventionally  used in the fairy  tale) and an omniscient third 
person narrator. Zipes makes clear how contemporary rewritings of fairy 
tale tap into the transformations which are traditionally an important 
element of the form (Lüthi 24), to transfigure a familiar tale into a socially 
relevant version:
[T]he fusion of traditional configurations with contemporary 
references within settings and plotlines unfamiliar to readers . . . 
Fantastic projections are used here to demonstrate the changeability 
of contemporary  social relations, and the fusion brings together all 
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possible means for illuminating a concrete utopia. . . . In effect, 
both the narrative techniques of fusion and transfiguration are 
aimed at disturbing and jarring readers so that  they lose their 
complacent attitude toward the status quo of society. (Fairy Tales 
and the Art of Subversion 180)
In her introduction to the Grimms’ tales Byatt explains how she has 
engaged with the developments of the fairy tale through the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, drawing on works which have helped establish the 
method of presenting “the changeability of contemporary  social 
relations” (xxiv) through a realist reworking of traditional fairy-tale motifs. 
She describes several nineteenth-century realist novels as formal 
engagements with the fairy tale: “There is a layer of most nineteenth-
century novels that is pulling with, or against, the fairy-tale paradigm. 
Mansfield Park is ‘Cinderella’. Middlemarch contrasts the diligent and lazy 
daughters, the white and red of warmth and cold and pulls against the 
paradigm with gritty  moral realism” (ibid.). This explains Byatt’s choice of 
a broadly  realist mode of writing and partly Victorian setting for 
Possession, as ideal for an assessment of how fairy-tale motifs have 
changed in contemporary times. Indeed, this “interplay of fairy tale and 
fact, of made-up worlds and fragments of history, has become characteristic 
of her work” (Wanning Harries 76).
The glass coffin is one way that fairy tales present beauty, 
abstracting it  from the person who possesses it so that beauty is 
universalised into a metaphor, an image representing the ultimate object of 
desire, an excuse for a quest. Byatt’s rewriting of ‘The Glass Coffin’, 
embedded in the narrative of Possession in the guise of a tale written by 
Christabel LaMotte, pushes its central image of the girl who lies motionless 
in her glass case into increasingly  complex and loaded metaphors of 
beauty:
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Have you remarked, where a fast-flowing stream comes to a little 
fall, how the racing water becomes glassy  smooth and under it the 
long fine threads of the water-weed are drawn along in its still-
seeming race, trembling a little, but stretched out in the flow? So 
under the surface of the thick glass lay  a mass of long gold threads, 
filling in the whole cavity of the box with their turns and tumbles, 
so that at first the little tailor thought he had come upon a box full of 
spun gold, to make cloth of gold. But then between the fronds he 
saw a face, the most beautiful face he could have dreamed of or 
imagined, a still white face, with long gold lashes on pale cheeks, 
and a perfect pale mouth. (63)
It is the girl whose beauty evokes the images of a stream and then a mass of 
gold thread, but she herself does not make an appearance until after the 
metaphors representing her beauty  have been elaborated. The reader is 
initially given non-human images of water, water-weed and gold thread 
with which to contemplate beauty, in the safe assumption that they are 
familiar enough with fairy tales to know that it is in fact a girl lying in the 
coffin, not water-weed. Human beauty is depicted through non-human 
imagery, severing the girl’s beauty from the girl herself, so that her physical 
appearance becomes an independent entity. 
This is done in stages: we are presented with “racing water” (ibid.) 
that resembles the glass of the coffin, our attention then brought to weeds in 
the water that tremble delicately in the flow. These are likened to “spun 
gold” (ibid.), threads of precious material that the tailor would have valued 
in themselves for their aesthetic and commercial value. The gold is then 
revealed to be hair, so lovely that it imitates gold; and only then, “between 
the fronds” (ibid.) that reach back to the water-weed image, does a face 
emerge. The preceding layers of beauty  and preciousness have prepared in 
us the knowledge that this will be a face of exceptional beauty, and so Byatt 
does not need to waste words describing the features in detail: they  are 
simply  pale and perfect. Tatar explores the fairy-tale language of beauty in 
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Enchanted Hunters, noting how the lack of specific description in fairy 
tales of a beautiful character’s features is replaced by “Luminosity, glitter, 
and sparkle” (75) which make it “actually easier” (ibid.) to imagine human 
beauty by evoking a general sense of lovely perfection, “awash in 
shimmering light” (ibid.). Her argument is drawn from Lüthi’s insistence 
that an avoidance of detail renders an image clearer and more easily 
comprehended: “A detailed description lures us into the infinite and shows 
us the elusive depth of things. Mere naming, on the other hand, 
automatically transforms things into simple, motionless images” (25). 
Describing a princess simply as ‘beautiful’, therefore, turns her into 
a clear, static image. This is emphasised by placing her, metaphorically or 
more literally, behind a glass screen. Abstraction draws us away from the 
small particularities of the human world, and into the grand realm of light 
and perfection. Tatar writes, “By  drawing on a syntax of enchantment that 
conjures fluidity, ethereality, flimsiness, and transparency, writers turn 
solidity into resplendent airy  lightness to produce miracles of linguistic 
transubstantiation” (80). It is not difficult to embody  this description of 
perfect beauty  in glass — that flimsy, transparent and ethereally beautiful 
substance that is transubstantiated from dust into a sparkling molten liquid 
that can be moulded into any shape, still retaining the molecular structure 
of a liquid in memory of its transformation.
The descriptive fleshing-out of images which is characteristic of the 
novel form gives Byatt the freedom to either remain in the vague sparkle of 
fairy  tale convention, or to probe into the workings of the glass coffin in 
more detail. With this combination of techniques Byatt demonstrates how 
the glass metaphor can contain an individual within the realm of art, 
altering their appearance so as to project various qualities upon them and 
ultimately  translating their features into an idea of abstract beauty itself. 
This is at the root of Maud’s thought, on inspecting her reflection, that the 
“doll-mask she saw had nothing to do with her, nothing” (57). When an 
object such as a glass coffin or a face, which can represent idealised notions 
of virtue, perfection or immortality, becomes the object of desire itself, that 
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object has become a fetish (Freud, The Essentials of Psychoanalysis 298–
9). The glass coffin shows that physical beauty  is frequently fetishised, as 
are specific aspects of it, whenever it  is separated from its possessor and 
desired in itself. 
Bronfen argues in Over Her Dead Body that this fetishisation is a 
way of eliminating the unpleasant idea of death by placing it  in conjunction 
with feminine beauty, an investment we make in “images of wholeness, 
purity  and the immaculate owing to our fear of dissolution and decay” (62). 
Bronfen specifically  identifies Snow White’s body as a fetish, made so by 
its isolation in the glass coffin purely for the purpose of display, separated 
from the world of human life in a half-dead stasis. Having ameliorated the 
horror of death by associating it with a beautiful woman, we naturally focus 
on the more pleasant image of beauty, attempting gradually  to push death 
out of the picture altogether. However, its air of putrefaction and terror 
continues to haunt the image of the beautiful woman to whom it was 
attached, and beauty becomes intrinsically  deathly — pale and motionless, 
desirable but inaccessible, dangerous. 
While there has been a great deal of psychoanalytic fairy-tale 
criticism following Bruno Bettelheim’s The Uses of Enchantment: The 
Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tales, the narrow Freudian 
interpretations of many of these works are not pertinent to this project.9 
However, the concept of the fetish as applied in Over Her Dead Body offers 
considerable illumination of the glass coffin motif. The process of 
fetishisation can be considered in metaphorical terms as well as 
psychoanalytic, occurring in artworks rather than entirely in the mind. In 
fiction, for instance, the glass coffin not only  facilitates the fetishistic 
idolisation of a body within the text, but  the glass metaphor itself with all 
its associations of inaccessible perfection, pursuit and cadaverous beauty, 
can be developed into a complex motif that explores the relationships 
between desire, beauty and death. This is the task undertaken by 
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9 These works include Allan B. Chinen’s In the Ever After: Fairy Tales and the Second 
Part of Life (1989), Marie-Louise Von Franz’s The Problems of the Feminine in Fairy 
Tales (1976, revised in 1993 as The Feminine in Fairy Tales) and Steven Swann Jones’ The 
Fairy Tale: The Magic Mirror of Imagination (2009).
Possession. The process relies on human beauty functioning as a self-
contained, two-dimensional entity  that lies cold and remote for our 
contemplation. It has become fetishised when all the concepts it was meant 
to represent  — such as death in Bronfen’s discussion — are entirely 
absorbed into the image and can no longer be separated from it, so that 
beauty becomes synonymous with death rather than merely  acting as a 
figure for it. 
Byatt’s strategy in Possession is to gradually adjust  the layers of 
implication that  enclose Maud in her glassy  beauty by rewriting fairy-tale 
images of glass, one at a time. A passage in Irigaray’s This Sex Which is Not 
One suggests the way in which the glass coffin becomes a haven of 
isolation in beauty, by manipulating the observer’s gaze: “her body finds 
itself eroticized, and called to a double movement of exhibition and of 
chaste retreat in order to stimulate the drives of the ‘subject’” (26). 
However, by  casting this ‘double movement’ only  as a method of inciting 
male desire, Irigaray excludes the possibilities that she herself suggests in 
an earlier passage, discussing female autoeroticism. Arguing that women 
are always “in touch” (24) with themselves through their plethora of 
erogenous zones, Irigaray presents a self-reflexive female sexuality that can 
be protected by this distancing screen of ‘exhibition’ and ‘chaste retreat’. 
Unlike Byatt, however, she does not consider this a viable strategy, instead 
asking, “Will woman not be left with the impossible alternative between a 
defensive virginity, fiercely  turned in upon itself, and a body open to 
penetration that no longer knows, in this ‘hole’ that constitutes its sex, the 
pleasure of its own touch?” (ibid.).
Byatt’s project in Possession is to answer this question with more 
optimism than Irigaray, finding for Maud a sexuality that preserves her 
solitude and intellectual activity without closing her off from connection 
with others. Criticism on Possession is often utopian in this way, 
occasionally becoming ecstatic in its admiration such as Deborah 
Denenholz Morse in her essay “Crossing Boundaries”, in which she 
describes the “sacred” (ed. Werlock 150-1) significance of Byatt’s language 
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as “the romantic avenue into paradise, a reimagined Eden” (ibid.). 
However, although Byatt’s critics discuss the themes of solitude and the 
female artist, the importance of beauty as a concept and a fairy-tale trope in 
developing these themes is neglected. The glass coffin which lies at the 
centre of the novel is nothing without the beauty  of its inhabitant, and it is 
important that a reading of the novel does not simplify  the coffin into a 
prison from which Maud is joyfully released. She does not break out of its 
images of glassy, clear beauty: she changes them.
The crystallisation of Maud’s beauty  into a screen separated from 
her allows her — and importantly her admirer Roland — to contemplate 
this idealised beauty without really  seeing Maud: her identity and 
perspective are anchored in other aspects of her personality. In this way her 
beauty does not force her into passivity, as Irigaray insists. Maud and 
Roland then also have the option of ignoring her beauty, putting it  aside 
while they connect freely. It therefore becomes vital that Maud’s beauty 
does become metaphorical, an idealised image, instead of being something 
to resist, as it is to Maud when she shaves off her golden hair. With this feat 
Byatt exploits the well-documented shallowness of the fairy tale, whose 
characters, according to Lüthi, “lack an inner world of their own” (56) 
because fairy tales “extend the principle of depthlessness to the realm of 
psychology” (99). The genre’s two-dimensional descriptions of characters 
through primary  colours and moral dichotomies are particularly amenable 
to the detachment of physical beauty from a person, as appearances become 
metaphors distinct  from what they represent. Accordingly, Lewis C. Seifert 
in his essay “Marvelous Realities” remarks how these depthless fairy-tale 
characterisations “show the body to be a socially constructed unit of 
significance lacking an inherent essence” (ed. Canepa 142). For Byatt, 
viewing the body  as a social construction presents the opportunity for 
reconstructing it.
Byatt shows how the flat simplicity of fairy-tale characters can be 
translated into a screen behind which a complex character in a novel can 
operate. Maud’s conflicting needs for both human connection and solitude 
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add depth to the depiction of her as a princess locked in a glass coffin — 
the fairy-tale images imply  the contradictory desires with which Maud 
wrestles, but they do not  explore them in detail. That is Byatt’s innovation, 
using the psychological realism of her novelistic medium to write an 
“inherent essence” (Seifert 142) into the fairy-tale princess’ character. 
Maud’s custom-made glass case is formed by  developing the image of the 
glass coffin into further images that open out from it, similar to the passage 
in ‘The Glass Coffin’ tale, when Byatt gradually  travels towards the girl’s 
beautiful face through the linked images of water, weed and gold thread. 
For Maud, however, the process must be reversed so that she moves 
outwards from the glass coffin. An intimation of this possibility comes from 
Christabel LaMotte, with whom everything begins for Maud: LaMotte 
writes in her first letter to Ash that her seclusion is “not like a Princess in a 
thicket, by no means, but more like a very fat and self-satisfied Spider in 
the centre of her shining Web” (87). The conversion of the fairy-tale motif 
into an alternative with modified associations offers a door out of the glass 
coffin without shattering it. Therefore, once Byatt has established Maud in 
her set of glass boxes — the Lincoln library, the Women’s Archive, her 
bathroom — she then gradually  adapts these images until they are more 
reminiscent of fun-house mirrors, with a wide choice of reflections, than a 
circumscribed box.
At first  the mystery of the Ash-LaMotte connection which drew the 
two academics together acts as an obstacle to their acquaintance, “like 
frosted glass between them, Roland and Maud” (87). It is not only Maud 
who lives in a glass coffin — the four protagonists are all connected but 
kept apart by a variety of invisible barriers such as time, propriety, previous 
commitments (Ash is married and Roland lives with his girlfriend Val) — 
and so the image of the coffin is refracted, opening to include all four of 
them while preserving their isolation. The development of the glass motif 
shows Byatt’s awareness of the implications of the glass coffin on those 
outside it as well as in, but she does not  position any of the characters as 
either passive victims or powerful intruders. The frosted glass image occurs 
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when Roland and Maud have just found the almost  complete 
correspondence of Ash and LaMotte and have begun reading it. Initially 
their feeling that they are intruding on the privacy of the two lovers, and 
their contrasting remoteness with each other creates the awkwardness that 
Byatt expresses through the frosted glass, but as they read on Roland’s 
observation of Maud slowly alters: 
The stained glass worked to defamiliarise her. It divided her into 
cold, brightly coloured fires. One cheek moved in and out of a pool 
of grape-violet as she worked. Her brow flowered green and gold. 
Rose-red and berry-red stained her pale neck and chin and mouth. 
Eyelids were purple-shadowed. (133)
The colours of the stained glass work to modify and mystify Maud’s 
appearance. Although this is certainly not the clear, rectangular glass coffin, 
the image nevertheless stays within the realms of fairy tale and literature: 
the colours all have their own associations, from the “green and 
gold” (ibid.) that represent nature at her most bountiful and lovely, to the 
darkness and decadence of purple and the two shades of red that always 
suggest blood, itself present in Snow White’s blood-red lips. “Berry-
red” (ibid.) takes us back to the forest where so many tales begin, and 
“Rose-red” (ibid.) is the name of Snow White’s sister in some versions of 
the tale. The references to fruit, particularly in this woodland fairy-tale 
context, allude to the delicious but dangerous fruits in Christina Rossetti’s 
Goblin Market, the work of another Victorian poet who lived in virginal 
seclusion. 
The passage also reflects the “divided” (ibid.) nature of the image, 
with its short declarative sentences, each containing a single “brightly 
coloured fire” (ibid.). Retaining its key elements of fairy tale, self-
containment and beauty, Maud’s glass coffin has been enriched and 
refracted, entrancing Roland while still keeping him at bay. This means that 
Maud is not necessarily trapped inside one strict mode of beauty: her 
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attributes of cold distance and carved regularity  can evoke other 
possibilities, if seen in the right light.
Maud and Roland’s metaphorical meetings come closer and closer 
to real physical contact  throughout the novel. An occasional touch, such as 
“an ankle overlapping an ankle” (424) builds their non-verbal, non-visual 
intimacy, until “One night they fell asleep, side by  side, on Maud’s bed, 
where they had been sharing a glass of Calvados. He slept curled against 
her back, a dark comma against her pale elegant phrase” (ibid.). It is 
significant that they are “sharing a glass” (ibid.), rather than a bottle with a 
glass each, implicitly enclosing them both in a single glass coffin motif, 
sequestered but comfortable. At this point Byatt writes from their mutual 
perspective, implicitly extending the “parody of ancient married agreement 
of ‘we’ or ‘us’” (421) in which they have begun to converse. Byatt’s use of 
the first  person plural in their dialogue emphasises that the connection 
between Roland and Maud is not based on the dichotomy of perceiver and 
perceived, as it inevitably  is with the original glass coffin. Instead, they 
quite deliberately avoid facing each other, either in sight or speech, but 
remain side by side: “They felt that in some way this stately peacefulness of 
unacknowledged contact gave them back their sense of their separate lives 
inside their separate skins” (424). 
It is essential to Byatt’s intentions that the glass coffin is not 
destroyed or lost in the attempt to fashion a flexible, individual metaphor 
for isolated beauty and artistry. The continuing presence of glass, in 
windows or glasses of liquor, maintain some of the central elements of the 
glass coffin motif, in particular solitude, inertia (changed to ‘peacefulness’) 
and visual, artistic beauty. These properties are no longer embodied simply 
by Maud’s lovely, gazed-upon body, but by moments of beauty such as the 
pair sleeping back to back and the stained-glass windows transfiguring 
Maud as she works (not as she lies asleep like her ancestor, Snow White): 
these are captured by Byatt in carefully crafted linguistic images. In this 
way she demonstrates how the ability of glass to transform human beauty 
into an immortal image need not be a constrictive objectification as 
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feminists such as Irigaray  and later Wolf and Butler would have it, but is an 
opportunity to create an original and adaptable work of art  from skin and 
bone.
When human beauty is placed behind glass it  is entirely changed, 
from a moving, breathing glory  of flesh to a cold, two-dimensional screen, 
showing a lovely image which invites and yet prevents touch. This static 
preservation of beauty conjures thoughts of both death and immortality, a 
paradox that beguiles and disturbs. Glass elevates beauty to an ideal that is 
always just out of reach, and which can only retain its particular icy  and 
enigmatic allure if it remains untouchable. Ever in pursuit, we push beauty 
into the realm of death so as to achieve an even more perfect 
unattainability, worshipping a corpse in what comes to seem like an absurd 
and dangerous obsession that  negates the beauty of the living. But 
contemporary  fiction tests the flexibility of the glass metaphor, proving that 
it can be reheated, made malleable, and blown into new shapes. Glass is by 
nature a material of transubstantiation, and writers like Shaw and Byatt 
reform the old glass castles and coffins into camera lenses and colour-
saturated windows that refract the glass metaphor into a variety of forms. 
Unlike ice, whose changes are dramatic and fundamental, glass 
provides a more stable articulation of human beauty by  transforming it 
either in accordance with its own fiery creation or by refracting an image 
into a myriad of alternative possibilities. As the enduring image of the glass 
coffin implies, glass exerts an inescapable force of containment that neither 
Ida in The Girl with Glass Feet nor Maud in Possession can defeat: glass 
offers a screen or picture of perfect, immortal beauty that will not melt like 
ice, but which comes at the cost of human connection — unless, like Maud, 
one uses the transformative capacity of glass to alter its metaphorical 
imaging of human beauty in a way that does not subsume the human 
individual entirely. The threat of this suppression by artistic form continues 
to be explored in the next chapter through the metaphor of gold, which as 
an articulation of human beauty abstracts it even further, into an idea of 
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perfection so desirable that it becomes defined by this desire, transformed 
into a commodity.
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Chapter 5
Gold
 Gold is a metaphor par excellence for beauty. Like the ideals of 
perfect beauty we have examined, gold is a pure element, rare and therefore 
precious, and it is immortal yet at the same time yielding. Formed at the 
time of the world’s own creation, the gold deposits in the seams of the earth 
are a single, unalloyed substance whose genesis will never be repeated. As 
such, the quantity of gold in existence is finite, and what we have on or in 
the earth now is all that there will ever be: Peter L. Bernstein asserts that 
there are only “125, 000 tons of it in existence” (The Power of Gold 19). It 
is largely  this scarcity that makes gold so rare and so prized, since the time 
will come when there is no more to be found. But what there is, endures. 
Gold is immortal because it cannot really be destroyed: although it can 
erode, the traces that are rubbed or washed away do not disappear but are 
merely  dispersed. This metal can only be transformed into other 
manifestations. And that is easy to do — despite being eternal, gold is soft 
and malleable, yielding to the goldsmith’s little hammer with perfect 
willingness. So it is that gold can be made even more beautiful, capable of 
being shaped into almost any ornamental form. This is the standard to 
which any coveting the accolade of beauty  must aspire, a standard more 
easily achieved by metal than by flesh.
 Not only as a substance, but also as a metaphor gold is characterised 
by transformation. The desperate diggers of the Gold Rushes sought gold to 
facilitate the transformation of their lives, a single day’s work occasionally 
— very occasionally — being enough to lift them from the squalor of the 
goldfields and the poverty that was often their only alternative, into a life of 
wealth and luxury with access to beautiful people, objects and places. It 
was the radiant beauty of their hopeful visions that prompted thousands to 
endure such danger and difficulty, and in this sense gold was a metaphor for 
201
them, for the transformation of their circumstances. Similarly, the discipline 
of alchemy, dating back to at least the second century BC, was not for 
genuine alchemists the attempt simply to transform base metals into gold 
(Hessayon, Gold Tried in the Fire 343). This laboratory  process, as 
desperate and dangerous as gold mining and with equally slim odds of 
success, was a metaphor for the transformation of the self. The alchemist 
wanted to turn his soul to ‘gold’, to perfect it. 
 Again, in Greek mythology, King Midas learns the peril of gold’s 
enticing beauty when the power of transformation takes over and ultimately 
destroys all that he values; Atalanta loses the race whose victory would 
have protected her virginity when she is distracted by Venus’ golden apples; 
and Croesus is killed by the gold that he adores when his enemies pour it, 
molten, down his throat (P. L. Bernstein 1). The Power of Gold concludes 
with the statement, “The most striking feature of this long history is that 
gold led most of the protagonists of the drama into the ditch” (372). 
Evidently, coming too close to gold is more than the human body and spirit 
can endure: they  will submit to transformation under its power, but may not 
survive the process. We are not made for perfection.
 Using gold as a metaphor for human beauty involves paradox as 
well as impossibility. It is by using a part of the earth that we attempt to 
transcend our natural limitations, infusing human beauty with gold so as to 
transform humanity into something more perfect. A natural substance used 
to transcend the natural: as will be seen in contemporary fiction, the natural 
world may  retaliate against this, whether it be the landscape, gold itself or 
human flesh that rebels. It is this attempt to exploit and commodify  the 
natural (human and landscape) that generates conflict in the novels studied 
here. Rose Tremain’s The Colour (2003), a Gold Rush novel set  in 1860s 
New Zealand, traces transformation both for the worse, as the beautiful 
landscape is mangled by gold miners and mangles them in return, and for 
the better when a woman more respectful of the natural finds herself in a 
transcendently beautiful union of the flesh and the earth. 
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 Venus as a Boy (2004) by  Luke Sutherland establishes a standard of 
perfect beauty  in its presentation of the natural environment and channels 
this standard into a reimagining of human beauty  and its commodification. 
The transcendence beyond a commodified existence becomes visible when 
the protagonist finds his body gradually turning into gold in a reworking of 
the Midas myth. Post-1980 fiction demonstrates that it is possible to 
transcend the flaws and frustrations of the human state, but it requires one 
to fully accept the abstraction of beauty from the human who possesses it; 
this allows the individual to harness beauty’s transformative power and, 
through metaphor, experience a moment of perfect beauty — which, 
transcendent by definition, could never be literal or physical anyway.
 Beauty, and human beauty in particular, may have a transcendent 
element but it  has also been characterised in very  literal terms as a 
commodity. The physical, natural bodies of both humans and gold can be 
passed around in economic transactions just as easily as their beauty can be 
contemplated in the abstract. The paradox that arises from this dual nature 
of beauty forms the focus of this chapter, as it occurs in recent fiction which 
attempts to resolve these conflicts. Arthur Marwick, one of very few critics 
who address human beauty, positions himself within a highly practical 
understanding of beauty. In contemporary life, he observes, “we see that the 
received method of marketing products of every type is to associate them 
with a beautiful human being” (Beauty in History, 1988 13). This does not 
necessarily constitute commodification of the beautiful person (although 
involving them in a projected commodity exchange), but in an later work 
Marwick expands on this argument, asserting that this “is the modern view: 
beauty has market, not moral, value” (IT: A History of Human Beauty, 2004 
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 John Frow, in Time and Commodity Culture (1997), supports 
Marwick’s position by emphasising the aesthetic as a field of debate and 
ambiguity  regarding commodification: “there are a number of areas of 
increasing uncertainty, including that of the aesthetic, especially  in its 
growing integration into advertising and marketing” (145). Marwick’s 
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historical accounts provide a large collection of evidence for the 
commodification of human beauty, acknowledging the practical uses to 
which it  has been put without sacrificing a more esoteric awareness of the 
fascination human beauty has exerted: “songs, sagas, poems speak to us 
directly  across the centuries of the power and fascination of human beauty. 
Is it really  believable that  all that passion, all that joy, all that despair was 
lavished on what was merely  a cultural construct?” (IT 222). Marwick 
assesses the pragmatic implications of his historical evidence rather than 
offering grand answers to this question, criticising those such as Elaine 
Scarry who attempt to do so10. For Marwick, the mystical fascination of 
human beauty does not preclude its operation as a commodity  — indeed, 
this mystery constitutes an important part of its exchange value. 
 For Marx and his successors, it is no mysterious power of 
fascination that determines exchange value, but an abstracted calculation of 
human labour: how many hours of average human labour it takes to 
produce the commodity. His focus on the abstraction of the human from 
labour and product aligns his theory of commodities usefully  with my 
argument regarding human beauty in literature as a separation or 
abstraction from the individual; Marx’s idea of ‘alienation’ illuminates my 
arguments in the context of human commodification. In Capital, Marx 
defines a commodity as “a thing which through its qualities satisfies human 
needs of whatever kind” (125). This does not  preclude the commodification 
of persons or their services which, as Appadurai argues, are a commodity 
especially demanded and produced in our “complex, postindustrial 
economies [in which] services are a dominant, even definitive, feature of 
the world of commodity  exchange” (55). In relation to persons and 
services, Marx’s description of the commodification process still holds: he 
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10 As noted earlier, when discussing Scarry’s 1999 work On Beauty and Being Just, 
Marwick is scornful of her impractical mysticisms: “This equation of copulation with 
artistic creation or the promulgation of legal systems is the sort of drivel, gift-wrapped in 
olde worldly terms like ‘begetting’, with which philosophers habitually confuse such 
issues as human beauty” (IT 10). Although Marwick distorts Scarry’s argument slightly in 
his summary — her “equation of copulation with artistic creation” (ibid.) is not nearly as 
direct as he implies — I wholly approve of his emphasis on the need for a more practical 
element to the philosophy of (human) beauty.
establishes his claim that “A use-value, or useful article . . . has value only 
because abstract human labour is objectified or materialized in it” (129). 
 Services may be seen as a perfect manifestation of this principle, 
since they are the precise calculation and sale of hours of human labour. 
However, the abstraction of human labour from its product (and the 
individual human labourer) in itself commodifies the individual who is thus 
defined, in the words of Lukács, “by  the fact that his labour-power is his 
only possession” (History and Class Consciousness 92). The consequences 
of this for individuals and for society are made clear as Lukács continues, 
“His fate is typical of society as a whole in that this self-objectification, this 
transformation of a human function into a commodity reveals in all its 
starkness the dehumanised and dehumanising function of the commodity 
relation” (ibid.). Returning to Marwick and his insistence on the 
commodified status of human beauty, it  appears in this context that  a 
beautiful person is doubly commodified: firstly, their beauty  itself, as a 
service or an object  for gratification, becomes commodified; and secondly, 
the individual as the ‘producer’ of this commodity  suffers the alienation 
that Marx identifies, functioning as a mere cog in the capitalist machine of 
commodity  production, a marketable number of hours of human labour and 
nothing more.
 However, beauty  resists this condition of alienation, retaining the 
promise of transcendence beyond the merely mechanical, as Marwick 
observes. The novels studied in this chapter present human beauty in a 
context of heightened commodification — primarily through the metaphor 
of gold, a substance of huge historical importance as a commodity — and 
equally present the attempt to transcend the moral taint of commodification 
by hijacking and modifying the very  process of abstraction by  which 
commodification occurs. Marx writes that “Not an atom of matter enters 
into the objectivity of commodities as values; in this it is the direct opposite 
of the coarsely sensuous objectivity of commodities as physical objects. We 
may twist and turn a single commodity as we wish; it remains impossible to 
grasp it as a thing possessing value” (138). The commodity aspect of an 
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object (or person) is emphatically, and necessarily, detached from its 
physical body: its exchange value is a manufactured and abstract  principle 
not intrinsically related to its physical existence. 
 The commodity value and the aesthetic value of beauty are therefore 
entirely  discrete elements of the whole, and as we shall see shortly in the 
Kantian theory of the aesthetic, detachment and abstraction are also 
essential processes in the attribution of beauty to an object. In fact, 
according to Binsbergen and Geschiere, “Kantian modern thought, thus, is 
the matrix of commodification, as much as commodification is the matrix of 
Kantian thought” (34 emphasis in text). The theme of detachment thus 
assumes great importance, and it is by inverting and manipulating the 
various modes of internal separation inflicted upon it that  human beauty, in 
post-1980 literature, detaches itself from the dehumanised and morally 
unsavoury process of commodification. Specifically, this is achieved by 
reidentifying human beauty with its natural, physical body, and the natural 
body of the earth through gold, an earthly product.
 By metaphorically equating human beauty with the beauty  of gold, 
the first link has been forged between the human and the earth. However, 
when gold functions in this metaphorical capacity, its history  as a form of 
money  illuminates the issues of exchange and commodification that often 
arise around beautiful objects or people. It is not an easy task for these 
novels, then, to resolve the paradox of the commodification and abstraction 
of human beauty through a connection to the earth via gold. On the other 
hand, the choice of gold makes all the problems of commodification 
distinctly visible, and therefore capable of being directly addressed. 
 P. L. Bernstein characterises the relationship between gold, beauty 
and commerce in terms of conflict: “The tension between gold as 
adornment and gold as money developed early  in history and has continued 
up to the present time” (18). Gold, as will be seen in the novels that explore 
its workings, is an ideal metaphor for the paradox of beauty — is it only 
true beauty if it is self-sufficient, beautiful merely for the sake of it 
(adornment), or can it be turned to practical use (money or economic 
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exchange) without being corrupted? Iris Murdoch argues in The 
Sovereignty of Good that “Metaphors often carry a moral charge, which 
analysis in simpler and plainer terms is designed to remove” (77-8). The 
complexity of the gold metaphor testifies to this concern with morality, in 
its particularly knotty moral questions. Gold cannot be considered apart 
from its paradoxical features of corruption and purity, and it highlights with 
unique power the association of these qualities with human beauty.
The Golden Mirror
 Beauty, in Rose Tremain’s 2003 novel The Colour, appears as a rare 
and valuable pleasure in the otherwise bleak landscape of New Zealand’s 
South Island in the 1860s. Newlyweds Joseph and Harriet Blackstone, who 
attempt to establish a small farm in the almost entirely uninhabited 
wilderness of the Okuku river plains, name their cow ‘Beauty’, because 
“her eyes are like pools of amber and the curls on her head appear quite as 
though they had been set in curl-papers” (25). Harriet’s description of 
Beauty the cow is one of the first examples of the novel’s defining 
technique: the metaphorical binding of the human to the natural world, via 
beauty. Thus the significance of Beauty is the connection to the earth that 
she facilitates for Harriet, whose favourite task in her new life is milking 
Beauty and churning the milk into butter. Harriet involves herself in the 
natural cycles of the earth in which the grass Beauty munches becomes 
milk and then butter to feed the Blackstones:
Waiting for the butter gives me such excitement. The extraordinary 
change of colour! I think I have always been enthralled by  any 
process by which one thing is transformed into something else. I 
can understand the obsession of the alchemists of the Ancient 
World. (26)
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The suggested yellow colour of the butter is a premonitory echo of the gold 
associated with alchemy. Harriet’s statement itself carries more than a hint 
of prophesy, as soon after she writes it Joseph finds gold in their creek and 
their lives are indeed transformed. Only a page later the omniscient third 
person narrator, at this point inhabiting Harriet’s thoughts, recalls that in her 
previous life as a governess a particular ten-shilling note had never been 
“alchemised” (27) into the promised pair of gloves. Gold lies in wait in the 
narrative as it lies in the seams of the South Island earth, shortly to emerge 
in all its transformative power. However, once their primary  connection to 
the earth is through gold, the purity of their previous relation to the earth 
through Beauty the cow is contaminated by self-interest and the desire for 
beauty as a highly valued commodity. Soon enough, these forces infect the 
presentation of the characters’ physical appearances, and while Harriet 
develops into a beauty predicated on a staunch resistance to selfish 
exploitation, Joseph loses what attractiveness he had in proportion to his 
diminishing moral capacities.
 Once he has joined the Gold Rush, Joseph’s physical appearance 
decays in parallel with the landscape he is helping to destroy: at  the well-
dug goldfields of Kaniere, “The ground had a pocked and tousled 
look” (153) like the reflected face ravaged by disease and suffering that 
Joseph sees when, after months of mining, he observes “how strange he 
looked, how ill he had become” (360) with his hair “straggly and 
long” (324). He and the other miners are stripped of their flesh and their 
youth by malnutrition, just as the “scrub [is] uprooted and burned, the trees 
felled and stripped” (153). Significantly, it is this process of ravaging the 
landscape undertaken by the miners that causes the mirror-image 
destruction in themselves, as if in retribution. When humans attempt to 
commodify the land, each tearing off their own piece, the corruption and 
commodification extends to themselves: Will Sefton, for instance, a 
beautiful young boy whom Joseph encounters on his way to the Kokatahi 
goldfields, sells his sexual services to the miners in exchange for gold (he is 
entirely indifferent to any other form of payment). 
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 In the Gold Rush environment, the ‘natural’ commodities of gold 
and sex are the only currency with real exchange value. In Marxist terms, 
this exchange value becomes an objective quality, separate from either the 
shining gold or the beautiful body of Will Sefton; but it does change their 
material existence. Marx writes of the commodity that in the “abstraction 
from its use-value, we abstract also from the material constituents and 
forms which make it a use-value” (128). Abstracting an exchange value 
from the use value alters the nature of the object, so that “All its sensuous 
characteristics are extinguished” (ibid.) in the encompassing force of 
exchange. The exchange value of a golden nugget or a human body may be 
separated from their physical existence, but they inevitably partake of the 
moral contamination and denaturalisation of the commodity form.
 However far gold is commodified, though, it invariably retains its 
transcendent aesthetic quality  in written accounts, just as Marwick noted 
that human beauty keeps its fascination even after extensive use as a 
marketing tool. Gold, a substance of the earth, is sought in order that the 
miners in their squalid tents and latrines may transcend their miserably 
earthly conditions. P. L. Bernstein agrees, the lyrical quality of his writing 
betraying his own susceptibility to gold’s allure: “The wonderful thing 
about gold”, he claims, is that despite “its achievements in its critical role 
as the prototype of wealth and money” gold has “never lost its poetic 
quality. It  has always been both sacred and profane” (76). Even economic 
historians, it seems, cannot help but imbue their histories of gold with some 
of its lustre, and other examples of critical writing on gold will be seen to 
indulge in the same poeticisms. Meanwhile, it is precisely the exchange 
value of gold that elevates the substance itself from its earthly origins to 
make it an abstract facilitator of human dreams. Fairy tales such as 
‘Cinderella’ and ‘Snow White’ show us how the value of their beauty  is 
currency enough to lift them into wealth and splendour; The Colour’s 
Harriet will offer an alternative version of this, one in which the exchange 
values of gold and beauty interact  in a modified way. Instead of exploiting 
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either gold or her own beauty she makes a pact with the natural world in 
response to its demands, greatly to her benefit.
    Joseph’s appreciation of the beauty of gold is inextricably 
connected to what it can do for him: “He found each and every particle of 
the gold astonishing and beautiful. It had come out of the mud and it was 
his, because he alone had seen it and recognised it for what it was” (74 
emphasis in text). Harriet  begins to understand “the ‘gold fever’ which has 
taken hold of Joseph” (302) when she discovers gold herself, and she writes 
to her father that, “gold, I now understand, is a substance truly fascinating 
in its allure. It’s not merely  the weight and shine of it that enthrals us, but 
its infinite transformations, its power to become whatever we 
choose” (302). This transformative power is located in gold’s exchange 
value, in all the things it can buy; the commodification of gold, then, is an 
integral part of its transcendent quality and its appeal, and at this point 
Tremain’s narrative refrains from implying any cheapening or corrupting of 
gold’s beauty  as a consequence. Donald Dale Jackson records a historical 
parallel when he quotes Sergeant James Carson’s reaction to the California 
Gold Rush: 
Frenzy seized my soul: unbidden my  legs performed some entirely 
new movements of polka steps. . . . Piles of gold rose before me at 
every  step; castles of marble, dazzling the eye with their rich 
appliances; thousands of slaves bowing to my beck and call; 
myriads of fair virgins competing with each other for my love — 
were among the fancies of my fevered imagination. (Gold Dust: 
The California Gold Rush and the Forty-Niners 29) 
In itself, the beauty of the gold has no actual literal value: it  is not 
especially useful, it is simply beautiful. In the hands of people, however, 
this beauty immediately transforms into currency  to buy other objects and 
alternative lives. This value relies, however, on the self-interest and desire 
for beauty that drives other people into an economy of exchange, in order to 
210
obtain what they want. In her correlation of physical ugliness with moral 
corruption, Tremain draws a clear link between beauty and morality, but 
keeps them separate; their connection is manifested in the structure and 
detail of the narrative, the careful conjunction of images of human and 
natural beauty, or ugliness. Although there is a causal relationship  between 
Joseph’s destruction of the landscape, his moral decay  and his physical 
dissolution, the connection remains metaphorical, symbolic and suggestive. 
This framework owes much of its structure and moral underpinning to the 
aesthetic philosophy  of Kant, who also defines beauty through a series of 
connections predicated fundamentally  on the discrete, separate existence of 
the entities that are joined.
 
The Kantian Separation
 Numerous philosophers have identified Kant’s three Critiques (of 
Pure Reason, Practical Reason and of Judgement) as marking the 
beginning of ‘modernity’. Binsbergen and Geschiere cite the 
phenomenological approach of Kant’s Critiques as “the beginning and 
foundation of modern thought” (33) in their isolation of man from the 
surrounding world; “we are utterly  incapable of knowing things as they 
really are. We can only  know our mental representations of them. Yet there 
is the unmistakeable continuity between these representations, and reality”. 
J. M. Bernstein in The Fate of Art (not to be confused with Peter L. 
Bernstein and The Power of Gold) traces the extension of this separation to 
the realm of the aesthetic, which in Kant is detached from those of 
“cognition and moral worth” (J. M. Bernstein 5). He claims, “it is Kant’s 
third Critique that attempts to generate, to carve out and constitute, the 
domain of the aesthetic in its wholly modern signification” (ibid.). 
 The era of ‘modern thought’ is also, according to Lukács, the era of 
capitalism. This is not merely coincidental: the principle of categorical 
separation and rational abstraction that drives Kant’s philosophy is equally 
the foundation of capitalist  society, and in particular of the process of 
211
commodification. The abstraction of an object’s (or a person’s) exchange 
value from the object’s material or individual existence, determined by the 
objective calculation of the number of hours of human labour required to 
produce it, is entirely  built on the premise that the world is made up of 
distinct categories whose relationships are based on exchange. It is due to 
the success of this philosophy that Lukács can identify “the commodity [as] 
the universal category of society  as a whole” (86), and Binsbergen and 
Geschiere argue that the “concept of commodity  has universalizing 
tendencies” (46), meaning that the commodifying attitude tends to take 
over more and more “spheres” of existence (ibid.). They then forcefully 
conclude that, “Kantian modern thought, thus, is the matrix of 
commodification, as much as commodification is the matrix of Kantian 
thought” (34 emphasis in text). The principle of separate spheres of 
existence (cognitive, moral, aesthetic) that essentially constitutes this 
structural link is also connected to my argument that human beauty in art 
entails a separation of beauty from the human individual, by  abstracting 
human beauty into a separate sphere. In the metaphorical connection of 
gold to human beauty, the necessary implication of commodification (of 
person and beauty) becomes visible. The novels addressed here 
acknowledge this inevitable condition, but  attempt to invert the principle of 
separation in order to protect beauty and the human individual from the 
corrupting, dehumanising association of commodification.
 Although Kant’s theory of the formation of aesthetic judgements 
bases the attribution of beauty on the perception of moral good in the object 
— “the beautiful is the symbol of the morally  good” (180; bk. 1 sec. 59) — 
a claim which is rarely made in the late twentieth or twenty-first century. J. 
M. Bernstein argues that beauty and morality  have been forcibly separated 
in the post-Kantian, modern world: “The challenge is rather to think 
through what truth, morality and beauty (or its primary instance: art) are 
when what is denied is their categorial separation from one another — a 
separation, I shall argue, following Weber and Habermas, that is 
constitutive of modernity” (2). Iris Murdoch and Elaine Scarry are the most 
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notable defenders of a continuing link between beauty  and goodness in 
recent philosophy, although both have received criticism for this position. 
Murdoch’s The Sovereignty of Good, published in 1970, is no longer very 
recent and has been superseded by critics such as Bernstein; Scarry, 
meanwhile, has come under serious fire (as we have seen, from critics like 
Marwick) for her highly problematic arguments in Beauty and Being Just. 
Donoghue’s 2003 criticism of Scarry  could also be applied to Murdoch, 
when he remarks, “It seems to me a poor defense of beauty to isolate it and 
then make it an instrument in the advance of other values” (172). 
 Kant, however, has remained a focus of study  and debate. This may 
well be due to the complexity  of his philosophy: it is not the case that 
beauty is or is inherently bound up with the morally good, but that it is the 
symbol of it  — therefore beauty and moral goodness are discrete entities 
with a symbolic link. There is plenty  of scope in this idea for continued 
interpretation of the relationship between beauty and morality. We have 
seen in previous chapters that a conception of beauty as something 
transcendent and abstract, reaching beyond earthly concerns, has endured 
consistently right up to contemporary studies of beauty  and aesthetics. It is 
on this basis that Kirwan argues of the aesthetic theory expounded in Kant’s 
Critique of Judgement, that “it is noteworthy that, even as the secularization 
of thought once more appeared to gather momentum in the later nineteenth 
century, this form of aesthetics, which it would seem could hardly sustain 
itself without a commitment to something beyond the secular, nevertheless 
lost none of its hold. In the twentieth century  it was kept  alive in the 
continental tradition by such figures as Heidegger, Gadamer and 
Lyotard” (The Aesthetic in Kant 3). 
 It is this “something beyond the secular” (ibid.) that is still being 
sought in treatments of beauty, both critical and fictional — perhaps more 
ardently pursued now in response to the marketing and commodification of 
beauty observed by Marwick and Frow. J. M. Bernstein affirms Kirwan’s 
claim in his study of Kant’s successors (and critics), referring particularly to 
Heidegger, Derrida and Adorno, that “at least one significant strain of 
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modern thought has been seeking ways of (re)connecting the modern 
subject or self with an order beyond it” (8). Further supporting this trend 
towards the reunification of separated categories, Binsbergen and Geschiere 
insist that “the general trend in 20th-century CE thought has been not to re-
affirm, but to expose, criticise, and remedy such a separation between 
humankind and ‘the things’ as is taken for granted, celebrated even, in the 
concepts of ‘commodity’ and ‘commodification’” (34 emphasis in text). 
 One of the main strands of Luke Sutherland’s Venus as a Boy 
establishes the protagonist D.’s standard of beauty within an almost Kantian 
framework of disinterestedness and the separation of spheres of existence, 
though these spheres are held in connection by the metaphor of gold. The 
varying manifestations and transformations of gold constitute a partial 
reunification of the spheres, which is pushed much further in later parts of 
the novel in a challenge to the Kantian worldview. What remains 
emphasised throughout the novel is the transcendent and transformative 
power of beauty (and love, as a related phenomenon). The novel employs 
gold in a metaphorical capacity  to connect human beauty with that of the 
landscape, while keeping these beauties segregated from the vicissitudes of 
human relationships and from other uses of the land — interests, in Kantian 
terms. Kant defines interest in this context as follows: “The delight which 
we connect with the representation of the existence of an object is called 
interest. Such a delight, therefore, always involves a reference to the faculty 
of desire, either as its determining ground, or else as necessarily implicated 
with its determining ground” (36; bk. 1 sec. 2). 
 In The Colour, gold is firmly rooted in the earth, reluctant to leave 
it: in the Orkney and London scenes of Venus as a Boy, gold occurs in D.’s 
narrative (we never know his full name) as an indicator of his most 
precious moments of beauty and happiness, which are always embodied in 
his environment. In this sense, the landscape itself is almost metaphorical. 
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Introducing himself and his story11, D. remarks of Orkney  that “once 
you’ve lived there and come away you never quite stop pining for the 
beauty and magic” (8). This beauty explicitly  refers to the landscape of the 
islands, which remains separated from and “Regardless of the nastiness and 
violence and hate” encountered in the people (ibid.). The magic of Orkney 
is primarily concentrated in its light, and it is in D.’s descriptions of this 
that gold becomes a consistent feature. Whereas The Colour depicts gold as 
intransigently earthbound, Sutherland finds his gold in the sky — but this 
airy  gold forges an equally strong connection between environment and 
characters. In a reflection on “just  how deep  Orkney went in me” (51-2), a 
metaphor expressing the significance of his connection to his homeland, D. 
particularly emphasises “qualities of light” (ibid. emphasis in text), which 
extend the metaphor into transcendent realms by implicitly  filling D. 
himself with light. This golden light running through D.’s body ultimately 
becomes visible, when he turns to gold. 
 Returning to Orkney after almost twenty years away, D. observes 
“strips of red, yellow and gold along the horizon where the last of the 
sunlight seeped through. Classic Orkney” (136). The golden horizon makes 
frequent appearances in the novel, a metaphor for the idealised future life 
envisioned by the characters in this novel and in The Colour. In this 
description, near the end of the novel, the distant golden horizon is part of 
the experience of being in Orkney  — not a call from afar to leave the 
islands. D. has recognised that the beauty is precisely in the distance of this 
ideal, and that he will never actually reach it as his destination. Kirwan in 
Beauty offers an explanation of this situation: “This is the fundamental 
oxymoron of beauty. It  is the desire alone that  endures and, in enduring, 
itself provides that which is its end — beauty” (122). Beauty is, in these 
terms, an unfulfilled and thereby self-fulfilling desire. For this reason 
Kirwan characterises beauty as “ateleological” (ibid.), aligning his theory 
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11 The narrative of Venus as a Boy is presented to us as a transcript, taken down by the 
writer ‘L. S.’ (Luke Sutherland is the obvious suggestion), who has been approached by 
Pascal, the lover of D. who is now on his deathbed. After his death, Pascal gives L. S. 
several minidiscs containing D.’s narration of his story. There is no admission by L. S. that 
any license has been taken with the transcription, and so, for consistence, I refer to the 
story as D.’s narrative, rather than Sutherland’s.
partially with Kant’s emphasis on disinterestedness. The golden horizon is 
an absolute metaphor of separation: although D. figuratively establishes 
Orkney’s gold light as a part of himself, its manifestation is external to him 
and unreachable. 
 Beauty is therefore abstracted from the material world — or at least, 
the attainable material world — in line with Kant’s assertion that in making 
an aesthetic judgement we should not be “concerned with the existence of 
the thing, but rather how we judge it on the basis of mere contemplation 
(intuition or reflection)” (36; bk. 1 sec. 2). The frequent recounts of 
“nastiness and violence and hate” (8) also associated with Orkney and with 
D. (as both victim and perpetrator) make it  necessary  for the island’s beauty 
to be detached from the inhabitants, and even from the physical mass of the 
island itself; on the horizon the beauty is safe, as Kant would wish, from 
moral contamination.
 The novels studied in this chapter show the relationship between 
beauty and morality to be contingent and man-made: the link may  have 
become deeply entrenched, but Tremain and Sutherland demonstrate that it 
is open to deconstruction. The problem of the desirability and subsequent 
commodification of human beauty is articulated through the metaphor of 
gold, which shares these attributes. The novels’ narrative treatments of this 
metaphor attempt to transcend the implied contamination of 
commodification, abstracting and purifying gold until its beauty is entirely 
detached from the interests which Kant banishes from his own conception 
of the beautiful. However, in these narratives beauty must first pass through 
the commodifying process which separates it from its material body. This 
abstraction is necessary for beauty to then continue to abstract itself from 
other associations. The urge towards the purification and transcendence of 
beauty above the base and earthly is still evident in post-1980 fiction, but 
we can no longer rely on assertions of intrinsic goodness. Instead, we have 
to build the scaffolding from which transcendence can take off, with 
metaphor and its manipulation within narrative as the primary materials. 
However, it must be remembered that gold is chemically pure, refusing to 
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bond with other elements: a certain degree of inherent purity  is already 
present.
 Harriet in The Colour and D. in Venus as a Boy find that  neither 
beauty nor gold can be easily separated from their exchange value, and that 
this incurs moral compromises and difficulties. However, by exploiting the 
metaphorical process by which abstract beauty is joined to natural, earthly 
objects, they attempt to transcend the commodification of the beauty they 
possess. Both characters reconnect beauty to the earth through their use of 
metaphor in the narrative, with a definite moral intention. By establishing 
the environment as a pure and morally good origin of beauty, the 
beleaguered attribute of beauty  is sheltered in the more general 
manifestation of the earth, which is not so entangled as the characters are in 
the economies of exchange governing the texts.
 
Natural Gold, Golden Nature
 In both The Colour and Venus as a Boy the connection of the human 
to the natural world, via beauty  and gold, fluctuates between the literal and 
the metaphorical. In Tremain’s novel, gold exists as a solid substance in the 
New Zealand earth and in the narrative, but its radiant and valuable beauty 
escapes the bonds of physicality to function metaphorically. Gold and 
beauty become almost synonymous, as a single shapeshifting metaphor for 
the dream of transcendence, the idealised future life. In literal terms, the 
future life that can be attained if only an individual can procure enough 
gold to buy  themselves this dream. Less literally, the idealised life that 
might occur if one can find a perfect love. It is the discordance between 
these two aspirations that creates a moral difficulty: the ‘purity’ of self-
sacrifice and freely giving to another are in conflict with the self-serving 
exchange economy of gold as money. 
 Kant distinguishes two types of beauty on this basis, and two types 
of aesthetic judgement. The interest present in an evaluation of gold as a 
commodity  renders any consideration of its beauty impure — “Everyone 
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must allow that a judgement on the beautiful which is tinged with the 
slightest interest, is very partial and not a pure judgement of taste” (36; bk. 
1 sec. 2). Purity here can be interpreted as denoting both moral purity and 
the undiluted singularity of the judgement; both readings are suggested by 
Kant’s usage of the term throughout the Critique. It  is acceptable for an 
interest to arise after a pure aesthetic judgement has been made, such as the 
desire to own a beautiful object or merely to remain in its presence, but 
once an economy of exchange has been established in society, in which 
gold has a value, no judgement of gold’s beauty can be pure. 
 Tremain attempts to redeem the beauty of gold by transforming it 
into a metaphor for a disinterested and aesthetic love between two people: 
once gold is bound up with this pure aesthetic judgement, its own beauty is 
detached from the taint of commerce. However, this redemption is only 
temporary, as her characters cannot survive without self-interest. In The 
Colour, the gold itself is an ever-present sprinkling of beauty  in the 
narrative, insidious and beguiling. In all the open vastness of New Zealand 
the precious metal that takes over and transforms it almost invariably 
appears in tiny quantities, a “coarse dust” (268) or a few “grains” (271), 
always emphatically combined with the earth or rock from which it has 
come. Joseph Blackstone’s initial find in his creek consists of “grey  mud 
dusted with gold” (56), and later on his way to the Kokatahi goldfields he 
learns how the gold lies “on the blue-clay bottom” (153) of the rivers, 
elusive beneath the rushing waters. The miners’ task is one of separation, 
removing the gold from the earth in which it has been embedded for 
millennia. This is a notoriously difficult task: “Although gold deposits are 
widespread, in one form or another, no one area has yielded its gold easily. 
Finding and producing gold demands immense effort relative to the amount 
of glittering yellow metal that makes its appearance at the end of the 
process” (P. L. Bernstein 9).
 These small quantities of gold are most frequently  measured in 
terms of the human hand: the Chinese vegetable seller Pao Yi finds a 
nugget “much larger than his thumb pad” (216) described again later as 
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measuring “about the length of his thumb” (248), while Joseph’s first 
discovery  amounts to “a little mound of bright dust . . . the size of a man’s 
thumb-nail” (57). In this way the gold dug from the earth is connected to 
the people who dug it, implicating them in the tensions and moral 
paradoxes its beauty provokes. The gold also connects people to the earth 
itself via their digging hands, and for Harriet and Pao Yi it is this 
fundamental connection to the landscape that saves them from the vicious 
commodity culture of the Gold Rush.
 Gold is the medium by which the narrative joins earth and man, and 
it is specifically the seductive beauty of the gold that effects this: it draws 
people to the earth, draws their hands deep into the soil, and leaves mud 
under their fingernails. Although Tremain does imply a degree of moral 
judgement on the miners who ravage the landscape in their pursuit of gold 
as riches, in these earlier descriptions of the beauty of gold and its apparent 
affinity with the human body she presents the characters’ appreciation of 
beauty as relatively  uncorrupted. Before the gold has actually become a 
commodity, and is only radiant with beauty  and promise, it is not morally 
problematic. The establishment of an original purity becomes crucial later 
in the novel, as a state to which gold and human beauty  might return, 
through a reunion with the natural environment. 
 Tremain’s conjunction of human and natural beauty  does not disrupt 
the broadly Kantian framework of the text’s morality, as it is predicated on 
a disinterestedness in human interactions with beauty. Further, Kant allows 
for a certain amount of pleasure in nature’s beauty; “I do maintain that  to 
take an immediate interest in the beauty  of nature (not merely to have taste 
in judging it) is always a mark of a good soul” (128; bk. 1 sec. 42 emphasis 
in text). However, his precepts are too strict to allow one to engage gold in 
a ‘pure’ aesthetic judgement since the implication of the personal interests it 
can satisfy is too deeply ingrained in the substance of gold, and its colour 
and shine fall under Kant’s category of ‘charms’ rather than true beauty, 
which is found in ‘form’ (ibid.). 
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 Yet in both novels it is precisely this sense of possibility and 
transformation, based on the economic value of gold, wherein lies its 
beauty. Before gold is actually sought and used as a commodity, its 
commodity  value (which, as Marx reminds us, is detached from the 
material object), lends the gold a metaphysical value as a non-specific 
facilitator of dreams. Both Tremain and Sutherland challenge Kant’s narrow 
and rigid definition of beauty, by creating narratives that foreground 
experiences that abuse or exploit such strictures but remain explicitly 
beautiful and concerned with beauty. The rapture produced by  gold can be 
presented as pure and uncorrupted by exploiting the principles of separation 
that govern Kant’s doctrine and also the process of commodification 
associated with (and condemned by) it. The moral impurity attached to the 
commodification of gold is abstracted by Tremain from the gold itself, and 
presented as a human frailty  not attributable to the substance used by them 
as a commodity. Moral judgement is reserved for those who actively 
engage in destruction and corruption in their quest for gold, as we see in 
Joseph’s physical and mental ruin. The beauty of gold, however, remains its 
own.
 Sutherland, however, employs sex in his challenge to the Kantian 
‘purity’ of aesthetic judgements, as method of transcendence through 
beauty — and even, ultimately, through commodification. J. M. Bernstein 
interprets Kant’s Critique as arguing the following: 
. . . disinterestedness is, in a sense, measured against, and perhaps 
determined by, the powerful interests from which it withdraws. In 
withdrawing from sensuous interests, the very ‘pathological’ 
interests which moral reason requires us to withdraw from, the 
achievement of aesthetic disinterestedness is nearly  as great, 
granting the diminished character of the ‘sacrifice’ involved, as the 
achievement of moral autonomy. The diminished character of the 
sacrifice of sensuous interests turns on the fact  that aesthetic 
disinterestedness requires only the temporary ‘bracketing’ or 
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deferral of sensuous interests and not their wholesale abandonment. 
(25) 
Taking Bernstein’s interpretation further, Sutherland refuses to concede that 
beauty requires a withdrawal from sensuous interests, instead giving his 
protagonist the definitive power of both providing and receiving 
transcendent experiences of beauty through sex. 
 At various moments throughout the novel, D.’s narrative refers back 
to the golden horizon, evoking its most significant incarnation on Orkney’s 
Bu Beach. As teenagers, D. and his first love Tracy are one night having 
sex in a small boat when a group of other youngsters push them out to sea. 
As the foundations of their relationship begin to dissolve in hostility, D.’s 
narrative is suffused first with darkness, and then with gold. Tracy  herself 
becomes part of the landscape, with “her hair all halo, sky  twinkling in the 
background” (54), one instance of many in which human and natural beauty 
are combined, becoming almost synonymous through their mutual infusion 
of gold. When she tells him finally  that their relationship  is over, the 
narrative switches entirely to description of the environment: “It was black 
all round. No stars. A gold strip  glimmering on the horizon” (58). The hint 
of pathetic fallacy, in the total darkness, gives way to a strip  of gold, which 
seems to act as some kind of consolation offered to the two of them by 
Orkney itself. 
 The gold strip  turns out to be Bu Beach, one of Orkney’s most 
beautiful spots, and this is the only time that D. comes close to reaching the 
golden horizon and the paradise it promises: “Whatever tension there’d 
been on the boat, Bu Beach drained it away” (58). The power of natural and 
human beauty, in conjunction, to detach D. and Tracy  from all their 
practical and emotional interests presents a novel kind of disinterestedness, 
reminiscent of Murdoch’s description of beauty as “an occasion for 
‘unselfing’” (Sovereignty of Good 84), in which we “clear our minds of 
selfish care” (ibid.). The whole of D.’s story  revolves around this single 
image of perfect beauty, in which Tracy and Bu Beach are conflated in a 
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golden light, and this image functions as the pivot around which he can 
build an alternative articulation of beauty.
 It is vital for Sutherland to connect the beauty of people and 
landscape not only through gold, but also with the infusion of sexuality. 
The two become inextricably  combined in the gilded visions that D. and his 
partners can achieve during sex — “tunnels of light, orchards, and angels, 
always angels” (50) — and later when, through his gift of providing sexual 
transcendence, D. is given the ambivalent “reward” (145) of the 
transformation of his whole body into gold. Merely withdrawing from 
sensuality and its attendant problems of exploitation or commodification of 
individuals would not  allow D. to fully  transform these evils, as he 
ultimately does. 
 J. M. Bernstein articulates the same frustration at the narrowness of 
definitions of beauty such as Kant’s: “Once the capacity  for the 
appreciation of beauty becomes essentially a moral virtue, then the 
autonomy, integrity, disinterestedness and impartiality of judgements of 
taste are destroyed” (28). In this he seems to suggest that there should be 
more separation of beauty  and morality, although the terms he ascribes to 
beauty — integrity and disinterestedness in particular — have a distinctly 
moral flavour, at  least  in a Kantian context. The entanglement of beauty and 
morality  is thus made even clearer, and it is worth noting that Kant 
specifically describes beauty as the symbol of the morally good; Salim 
Kemal observes in Kant and Fine Art (1986) that “it is more appropriate 
and fruitful to stress that beauty  bears analogies with moral good” (16). 
Beauty is therefore something essentially different from morality, but 
related. As a result it is perfectly  possible for Tremain and Sutherland to 
detach moral judgements from beauty, and to play  with the symbolic 
relationships between them.
! While The Colour embeds gold in its narrative in solid human hand-
sized chunks, Sutherland draws the natural and the human together through 
metaphorical gold, in the descriptions of golden beauty that encompass 
everything in the scene. In Kantian terms, by infusing gold into the 
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landscape in metaphorical form (as light), Sutherland abstracts gold from 
its literal form and the empirical interests that inevitably  arise from the 
contemplation of its beauty. Having purified gold in this way, using it as a 
natural, landscape-bound metaphor for semi-divine perfection, gold is 
sufficiently transcendent that Sutherland is able, later, to reincarnate it in 
physical form. When D. literally turns into gold, Sutherland presents him as 
a metaphor for perfection and purity detached from the commodification 
that had consumed his former beauty. Both D. and gold itself are 
transformed.
   
“It Shows Itself and Beckons”: Golden Girls
 Although the beauty of gold may invoke both materialistic and 
transcendent visions that draw people back to the landscape, it  does not 
necessarily fulfil its promises. As a result, its lovely appearance takes on the 
hue of deception. Joseph in The Colour contemplates that gold is: 
. . . as duplicitous as a girl. It shows itself and beckons. Within its 
first gleam lies the promise of more, much more, and so men go 
forward, cajoling the earth, breaking their backs and their hearts, 
but very often they’re rewarded with nothing . . . (86)
Once again gold is metaphorically  connected to human beauty, a 
comparison that holds particular significance for Joseph because he has fled 
England to escape the consequences of an act incited by just  such a 
duplicitous beauty  — in his view, at least. He remembers how in Norfolk 
once, “in the golden evening, he saw the girl, Rebecca” (113). The ‘golden’ 
evening again connects the characters to their natural environment in an 
echo of Sutherland’s Orkney, and in this case sets the scene for Joseph’s 
fatal desire, mirrored by his later desire for gold. He watches Rebecca 
flaunting her attractiveness, her “crooked teeth” (ibid.) that he finds so 
fascinating “all on display, luring him on” (ibid.), yet what Joseph considers 
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“the beauty of it” (ibid.) is not Rebecca’s face or body, but the fulfilment of 
his own interests: seeing “blood on the petticoat” (ibid.), he realises that he 
need not fear her becoming pregnant and can enjoy “release without 
consequence” (ibid. emphasis in text). Joseph specifically regards this as “a 
kind of contract” (235), situating their relations in an economy of exchange; 
she has advertised herself as pleasure without consequence, and Joseph 
considers this to be binding. 
 A Marxist conception of Rebecca’s exchange value is particularly  
illuminating, since it is precisely  the abstraction of the human consequences 
from their sexual relations that Joseph considers “the beauty of it” (113). 
The abstraction of Rebecca’s (and to an extent Joseph’s) human 
individuality from their relations constitutes a new form of transformation 
in the gold metaphor; the evening is golden and Rebecca is beautiful to 
Joseph because she has been ascribed a use value (rather than an exchange 
value) that allows him to enjoy her without the intrusion of other interests 
and consequences. Marx observes the transformative power of 
commodification: “But even the product of labour has already been 
transformed in our hands. If we make abstraction from its use-value, we 
abstract also from the material constituents and forms which make it a use-
value” (128). In the case of Joseph and Rebecca it is difficult to clearly 
identify a product, the transaction perhaps better characterised as one of 
services. 
 However, Rebecca herself has been transformed, but  not quite in the 
manner Marx describes the transformation of products (she may be 
considered, along with products and services, as a commodity). Her use 
value is abstracted from her human individuality, but  not from her 
‘material’ existence, which remains bound to her sexual use value. The 
implication is that her physical sexuality is also abstracted from her 
individuality, since it is that which constitutes the use or service that she 
provides for Joseph. When it  comes to human beauty, therefore, Marx’s 
assertion that in this commodification process “All [the commodity’s] 
sensuous characteristics are extinguished” does not apply (ibid.). Rebecca’s 
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sensuous characteristics are abstracted from her individuality as 
components of her use value, her detached beauty thus becoming 
highlighted and increased: this dehumanised ‘contract’ for Joseph 
“immediately became the thing that held him to her” (235). In refutation of 
Kant’s principle, the beauty that Joseph finds in this moment is precisely 
that which caters to his interests. However, this golden seduction is indeed 
duplicitous, since Rebecca eventually tells him that she is having his child. 
Joseph tricks her into an abortion which causes her death, and then flees to 
New Zealand only to be caught up in another frenzy of hopeless desire, in 
the Gold Rush. 
 The association of gold with women, via beauty, was characteristic 
of the California and Alaska Gold Rushes as well as those in New Zealand 
and Australia. In a goldfield, the beauty of women is not only duplicitous as 
the gold, it is also just as rare. J. S. Holliday writes in The California Gold 
Rush Experience (1983) that “For all that was shipped to California, the one 
import most wanted remained scarce — women” (354). Casinos and 
brothels in San Francisco exploited this consuming desire, and themselves 
“mined the miners” of their gold (413). Holliday continues:
Bedazzled and excited by life-size paintings of naked men and 
women ‘in almost every attitude’ and by the reality  of women 
leaning on the bars, talking and laughing with the men, sitting at 
card tables, or walking about with trays of cigars hanging in front of 
bosoms partially, thrillingly exposed, the goldseekers would never 
forget San Francisco. (413)
It is significant that a historical work such as this chooses to conjure an 
elaborate linguistic image of the lure of the Gold Rush women, just as P. L. 
Bernstein’s lyrical descriptions of gold were noted earlier. Evoking 
bedazzlement, excitement and thrill, Holliday  echoes descriptions of the 
miners’ feelings towards the gold they seek, transposing the same language 
on to their desire for feminine beauty. As Joseph notes of the gold in his 
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creek, “It shows itself and beckons” (86), just as Holliday’s San Francisco 
women display bosoms “partially, thrillingly  exposed” (413). It  is also 
worth recalling James Carson’s vision of “fair virgins competing with each 
other for my  love” (Jackson 29), as part of the transformation made 
possible by the discovery of gold.
 The implication of these representations of Gold Rush women is 
that their beauty  is largely created by their scarcity, and the consequent 
force of male desire; a desperate desire inextricably connected to that which 
drives them to seek for gold. Further, women and gold are often conflated 
in Gold Rush writings, as in P. L. Bernstein’s observation that when the 
“first deposit of gold from California [arrived] at the U.S. Mint . . . it  was 
greeted by one periodical as ‘the new mistress’” (223). As Carson’s dream 
of fair virgins demonstrates, the attainment of beautiful women is 
associated with the attainment of gold — there is a direct causal link, in 
which women are a result of riches. This link is maintained in Venus as a 
Boy, but while both human beauty (in this novel masculine and feminine) 
and gold are connected by their exchange value, here beautiful people are 
not attained by riches: they are riches. They are also, nonetheless, a 
commodity  to be attained. Sutherland’s metaphorical gold, that we have 
seen to illuminate his landscapes as golden light, becomes increasingly 
fused with the golden beauty of the characters that D. desires. The people 
that he loves become golden themselves in his narrative through metaphor, 
mirroring the event of D. himself literally  turning to gold. As the 
description of this key incident is related both at  the very beginning and at 
the end of D.’s narrative, the gold-infused descriptions of other characters 
refer directly to D.’s transformation.
 In both Venus as a Boy and The Colour, what turns people into gold 
is, very  simply, love. Gold in its monetary form, however, turns people into 
objects. In London, D. ends up living and working in “a knocking 
shop” (82) populated by  drag queens and their ex-Nazi pimp Radu. D. is 
happy to wear drag for work, and in this guise he calls himself “Désirée. It 
means longed for” (90 emphasis in text). But although D., whose most 
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striking characteristic is his gift of providing immense sexual pleasure, is 
constantly longed for by his clients, he does not find the love for which he 
searches. He does, however, make money: “we snared our fair share of 
gold” (92). But money is not the central commodity in these transactions; 
more desperately desired is beauty. D. remarks that “money’s no substitute 
for beauty and money’ll get you anything” (ibid.), implying that beauty is 
the ultimate object of desire — money is only sought in order to attain 
contact with human beauty. D.’s remarkable ability  to induce visions and 
life-altering epiphanies in his sexual partners is described by  his friend 
Colm as a “gift [which] if I used it for good — would make me worth my 
weight in gold” (94-5). 
 D. does indeed use his gift  for good, to an extent redeeming the 
daily act of selling his body by transcending the transaction: “just as lovely 
is the fright of their lives these folk get when you turn the tables, and 
suddenly you’re no longer a salaried sex slave but a force of nature . . . The 
rush when you flood them with love and their eyes mist  over with this 
beautiful confusion” (94 emphasis in text). Murdoch observes that in the 
Symposium “Plato allowed to the beauty  of the lovely boy an awakening 
power which he denied to the beauty of nature or of art” (88): it is just such 
an awakening power that D. possesses, but in Sutherland’s framework this 
awakening is connected to nature, rather than constituting a denial of it. 
Further, Frow puts forward the claim that “the commodity form has the 
potential to be enabling and productive as well as to be limiting and 
destructive. Historically  it has almost always been both of these things at 
the same time, and the balance of gain and loss has rarely been easy to 
draw” (138). D.’s commodified person, strangely, enables him to mount a 
resistance to the dehumanised transaction of sexual services by 
foregrounding its absurdity, making the economic structure visible and then 
deconstructing it. By returning himself and his clients to nature through the 
elemental “force” (94) of his love (we have seen how nature and love are 
inextricably joined in the novel), the economic exchange on which their 
encounter is based simply dissolves. D. is giving them an experience of 
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beauty for free, and so it is no longer an artificially contrived exchange but 
a natural act. 
 In this way D. tries to return to the golden horizon of Orkney, his 
standard of the natural in which love connects people and earth in a 
moment of perfect beauty. The beauty of D.’s body  and the experiences he 
creates are the qualities that establish his value, which is measured in gold 
(or money). Therefore, gold is subordinate to beauty until the two are 
metaphorically confounded in the narrative and become synonymous. 
However, this is not fully  realised in D.’s recollection of his exploitation as 
a prostitute. The elevation of gold above the cheapening and corruption of 
its economic manifestation requires a more transcendent force: true and 
mutual love.
 The experience of beauty  as an “unselfing” for Murdoch (84) and a 
“decentering” for Scarry (112) is amplified in the experience of love in 
Venus as a Boy. D.’s first experience of such transcendence is intimately 
bound up with the sky, prefiguring the way in which the golden horizon and 
the stars are central to his rapture with Tracy on Bu Beach. In this earlier 
episode, however, the beautiful person himself comes from the sky. D. is 
situated at one of the highest points in his Orkney  landscape, “Flying kites 
on Ward Hill” (28). Connected to the sky by his kite, he sees “what I 
thought was another sun: this flaming wheel in the sky over Widewall, 
coming right at me” (ibid.). In alchemical texts “the Sun was synonymous 
with gold” (Hessayon 71), signifying its radiance, importance to humanity, 
and its potential for facilitating transcendence. Sutherland employs his 
metaphorical sun in very much the same way, as “the shooting star turned 
out to be a man with my twenty-eight-foot kite tail caught in his 
feet” (ibid.) and this man provides exactly  that radiance, significance and 
transcendence for the twelve-year-old D. The stranger is already imbued 
with the golden Orkney light, rendering him magical to D., and when he 
lands with his red parachute covering them both and says “My name is 
Engel” (ibid.) — the German for ‘angel’ — the spell is complete. Tracy 
later echoes the young Dane in her golden beauty: D. introduces her to us 
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as “sixteen, bleached-blonde hair and skin-tight Wranglers, all Norse 
godlike, with kind of hawkish features” (46). Together, Engel and Tracy 
establish the transcendent power of golden beauty, characterised by the 
gold Orkney light, for which D. continues to search once he has left the 
islands. 
 The only place in which he has any success is London. But although 
D. can bring his clients to tears — “I’d a guy go mute for half an hour and 
swear . . . that all Heaven had opened before him” (92) — he does not find 
the love he is looking for until the streets of Soho are bombed and he 
returns to the house to find that “sitting at the table was this... [sic] angel. A 
double-take made the wings and halo disappear, but the glow stayed put: 
one of the darkest days of my life suddenly  drenched in sunlight (97 
emphasis in text). The halo and the golden sunlight are indicators of love 
and perfect beauty in D.’s narrative, and this angel, a transsexual called 
Wendy, is the direct descendent of Engel and Tracy with “the whiteness of 
her skin, and all the blonde” (ibid.). From this point on, the narrative is 
once more imbued with golden light; before Wendy enters the London 
narrative, the only gold mentioned is in the form of money. In the human 
beauty which is both a cause and a signifier of love for D., gold is elevated 
above its earthly solidity into pure light, illuminating the sky.
 Sutherland integrates the gold of the landscape even more intimately 
with the gold of Wendy’s beauty, when she and D. share their first kiss. Her 
angelic incarnation is again evoked: “Wendy flew at me, arms spread, the 
coat opened” (111), and this time she is almost the angel of death as in her 
longed-for touch D. experiences “something like being struck by lightning, 
your whole life passing before you and then everything after; a long 
luxurious look at Paradise” (ibid.). The suggestion that such ecstasy is not 
for this life, but the one after, becomes explicit  at  the end of the novel with 
D.’s suicide attempt and subsequent meditations on death. The golden 
horizon, in the remote distance, begins to re-emerge at this point in the 
narrative, hinting at the impossibility of D.’s truly reaching paradise 
through Wendy. Nonetheless, in this first kiss D. is surrounded by gold and 
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is certainly awarded another taste of perfection such as he felt  on Bu Beach: 
“I kept my eyes open when she kissed me, saw every single city  light turn 
gold; meteor showers over Chelsea and Pimlico” (ibid.). D.’s narrative has 
already established Wendy’s beauty as consisting primarily of her golden 
blonde radiance, and as this beauty  transforms into love it spills its gold 
over into the landscape so that Wendy herself is almost lost  in it. The 
golden light blurs the distinction between human and environment, creating 
a completeness and perfection of beauty that forms the crux of the novel.
 Harriet in The Colour also achieves such completion through a love 
which generates an intimate connection between her and the land. This 
connection is, of course, forged by gold, which transforms her into a beauty 
inhabiting a beautiful world. For more than half the novel, Harriet’s 
appearance is only rarely described, and never with reference to beauty. The 
narrator, through Joseph’s eyes, describes her in the simplest manner: “She 
was tall and her hair was brown” (4). When she joins him at the goldfields 
of Kaniere, however, Joseph reassesses his perception of her:
He couldn’t bear to hold his gaze on her for long. She looked too 
plain in the cold morning light, her hair too short, her nose too long, 
her skin too weathered by her days out on the farm and by  the salt 
sea winds.
He wondered if he’d ever found her beautiful, but couldn’t 
remember whether he had or not. (257)
Tremain’s description of Harriet here remains resolutely  straightforward 
and unadorned, consisting of simple clauses repetitively framed around 
negative comparatives — too short, too long. However, just a few pages 
later we are offered a perception of Harriet  different to Joseph’s. The other 
miners, staring at this “curiosity: a woman at Kokatahi” (263), do not see 
the plain farming wife that Joseph does, but rather “this tall, almost 
beautiful wife of his, with her defiant look and her cropped hair” (ibid.). On 
her approach to the goldfields, Harriet has already undergone a swift 
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transformation from absolute non-beauty  to an encouraging almost-beauty. 
Her appearance itself has not necessarily changed; rather, the narrative has 
transformed her by shifting perspective from her unappreciative husband to 
the gold-digging men who are, as we know, hungry for a female presence.
 Later, walking upriver to escape the squalor of the Kokatahi 
diggings, Harriet  is surprised by  the purity and beauty  of her surroundings, 
emphasised by the orderly garden of the vegetable-seller, Chen Pao Yi. In a 
strikingly similar narrative move to those of Sutherland, her first sight of 
this garden is illuminated by golden light: “She had to . . . shield her eyes 
against the sun — which had lit up  the garden on the other side of the river 
like a bright lamp lighting a darkened stage” (266). On the banks of the 
river, she finds nuggets of gold offering themselves up to her: she has found 
herself in an unexpected paradise. Just as for D. in Venus as a Boy, what 
this utopia needs to illuminate its qualities is love. And, when a surge of 
melted mountain snow floods the river to sweep away the hideousness of 
the Kokatahi goldfields, Harriet is saved from drowning by  Pao Yi. In the 
cave he has made into a home, they fall in love.
 In the darkest recess of the cave, Pao Yi and Harriet smoke opium 
and make love, allowing themselves to sink into total animality: in her 
visions Harriet finds herself transformed, “as a bird she lay on her lover’s 
body and covered him with her wings and she felt him rise up  in her as 
though he were growing there” (347). When they wake, they see that “This 
cave is made of gold” (348). Only when they have surrendered their human 
selves to the pure force of elemental desire do the elements of the earth 
offer their treasures to them. Pao Yi realises that “the yellow light he’d seen 
in opium reveries and which he’d thought had been made by  the candle 
flame, had been a golden light” (348). Just as in Venus as a Boy their love 
has caused their environment to transcend its earthly incarnation, 
transforming it into pure golden light. 
 However, they  are also aware that if they break their pact of mutual 
respect with the landscape, if they “decided to steal that light” (ibid.) — dig 
the gold out of the cave — it would become earthly and commodified once 
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more. In Kant’s terminology, they would no longer be participating in a 
pure aesthetic judgement; interest would have intruded. The golden spell 
encompassing both humans and environment would be broken and “they 
would have to part” (ibid.), since the corresponding pure aesthetic 
judgement of each other, on which their love is built, would be 
contaminated. The metaphor of the golden light, which both signifies and is 
an essential part of their paradisal love, must remain intact; it must remain 
metaphorical or the magic (the same magic that  D. finds in Orkney, where 
earth and human love are joined) will be corrupted. Gold can only be 
perfect when its physical temptations, corruptions and commodification 
have been transcended. Beauty is moral for Tremain, but  only within the 
exchange economy that  people have constructed around gold. By 
connecting beauty to morality in a natural context, it can be attributed other 
values than those of commerce, from which it is then isolated.
A Solid Gold Metaphor
 The description of D.’s body turning to gold straddles the beginning 
and the end of his narrative in Venus as a Boy. All the events that occur in 
between — loves found and lost, despair, abuse, moments of utter beauty 
and a suicide attempt — are gilded with the presence of this defining 
incident, the gold metaphor becoming physical in D.’s body  gives meaning 
to the memoir it frames. D. makes this explicit in his introductory  section, 
addressing “anyone who’s been looking for proof of meaning, or a grand 
design, or divinity — I’d say to you, look no further than me” (7-8 
emphasis in text). D.’s opening statement, “Maybe this’ll be my 
resurrection” (4), may refer to his transformation or to the inscription of it 
in text — or probably both, since in turning to gold D. is translated into a 
textual metaphor for resurrection and affirmation through transcendent 
beauty. It is an apotheosis into meaning through the conversion of 
exploitation and sadness into pure beauty. 
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 This process is echoed throughout the memoir that follows, as we 
have seen in the episode at Bu Beach where the demise of D.’s relationship 
with Tracy  is transformed through the golden beauty of Orkney into a 
moment of poignant natural perfection, and in D.’s transcendence of the 
commodification of his prostituted body into a “force of nature” (94) filling 
his clients with unexpected love. The transformative power of these scenes 
is driven by the initial transformation of D. into gold, which establishes the 
paradigm of conversion and transcendence through beauty.
 D.’s miraculous golden body functions metaphorically in relation to 
several other parts of the text. The core of the metaphor consists in the 
detachment of D. from his own physical body, which is necessary in order 
for him to transcend the failures of his life. He describes waking up “the 
Morning After the Night Before” (4) — the morning after he overdosed on 
pills and alochol and jumped off the Millennium Bridge — and spitting into 
the sink “these wee nuggets” of gold (ibid.). With his retrospective 
knowledge of the transformation that follows, D. observes that “what I spat 
out that morning was me” (ibid. emphasis in text). The process of turning to 
gold begins, therefore, with D.’s body voiding part of itself, and it continues 
with the increasing alienation of D. from his physical body. As he dictates 
the opening of his narrative, at this point almost entirely made of gold, he 
says that  “My arms and legs have got all stiff. Breathing’s getting harder. 
Talking’s agony” (ibid.); his body is slowly petrifying into a golden statue 
which he can no longer control or live in. He observes a little later, “I’m 
going to die soon, no doubt” (7). The transformation of his physical body 
into a substance so totally inhuman necessitates the complete detachment of 
his spirit or consciousness from that body. 
 However, this is only a metaphorical — though also physical — 
representation of something that has already happened. D. connects his 
suicide attempt to the time when “the hormone pills I was forced to take 
made nothing of me” (6). His pimp, Radu, forced him into the early stages 
of a sex change as a punishment for trying to run away with Wendy. As a 
result of the hormones, D. claims, “My body died: insides collapsing, 
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stomach cramps, vomiting, aching bones” (ibid.), and having become “this 
man with an unwanted woman’s body” (ibid.) he found he “didn’t want to 
be with myself” (ibid.). Just as, in the Marxist view, the worker becomes 
alienated from their labour and its product, their identity constituted purely 
of the hours they  work at an anonymous task, D. becomes alienated from 
the body  which no longer feels like his — because it is a her — and is 
unable to employ that body as an elemental vehicle for love. In this 
alienation, D.’s commodification is complete, and he surrenders himself 
totally  to the sale: “I stopped using a condom. Caught hepatitis B. My 
visions disappeared. . . . I had everyone call me Désirée. No 
exceptions” (138). In exclusively using his drag queen prostitute name, D. 
has labelled his identity as such, and erased the former self which he feels 
no longer exists. 
 Finally, in order to separate himself completely from the 
commodified alien body  he inhabits, D. then attempts suicide. The 
subsequent events, in which D. transforms into a rigid, golden and self-
destructive object of beauty  echo this earlier alienation from the self, but 
with a transcendent sense of meaning, as D. becomes a physical 
manifestation of all the golden visions he has given his sexual partners and 
experienced himself: “folk are suddenly saying how beautiful my voice 
sounds” (142). Appropriately, D.’s interpretation of this is a selfless one, 
having become detached from all the ‘self’ he previously  had. He draws his 
narrative to a close with the thought that, “My reward is the understanding 
that, for those I’ve touched, knowledge of me is knowledge of the 
divine” (145 emphasis in text).
 In positing his golden self as a metaphor for the divine, D. has, like 
Harriet and Pao Yi in The Colour, overwhelmed the commodity aspect of 
gold (and human beauty) with its contradictory  associations of eternity, 
perfection and transcendence. The moral problems relating to the 
commodification of gold have been detached from the substance by the 
same process of abstraction that, in the Marxist conception, produce 
commodification in the first place. By  separating golden beauty from the 
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human individual who displays it, and reidentifying that beauty  with the 
natural environment from which the gold was originally  extracted, Tremain 
and Sutherland manipulate the Kantian and capitalist principle of 
categorical separation. The commodity sphere is fully acknowledged, but 
golden beauty harnesses its own transformative powers — the mysterious 
fascination so often ascribed to it — and floods the commodifying process 
with love. The alienation denounced by Marx and his followers is thus 
ameliorated into a benign separation: golden beauty  now resides in the 
natural landscape, where money is a very  minor force. The intangible 
fascination of golden beauty turns out to a very substantial power after all.
 As a metaphor for human beauty, gold has been shown to be an 
effective vehicle for the transformation of human beauty itself in the 
contemporary  novels studied here. I have chosen to end with gold because 
in its sublimation and abstraction of human beauty  from the human body it 
brings us full circle back to the natural, to the earth and the flesh. In this 
manner Tremain and Sutherland offer a renewed conception of beauty  as a 
meaningful object of study, accepting both its fleshly and its idealised 
manifestations; a reformulation of human beauty that has been variously 
proposed by each of the novels analysed in this thesis. The tension between 
these two aspects of beauty  endures, but has proved fruitful for post-1980 
novelists as a driving force for fictional narrative. Contemporary 
explorations of concrete and abstract human beauty negotiate the paradoxes 
that emerge in this field, presenting a consistent  attempt to redeem and 
revive our fascination with human beauty  — which has never, in fact, gone 
away.
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Conclusion
 Having traced the progress of human beauty in post-1980 
anglophone fiction from the fleshiness of fruit metaphors, through the 
destabilising dissolution of water, to the gradual petrification and 
abstraction of ice, glass and gold, it has become clear that the urge to turn 
human beauty into art is a vital concern of many  recent novels. I have 
found that the desire to preserve transient human beauty  in art remains as 
strong as ever, undiminished in the continuing preoccupation with images 
of immortalised beauty  such as Snow White in her glass coffin. The 
remarkable endurance of these fairy-tale images of beauty — Cinderella’s 
glass slipper, the Snow Queen and snow child, along with the Midas myth 
and golden apples of Greek mythology — shows that magical 
transformations retain their allure at  the beginning of the twenty-first 
century. The idea of transfiguring the human and ordinary  into eternally 
sparkling perfection continues to motivate literary production, supporting 
Adorno’s claim for the inescapable “affirmative essence” (Aesthetic Theory 
2) of art which persists even when employed for the negative uses 
identified by Adorno and Zipes, in the reinscription of oppressive social 
values. However, beauty’s potential as a driving force for the disruption of 
such values, and their utopian reimagining, has also been demonstrated.
 In each of the novels examined here, the miraculous transformations 
of human beauty have been presented with ambivalence, always 
questioning the motives, processes and consequences of the quest for 
immortal perfection. In particular, the texts explore the implications of 
conflating the artist and the beautiful work of art in the same character, as 
we have seen most clearly in Possession, The Sea Lady, The Ice Queen and 
Venus as a Boy. As Patricia Waugh has observed, this self-conscious focus 
on artists has arisen with notable prominence in post-1980 fiction, and 
directly  addresses the postmodernist conception of individual identity as a 
discursive construction, exploring the “self-fictionalization” (Metafiction 
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118) that this entails. Therefore, artist  characters in the novels studied here 
convert their own beauty into metaphor, translating it into an artistic form 
that functions separately  from them. But this extreme self-detachment can 
be overwhelming to the point of destruction, as in The Ice Queen and Venus 
as a Boy; it can also be liberating, as Maud in Possession, Ailsa in The Sea 
Lady, Sue and Maud in Fingersmith all employ the metaphorical flexibility 
of their beauty  — its capacity  to be transformed — to rewrite their 
identities. Those whose beauty is turned into art through metaphor by 
another character fare less well: in Goblin Fruit, The Girl with Glass Feet 
and The Snow Child beautiful characters find themselves forced into an 
artistic form, a metaphorical refiguration of their beauty, with all the 
violence identified by Adorno in this process which subsumes their human 
individuality.
 In the process of transmutation from flesh to art we see the ancient 
dichotomy of concrete and abstract beauty, and the apparent 
irreconcilability of the two. Since Plato’s Symposium, aesthetic 
philosophers such as Augustine and Kant have reinforced this divide, 
assigning clear moral values to the two types of beauty: abstract beauty is 
pure and good, while the concrete beauty of the flesh is dangerous, sinful, 
corrupted and corrupting. This divide has been shown to endure in 
contemporary  fiction and criticism, though not without challenge. The 
obvious underlying dilemma of sexuality, its enticement and its prohibition, 
has been thoroughly addressed by post-1980 fiction, which operates in a 
context permissive enough to allow full exploration of this theme. In every 
novel analysed here the sublime purity  of a person’s beauty has collided 
with the sexual desire it incites, as well as the beautiful person’s own 
desires. In Goblin Fruit, Fingersmith and The Snow Child in particular the 
impossibility  of preserving the chastity associated with ‘pure’, abstract 
beauty has been portrayed, with only  beauty’s death or the disappearance 
into art offering a way to resist  the flesh (Faina in The Snow Child 
vanishing into the woods, remaining only in pictures). 
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 Adorno’s reconsideration of the divide between abstract and 
concrete beauty, in which he argues that  these two facets of beauty (and of 
the artwork) engage in antagonistic negotiation rather than existing in 
entirely  separate spheres, has been influential to contemporary  discussions 
of beauty. In the wake of Adorno’s destabilisation of the boundary between 
concrete and abstract, contemporary fiction and theory have continued to 
place the flesh and the idea of beauty in dialogue with each other, and even 
to fuse them together. J. M. Bernstein characterises these recent discussions 
of beauty  and art as “Post-aesthetic philosophies of art” (4) because they 
“employ art  in order to challenge truth-only cognition” (ibid.), referring to 
the Kantian categorisation of the aesthetic as non-cognitive and therefore 
incapable of imparting ‘truth’. This promising new ‘post-aesthetic’ 
approach is manifest in the work of Steiner, Kirwan and Donoghue in their 
analyses of contemporary attitudes to beauty and contemporary artworks in 
a historicised context, examining specific instances of beauty  in 
conjunction with earlier aesthetic theories — in a similar manner to this 
thesis — but with a degree of distance that facilitates the deep interrogation 
of these philosophical systems as well as the formulation of alternative 
approaches to beauty. Nonetheless, these contemporary  discussions 
continue to be substantially formed of analysis of previous philosophers, 
most often Kant, rather than offering a genuinely new theory of beauty. 
Still, their new perspective is valuable in working towards a more 
fundamental reconception of beauty.
 Even in contemporary  theory  and criticism, however, human beauty 
remains a peripheral subject. In the work of Scarry, Dutton, Kirwan and 
Steiner it is the beauty  of nature and art that is explored from this new 
perspective, while Donoghue offers little more than the acknowledgement 
that it has been “difficult to go beyond the flesh” (64) in the study  of human 
beauty: he does not attempt to reconcile the physical and ideal aspects of 
human beauty  himself. Marwick’s pragmatic historical examination of 
human beauty presents a useful foray into this field, but the purely 
historical specificity of his approach permits little opportunity for asking 
philosophical questions, or indeed for investigating the connection between 
human beauty and its representation in artworks which this thesis has 
shown to be fundamental to our conception of human beauty itself. 
Similarly, the feminist projects of Butler, Wolf, Bronfen, Grosz, Brand and 
others have been vital in bringing the theorisation of human beauty  to wider 
attention, but have done so within a narrow political agenda from which it 
is difficult to extrapolate. Nonetheless, it  is time to make the attempt, and 
the broader the range of approaches to human beauty, the better.
 The preoccupation with the transformation and rewriting of beauty 
has been shown in this thesis to indicate a distinct trend in post-1980 
fiction, and one which enacts a notable move away from the approaches 
and techniques of fiction regarded as postmodernist. It is only from the 
retrospective position of the twenty-first century that  postmodernism can 
reasonably be viewed as a “periodizing description” (Smyth 9), with of 
course the awareness that this periodisation is not definitive. Features such 
as metafiction, fragmentation and intertextuality that are associated with 
postmodernist fiction are not limited to the late twentieth century. The same 
caution must be exercised in any discussion of contemporary  fiction: by 
nature this is a constantly changing scene and so “a critic of the 
contemporary  lives in the midst of staggering evanescence and blind 
gambles” (Dipple 3). Tew’s assertion, in a similar vein, that academic 
criticism of post-1980 fiction must “reflect a contemporary culture that is 
aware that both the national and the intellectual landscape undergoes 
constant transformation” (2), suggests the necessity  for criticism to be 
flexible, taking account of the constantly changing spectrum of concerns 
within fiction. 
 However, beauty is emerging as a significant subject through which 
the range of contemporary concerns identified by Childs (in both culture 
and fiction) can be explored: “issues of ethnicity  and sexuality, gender and 
the body, history and memory” (275). Further, the texts which engage 
beauty in this manner “seek through the very act of writing to deconstruct 
and reinterpret” (Heilmann and Llewellyn 2) the themes they interrogate. 
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Herein lies the key shift in post-1980 fiction away from postmodernism: its 
agenda is reconstructive, focused on reforming concepts such as beauty 
anew, rather than merely deconstructing them. Many more critical works 
will be required to fully  analyse the role of beauty as a medium for 
interrogating these issues in post-1980 fiction, but meanwhile this thesis 
adds to the growing number of voices speaking of beauty.
 In the novels studied in this work, no reconciliation between 
concrete and abstract beauty is offered as such, although some tentative 
compromises feature in Goblin Fruit, Possession, Fingersmith, Joanna, The 
Ice Queen and Venus as a Boy. The first three novels portray  a female artist 
using metaphor to manipulate her beauty  so as to refigure her own 
appearance and sexuality, satisfying her desires without guilt. The latter 
three texts present an acceptance of death as a way to bridge the gap 
between concrete and abstract. In dying, a transition is made from the 
fleshly  body  to an esoteric essence which parallels the transformation of 
human beauty into art. Further, the threat of annihilation to the individual 
by the imposition of artistic form, articulated by  Adorno, implies an 
intrinsic relation between the two processes. The ubiquitous Snow White 
again provides a perfect example of this: her transition to apparent death is 
simultaneously a transition into art, displayed as she is in a glass coffin. 
 Post-1980 fiction seeks to rewrite the aestheticisation of death, 
locating human beauty precisely in its fleeting mortal nature rather than in 
its unnatural preservation — the butterflies that accompany  Ned’s death in 
The Ice Queen are a metaphor for this. Unstable metaphors for human 
beauty such as water and ice help writers to break down conventional 
paradigms of beauty and their moral attributions, rewriting them into a 
celebration of the changeable human state and revealing “an optimism 
about the possibility of human relationship and human agency which is 
rarely articulated in the ‘classic’ postmodernist texts” (Waugh, Feminine 
Fictions 169). This observation refers to one of Drabble’s novels that 
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precedes The Sea Lady, and offers a prescient characterisation of post-1980 
fiction more generally.
 A key  conclusion drawn from the novels studied here is that the 
concept of self-inscription is central to post-1980 fiction. These texts 
present an exhortation to employ the transformative powers of beauty and 
metaphor to fashion an existence for oneself, before someone else does it 
for you. It would be fascinating to see the directions in which studies 
focused on gender, race, postcoloniality  or socio-political interpretation 
could take this concept, and I have refrained from exploring these angles 
here because they  each deserve a study of their own. This thesis has been 
kept within specific boundaries so as not to lose sight of human beauty 
amid other concerns more appropriate to the fields mentioned above. 
Equally, it has been important to analyse the texts closely in their individual 
workings, following their development of a particular vision of beauty 
rather than imposing an interpretation upon them. 
 What this exploration has revealed is that post-1980 novels are 
profoundly concerned with the paradox of human beauty, its irresistible 
fascination and the danger inherent in pursuing it. The contradictory desires 
that beauty invokes — sensual desire for the exquisite flesh, spiritual desire 
for the abstract perfection — are also unravelled in these novels, which 
attempt to resolve the conflict between abstract and concrete in order to 
construct a version of human beauty  that integrates both aspects. Living 
with beauty, it seems, is not easy, but each novel insists that it is worth the 
trouble. Until now, academic criticism has shown some reluctance in 
engaging with this subject, but the transformation has undeniably  begun. It 
could be the start of something beautiful.
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